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3Abstract
This thesis integrates the epistemology of testimony with work on the epistemology, psychology,
and metaphysics of language. Epistemologists of testimony typically ask what conditions must be
met for an agent to gain testimonial justification or knowledge that p given that p has been asserted,
and  this  assertion  has  been  understood.   Questions  regarding  the  audience's  ability  to  grasp
communicated contents are largely ignored.  This is a mistake.  Work in the philosophy of language
(and related areas) suggests that the determination and recovery of communicated contents is far
from straightforward, and can go wrong in many ways.  This thesis investigates the epistemology of
testimony in light of this work, with a special focus on miscommunication. 
The introduction provides a brief overview of some relevant work on testimony, the philosophy of
language,  and  psychology,  and argues  that  there  is  good reason to  investigate  the  three.   One
obvious problem in this area is that if testimonial knowledge requires knowledge of what is said
then  the  risk  of  miscommunication  will  block testimonial  knowledge.  Chapter  two argues  that
testimonial knowledge does not require knowledge of what is said. The remaining four chapters
discuss problems which do arise from miscommunication.  Chapters three and four focus on the
epistemic uncertainty of communication with context sensitive terms.  Chapter  three argues that
many beliefs formed on the basis of context sensitive testimony are unsafe and insensitive.  Chapter
four argues that speakers often have plausible deniability about the contents of their  assertions.
Chapters five and six explore types of miscommunication which arise as a result of background
mental  states  affecting  our  linguistic  understanding.   Chapter  five  explores  the  social/ethical
consequences  of  this,  arguing  that  certain  groups  are  disproportionately  subject  to  harmful
misinterpretation.  Chapter six argues that testimonial anti-reductionists make the wrong predictions
about a range of cases of cognitive penetration. 
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8Chapter 1: Introduction.
0. Introduction.
The epistemology of testimony is the study of the beliefs we form through being told something.
The study of the epistemology of testimony includes questions such as the following: under what
conditions do we gain knowledge through testimony? Under what conditions are we justified in
accepting testimony? Is  testimony a generative source of knowledge or does it  merely transmit
knowledge? And are our testimonial belief forming practices flawed in any way (for example, by
unfairly disadvantaging certain groups, or by being unreliable)?  The formulation of these questions
often assumes that  the recovery of asserted contents is  relatively unproblematic.   For example,
questions  concerning  testimonial  knowledge  or  justification  might  be  formulated  as  follows:  a
speaker S has said that p, and an audience recognises that the speaker has said that p, what further
conditions (if any) must be in place for the audience to be justified in believing p, or for them to
gain knowledge that p?  Very little attention is paid to the process by which the speaker manages to
say that  p,  or  by which  the  audience  recognises  that  p has  been asserted.   These  process  are
generally taken for granted as reliable.  A brief look at the literature in the philosophy of language
illustrates that this assumption is naïve. This research reveals that audiences often rely extensively
on  contextual  knowledge  to  recover  the  contents  of  an  assertion,  and  that  this  processes  of
interpretation leaves a lot of scope for error.  That is, this research reveals that there are many ways
for communication to go wrong, leading to miscommunication. The aim of this dissertation is to
investigate the epistemology of testimony through the lens of the philosophy of language, and to
explore some of the problems which arise at the intersection of these two areas.  
This introductory chapter will proceed in four sections.  The first section will explore several ways
in  which  testimonial  belief  formation  can  go wrong.   These are  through intentional  deception,
speaker unreliability, miscommunication, or environmental factors. In the second section I will give
a brief overview of some of the most influential theories of testimony - theories which characterise
the recent debate, in order to indicate that the issue of miscommunication (and the processes from
which it arises) has received little attention. In the third section I will discuss a type of argument I
call 'mismatch arguments' which appear in the philosophy of language and seem to suggest that
minor  miscommunications  (or,  the  failure  of  speaker  and  hearer  to  coordinate  on  precise
propositional contents) might actually be a a very common occurrence.  In the final section I will
9outline some recent research from social psychology which seemingly reveals both new sources of
miscommunication, and that speakers and hearers may often over estimate their ability to coordinate
with one another reliably.  
Together the aim of these four sections is to show that there is an important gap in the current
research on the epistemology of testimony, and that this gap might be fruitfully investigated by
looking at the implications of recent work in the philosophy of language for the epistemology of
testimony.  There is a gap because there are three ways in which testimony is regularly rendered
defective, yet current theories are generally formulated with a focus on only two of these defects.
Moreover, this gap seems to arise out of a general lack of focus on the processes underlying our
communicative exchanges.  This raises the suspicion that if there is anything interesting to say
about this third type of defect, and the processes it  arises out of, it is likely to have been missed. It
is  important  to  explore this  type of defect  because it  seems to be a  rather  mundane and often
unnoticed aspect of our communicative practices (this is illustrated by the discussion of mismatch
arguments, and recent research in social psychology).  Yet, as we will see in the following chapters,
it  can render  testimonial  belief  defective in  a  number of  ways.   Such defects  can be fruitfully
investigated by looking at the epistemology of testimony through the philosophy of language, as the
philosophy of language gives us a picture of some of the ways in which communication actually
does go wrong.  I close this introductory chapter with an overview of the chapters of the thesis, and
a little information on how they are connected. 
1. The Ways Testimony Can Go Wrong.
The issue which receives perhaps the most attention in the epistemology of testimony concerns the
conditions  under  which  we gain  testimonial  knowledge,  or  are  justified  in  forming testimonial
beliefs. The dispute primarily concerns how demanding the conditions for testimonial knowledge or
justification actually are.  That is, the debate concerns whether or not (and to what extent) audiences
must have reasons to believe that the testimonial exchange they are involved in has not gone wrong
in some way.  Some theorists think that we have a default right to assume that nothing has gone
wrong (at least in particular ways) (for example, Coady 1992, and Burge 1993).  Others think that
audiences need to posses positive reasons to think that the testimony they are receiving is reliable
(for example, Fricker 1994, 1995).  In order to judge the viability of such positions it is important to
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be clear on the ways in which testimonial belief formation can go wrong. 
1.1. Honest Unreliable Testimony.
The first way for testimony to go wrong is for the speaker to be honest but unreliable.  The simplest
way for this to happen is for the speaker to mistakenly take themselves to know that p when p is in
fact false. In such a situation the speaker might tell an audience member that p, and if the audience
member were to believe the speaker then that audience member would form a false belief.   In
general an unreliable belief former will be an unreliable informant. They will assert on the basis of
false beliefs.  Believing such an informant will often lead to the formation of false beliefs. It has
been argued that  honest  false  testimony can  produce  testimonial  knowledge on occasion.   For
example, Sanford Goldberg (2001) presents the following case: 
'Martha is a very reliable friend of George. George hears Martha talking about a party she
attended last night. Speaking of what she saw there, Martha reports that Jones was wearing a
pink T-shirt at the party. (Context makes it perfectly clear that Martha makes this judgement
on the basis of an observation she made while at the party.) However, George happens to
know that Jones was not at the party in question (George was privy to Jones' last-minute
decision not to attend the party; Jones subsequently spent the entire evening in question with
George).  George also knows that there are several people in town who are often mistaken
for Jones (he is a rather regular-looking fellow).  Still, none of George's doubts on the score
of who Martha saw warrants any doubts in his mind on the score of Martha's sincerity, nor
does George doubt Martha's observation regarding the colour of the T-shirt  worn by the
person  in  question  (whoever  that  person  was).  Consequently  George  accepts  Martha's
testimony in so far as this  testimony includes the informational content that  someone of
other was  wearing  a  bright  pink  T-shirt  at  the  party.  That  is,  having  heard  Martha's
testimony, George comes to believe that someone was wearing a bright pink T-shirt at the
party.' Goldberg (2001), 516. 
As Goldberg notes, Martha's testimony does present as true the proposition that someone or other
was wearing a pink T-shirt.  However, it also presents as true the false proposition that Jones was
wearing a pink T-shirt.  Most audience members not in George's position would have formed the
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false belief that Jones was wearing a pink shirt. Thus, although this was an instance of testimony
which did produce knowledge, it very easily could have produced a false belief.  Thus it still seems
defective.   Moreover,  Martha's  assertion  was  incapable  of  producing  knowledge  regarding  the
primary content of her assertion (that Jones was wearing a pink T-shirt), because that content was
false. Thus, it still seems reasonable to conclude that the vast majority of cases of false (but honest)
testimony are defective and incapable of producing knowledge (certainly concerning the primary
contents of the testimony). 
Far more controversial is the issue of whether or not testimonial knowledge can be gained from
sincere true testimony that  p when the speaker does not know that  p.   It  may seem natural to
conclude that no such knowledge can be gained.  Testimony seems to be a way of passing on
knowledge, not generating new knowledge.  And if a speaker doesn't know that p despite the fact
that  p is  true  then  this  surely must  be  because  the  speaker's  belief  is  unjustified  or  otherwise
unreliable.  If so then their testimony that p will be unsafe.  That is, they would assert that p even if
p were false.  Thus, beliefs based on such testimony will not be reliable.  This seems to be a good
general reason for considering such testimony to be defective.  However, it is once again worth
noting  that  are  cases  where  such testimony can  generate  knowledge.  Cases  are  given by both
Sanford Goldberg (2005) and Jennifer Lackey (1999).  Goldberg's case is as follows: 
'Frank is a writer with a strange habit. Every morning, at precisely 7:30 a.m., he wakes up
and dumps out whatever is left of the pint of milk he purchased the day before, but places
the empty carton back in the fridge until noon. Then, throughout the interval from 7:30 to
noon,  he  always  remains  in  the  kitchen,  as  that  is  where  he writes  every morning like
clockwork. Finally, at exactly noon, he takes the now-empty milk carton out of the fridge
and throws it away – an act which to him symbolizes the end of his day’s writing. Now
Mary is unaware of Frank’s milkdumping practice.  One morning, having spent the prior
evening at Frank’s house with Frank and her son Sonny, she awakens at 7:40 and goes to the
kitchen with Sonny. Upon entering (Frank is already there) she immediately goes to the
fridge for a glass of OJ, and as she reaches for the OJ she casually observes a small carton of
milk. She goes on to tell Sonny (who always has cereal with milk for breakfast) that there is
milk in the fridge. As luck would have it,  there is indeed milk in the carton on this day
(Frank failed to remember that he had bought milk yesterday). When Frank observes Mary’s
testimony, he realizes that he forgot to dump the milk; when Sonny observes her testimony,
he forms the belief that there is milk in the fridge.' Goldberg (2005),  302.
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Goldberg argues that Sally does not know that there is milk in the fridge.  This is because usually
there would not have been milk in the fridge, yet her evidence would have been unaltered, thus she
still would have believed that there was milk in the fridge.  As a result, Sally is lucky that her belief
regarding the milk is true.  That means that she asserted on the basis of a belief which could easily
have been false.  However, the belief that Sonny forms on the basis of Sally's testimony does seem
to qualify as knowledge. This is because in the situations where Sally's testimony was false Frank
would have corrected her, meaning that Sonny would not have formed a false belief.  In this context
Sonny's belief that there is milk in the fridge seems to be reliable, and thus a plausible candidate for
knowledge.  Thus, it seems that the speaker's lack of knowledge does not in principle block the
audience from acquiring testimonial knowledge.  However, this does not seem to raise doubts about
the claim that such testimony is usually defective, as most cases are not like this.  
1.2. Dishonest Testimony.
The first way for testimony to go wrong was for an honest speaker to make an assertion on the basis
of a false or otherwise epistemically defective belief. The second way for testimony to be defective
is for the speaker to be dishonest.  I use the term 'dishonest' rather loosely to denote cases where a
speaker says that p despite not believing that p. This includes cases from clear outright lies to cases
in  which  the  speaker  fails  to  believe  what  they assert,  despite  having no ill  intent  toward  the
audience.  It is not clear that all cases which match this definition are cases of genuine dishonesty in
the strictest sense1.  It should be clear how dishonest testimony is defective.  Usually if a speaker
asserts that p despite their belief that p is false (or their lack of belief that p is true) their assertion
will either be made because  p is false (in which case it will be reliably false), or (perhaps more
commonly) it will be made because the speaker wants the hearer to believe that  p regardless of
whether or not p is true, meaning that the belief the audience forms will be either false or merely
luckily true.  This  gives  us  good reason to avoid dishonest  informants  in  general.   Once again
however it is worth noting that there do seem to be cases in which audiences can gain knowledge
1
 Moreover, there are cases of dishonesty not covered by the characterisation I use here.  For example Jennifer
Saul (2012) asks us to consider a case in which one protagonist, Frieda, has a deadly peanut allergy, and the other
protagonist, George, wants to kill Frieda.  In order to kill Frieda George cooks her a meal using copious amounts of
peanut oil.  Frieda asks George whether or not the dish contains peanuts and George truthfully states 'there are no
peanuts'.  Although his utterance is true the dish does contain peanut oil and it will still kill Frieda.  This seems to be a
case of dishonesty which is not captured by the characterisation given above. 
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from dishonest testimony (at least as characterised here). Jennifer Lackey provides a compelling
example  of  testimonial  knowledge from testimony the  speaker  believes  to  be  false  (this  is,  of
course, also a case of testimonial knowledge from a speaker who does not know the truth of what
she asserts): 
'Suppose that a Catholic elementary school requires that all  teachers  include sections on
evolutionary theory in their science classes and that the teachers conceal their own personal
beliefs regarding this subject-matter. Mrs Smith, a teacher at the school in question, goes to
the library, researches this literature from reliable sources, and on this basis develops a set of
reliable lecture notes from which she will teach the material to her students. Despite this,
however,  Mrs  Smith  is  herself  a  devout  creationist  and  hence  does  not  believe  that
evolutionary theory is true, but she none the less follows the requirement to teach the theory
to  her  students.  Now  assuming  that  evolutionary  theory  is  true,  in  this  case  it  seems
reasonable  to  assume  that  Mrs  Smith’s  students  can  come  to  have  knowledge  via  her
testimony,  despite  the  fact  that  she  fails  condition  (ii)  and  hence  does  not  have  the
knowledge in question herself. That is, it seems that she can give to her students what she
does not have herself. For in spite of Mrs Smith’s failure to believe and therewith to know
the propositions she is reporting to her students about evolution, she is a reliable testifier for
this information, and on the basis of her testimony it seems that the students in question can
come to have knowledge of evolutionary theory.' Lackey (1999), 477.
Once again then it seems that there are cases in which dishonest testimony can yield testimonial
knowledge.  However, once again such cases seem to be the exception rather than the rule.  In the
majority  of  cases  dishonest  testimony will  fail  to  yield  knowledge,  thus  such  testimony is,  in
general, defective. 
1.3. Miscommunication.
As we will soon see the first two defects occupy a central place in contemporary discussions of
testimonial knowledge.  The central debate is often framed in terms of the conditions under which
we are entitled to treat the speaker as an honest and reliable belief former.  However, these two
defects do not exhaust the ways in which testimony can go wrong.  One type of defect which has
been given far less attention is that of miscommunication. Yet miscommunication can be just as
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damaging.  Miscommunication is understood here to occur when the proposition the speaker intends
to communicate and the proposition the hearer interprets the speaker as attempting to communicate
differ.   Of course, it  is unclear just  how much these contents must differ in order for the term
'miscommunication' to really apply.  If the audience recovers a proposition extremely similar to the
proposition intended by the speaker, a proposition such that a world at which it differed in truth
value to the speaker's intended proposition would have to be very different to our own world, then
we may wish  to  avoid  describing  it  as  an  instance  of  miscommunication.   Communication  is
something which can be more or less successful, so it seems that we should treat miscommunication
as a gradable phenomenon. This dissertation will be explore cases from relatively major instances
of miscommunication, through to cases where no miscommunication occurs at all, but where the
mere possibility of miscommunication gives rise to epistemic problems. 
Miscommunication usually has as its source a flaw in the processes by which we understand one
another's testimony.  The lack of emphasis on miscommunication seems to be partly a result of a
more general lack of emphasis on the processes underlying communicative exchanges.   In this
thesis I aim to emphasise the importance of the processes underlying communicative exchanges for
the epistemology of testimony.
Miscommunication can take several forms.  For example, you might mishear someone's testimony,
and thereby form a belief  in a  proposition the speaker never  intended you to come to believe.
Imagine  Samantha  and  Alex  are  talking  about  how  Samantha  is  going  to  travel  to  London.
Samantha says 'I'm getting a cab', but Alex mishears her as saying 'I'm getting a car'.  On the basis
of this Alex forms the belief that Samantha is buying a car and driving to London. This belief would
clearly not constitute knowledge.  It is likely false, and if it were true (for example, if Samantha
were lying to Alex and was in fact intending to buy a car and drive to London) then Alex's belief
would be luckily true. Miscommunication can also happen when the audience doesn't mishear the
speaker, but rather misinterprets them.  For example, one might mistakenly interpret 'I'm going to
the bank' as 'I'm going to the (financial) bank' when the speaker intended 'I'm going to the (river)
bank'.  Or one might misinterpret an utterance of 'every beer is in the bucket' to mean 'every beer
(for the party) is in the bucket', when the speaker intended 'every beer (belonging to the audience
member) is in the bucket'. Once again, in such cases the audience's belief will usually be false or
luckily true2.  In this thesis I will primarily be concerned with cases of misinterpretation, since I am
2 It is not clear that misinterpretations will always produce luckily true beliefs.  Case three in chapter two can be 
modified in such a way that the audience recovers a proposition other than what is said, yet could still plausibly be 
taken to achieve testimonial knowledge.  Additionally, several considerations are given early in chapter three to 
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investigating the epistemology of testimony through the lens of the philosophy of language, and the
focus  in  the  philosophy  of  language  is  generally  on  interpretation.   However,  I  do  consider
mishearings in chapters five and six. 
Perhaps the reason that miscommunication has received so little attention is the fact that the beliefs
formed are not usually beliefs in the propositions that the speaker has attested to.  For example in
the cases above the speaker testified that they were going to take a cab to London, that they were
going to the financial  bank,  and that  all  of the audience's  beer is  in  a bucket.  Yet  none of the
audience's beliefs were in these propositions.  Thus they might be thought not be to be properly
testimonial beliefs. 
While there may be some truth in this there is still good reason to consider miscommunication when
studying the epistemology of testimony.  This is because the beliefs we form via miscommunication
are still beliefs we form whilst attempting to form testimonial beliefs. Moreover, no doubt a few of
the beliefs we hold,  and consider  to  be testimonial,  are  in  fact  beliefs based on some form of
misinterpretation. Additionally, the notion that we may have misheard someone's testimony will
usually act as a defeater to whatever belief we formed on the basis of that testimony.  Leaving the
possibility of miscommunication out of our epistemic theorising about testimony would be like
leaving the  phenomenon of  hallucination  out  of  our  epistemology of  perception.   If  I  were  to
hallucinate a green apple on the table in front of me then there is a sense in which my belief that
there is a green apple in front of me would not really be perceptual.  After all, it is not caused by a
perception of an actual green apple on the table because there is no such object.  Nonetheless, it
would be a mistake to leave the possibility of hallucination out of our epistemology of perception.
It is likewise a mistake to leave the possibility of miscommunication out of our epistemology of
testimony.  
1.4. Epistemically Unsafe Environments. 
I will soon provide a brief overview of the debate over testimonial knowledge/justification in order
to indicate the extent to which discussion has focused on the first two defects rather than the third.
However,  an  overview  of  the  potential  defects  of  testimony  would  be  incomplete  without
mentioning one final  form of  knowledge blocking defect  discussed by Jennifer  Lackey (2003).
indicate that there may be cases of testimonial knowledge arising from testimony where agents fail to share contents.
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Lackey argues that testimonial knowledge can also be blocked by environmental factors.  That is,
there can be cases in which a speaker asserts p on the basis of their knowledge that p and with the
intent to transmit their knowledge that p to the audience, the audience has no reason to doubt the
testimony, and forms a belief in p on the basis of reliable comprehension of the utterance, and yet
still fails to gain testimonial knowledge that p. Lackey provides the following case: 
Marvin is an epistemically impeccable recipient of testimony. Not only does he have the
capacity for being sensitive to defeaters, he is also appropriately and reliably sensitive to
them when accepting the reports of others. One evening while on a road trip, Marvin stops
in a small town to find a hotel for the night and he encounters a large group of people
gathered  for  an  annual  neighbourhood  parade.  Out  of  this  large  crowd,  Marvin  quite
fortuitously focuses on Alfred, the only member of this epistemic community who reliably
shares information with ‘‘outsiders,’’ and asks him where they are. Alfred tells Marvin that
they are in Smithville. Now, it is true that they are in Smithville, Alfred is a reliable testifier
with respect to this information, and Marvin, not knowing that the testimonial habits of the
members of this community are extremely unreliable when ‘‘outsiders’’ are involved, readily
accepts  the  proffered  testimony.  Moreover,  because  he  has  no  reason  for  thinking  that
Smithville differs from his own community in any epistemically relevant way, Marvin does
not believe, or have evidence available to him such that he should believe, that Alfred’s
report is either false or unreliable. Lackey (2003), 714-715.
As Lackey points out this seems to be a case in which Marvin fails to gain testimonial knowledge.
This is because although he received testimony from a reliable informant he very easily could have
received testimony from an unreliable informant, and in such a case he would have formed a false
belief.  Marvin was lucky to have picked the one reliable testifier in Smithville, thus he is lucky that
his belief  is true.   Such environmental problems are also not widely discussed.  However, it  is
unclear that this is really a gap in the current literature, as it seems that communities like  Smithville
are  (hopefully)  rare.   Thus  it  seems likely that  very few of  our  testimonial  beliefs  are  in  fact
defective in this way. 
It is worth noting a similar type of defect which  relates to the problem of miscommunication and
may occur with some degree of regularity (as will be argued in chapter three). Although it seems
that we are rarely lucky to have selected a reliable informant, it does seem that we are sometimes
lucky in our interpretation of an informant's testimony. In some cases (especially cases of context
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sensitivity) there will be multiple similar ways of interpreting a speaker's testimony. In such cases
we  will  usually  settle  on  one  relatively  determinate  interpretation.   Yet,  when  multiple
interpretations are left open the processes which lead us to reach a particular interpretation will not
reliably select the interpretation intended by the speaker (In a similar way to our inability to reliably
select an honest informant in Smithville). Thus, in some cases in which we do interpret the speaker
correctly we will only do so luckily.  In such cases we could easily have misinterpreted the speaker
and formed a belief on the basis of that misinterpretation.  As already discussed such beliefs will
often be unreliable.   Thus,  in  a  similar  way to Marvin,  we would be lucky to receive reliable
testimony. I discuss cases like this at length in chapter three, and explain why knowledge is often
blocked in such cases.
2. The Formulation of Recent Views of Testimonial Knowledge and Justification.
I have outlined four ways in which testimony can be rendered defective, and I have also claimed
that the current debate in the epistemology of testimony places a great deal of emphasis on the first
two  types  of  defect  at  the  expense  of  the  third.   I  do  not  mean  by this  that  the  majority  of
epistemologists of testimony focus on analysing or studying these first two types of defect, although
the notions of trustworthiness and speaker-reliability are certainly studied in their own right (for
recent work on the nature and role of trust see Faulkner (2011), and Hawley (2014)).  Rather, what I
mean is  that  the  most  influential  views  in  the  epistemology of  testimony have generally  been
formulated and argued for with a sensitivity to the first two types of defect rather than the third. In
order to motivate this claim I will provide a brief overview of some of these views.  This is not
intended  to  be  a  comprehensive  overview,  either  with  respect  to  the  views  covered,  or  the
epistemology of testimony in general3.  Rather, the aim is to give a taste for how some of the most
influential views (the views which have really framed subsequent discussion) have generally been
formulated4.  
3 The epistemology of testimony extends far beyond considerations of testimonial justification and knowledge, for 
example, in this overview I leave out the topic of epistemic injustice which is an incredibly important recent topic in the
epistemology of testimony (I do discuss epistemic injustice in chapter five of this thesis however). 
4 It is important to bear in mind that not all the theorists discussed here do ignore the possibility of miscommunication
in their theorising.  For example, Elizabeth Fricker, the primary defender of local-reductionism about testimony, has 
also written on linguistic understanding and the relation audiences must bear to 'what is said' in order to gain 
testimonial knowledge. However, the focus here is on the particularly influential statements of the primary theories 
of testimonial knowledge/justification - the statements which have framed subsequent discussion. These statements 
have tended to be formulated with attention to the first two types of defect and not the third.  
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The primary debate  with  respect  to  both  testimonial  knowledge and testimonial  justification  is
between the reductionists and the anti-reductionists.  Reductionists maintain that in order to gain
testimonial knowledge, or be justified in forming a testimonial belief, one must have reasons to take
the testimony one receives to be reliable.  This is usually fleshed out as having reasons to take the
speaker to be honest and a reliable belief former, at least with respect to the topic of their testimony
(although it  has also been fleshed out in terms of the audience having a sensitivity to signs of
dishonesty (e.g.  Fricker  (1994,  1995))).   This  view is  called  'reductionism'  because  it  sees  the
reasons given by testimony as non-basic.   Testimony doesn't  provide reasons to  believe unless
coupled  with  reasons  concerning  the  reliability  of  the  speaker.   Thus,  testimonial  justification
reduces to these further reasons. Of course, in order for the reduction to be complete these further
reasons must be sufficient for testimonial justification.  Thus, there is room for hybrid views (e.g.
Lackey  (2006))  which  take  these  reasons  to  be  necessary  but  not  sufficient  for  testimonial
justification,  and  thus  don't  fully  reduce  testimonial  justification  to  these  further  reasons.
Reductionism is contrasted with anti-reductionism which holds that testimony that  p provides a
reason to believe that  p unless there are specific reasons to doubt the reliability of the testimony.
Testimony doesn't have to be supplemented with reasons to believe the speaker in order to provide
reasons for belief. This is usually fleshed out in terms of audiences having a default right to assume
that  speakers are  honest  reliable  belief  formers.   It  is  called 'anti-reductionism'  because it  sees
testimony as, in a sense, a basic source of justification.  That is, although perception plays a causal
role  in  bringing about  testimonial  belief  it  does not  play a  justificatory role.  Testimony that  p,
according  to  the  anti-reductionist, provides  reasons  to  believe  without  needing  to  be  further
supplemented with reasons to take the testimony to be reliable5.  
Much of the current interest in testimony (especially the reductionism vs anti-reductionism debate)
started with C.A.J. Coady's influential 'Testimony, A Philosophical Study'.  Coady endorses an anti-
reductionist view of testimony, but presents that view largely in contrast to Hume's reductionist
view (or Coady's interpretation thereof), so it is worth beginning with a brief outline of Hume's
view (as presented by Coady).  Coady's Hume maintains that we are justified in believing testimony
due to our observation of a constant conjunction between certain types of testimony (e.g. testimony
concerning a particular area of knowledge such as astronomy, or testimony from a particular type of
source e.g. an expert) and the world.  That is, we constantly observe testimony to be true, and we
infer the truth of particular instances of testimony from this general observation. We infer from the
5 Chapter six provides further discussion of the different ways of formulating anti-reductionist and reductionist views 
of testimony.  In chapter six I provide an argument against reductionist and anti-reductionist views which hold that 
we have a default right to trust our own understanding. 
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fact that we have been presented testimony that p, and the fact that testimony is generally reliable,
to the truth of p.  The upshot of this is that in order to form a belief in p on the basis of someone's
testimony that p we must have reason to believe that our informant has been honest and reliable in
the past.  
Coady presents several criticisms of Hume's view.  Firstly he argues that Hume's view is either
viciously circular  or  clearly false.   Hume,  according to  Coady,  holds  that  our  justification  for
testimonial belief rests on our experience of testimony usually corresponding to the facts.  However,
as Coady observes, 'experience' can be read as either individual observation or shared experience.  It
is argued that if shared experience is the correct reading then Hume's view is circular.  This is
because our reliance on shared experience is a reliance on the testimony of others.  Thus it cannot
be used to justify our reliance on testimony.  If 'individual observation' is the correct reading then it
appears that Hume is just mistaken.  As Coady points out we are simply in no position to personally
verify that testimony in general is reliable, since we are in no position to test the truth of most of the
things we have learned via testimony.  Of course, Hume maintains that it is really particular types of
testimony, not testimony in general, that we can observe to be reliable.  However, as Coady points
out, it is also unclear what is meant by 'types of testimony'. The candidates Coady considers are
testimony on particular topics and testimony from certain kinds of informants (i.e. experts).  It is
observed that we are in no position to verify the testimony of others on most topics (for example the
geography of east Asia) and so we are in no position to verify that testimony on such topics is
usually reliable.  Similarly, we are in no position to verify that supposed experts on such topics are
really  experts,  for  doing  so  would  require  an  observation  of  a  correlation  between  what  the
supposed experts have to say about the topic, and the facts about the topic.  It would require that we
too be first hand experts on the topic.  Thus Coady concludes that Hume's reductionist view is
fatally flawed. 
It is unclear whether Coady's criticism of Hume on this point is entirely fair.  Paul Faulkner (1998)
suggests that the conjunctions we observe between testimony and the truth are taken by Hume to
support a generalisation about human nature - that humans have a propensity toward truthfulness,
and that our observation of conjunctions between testimony and the truth is what lays behind a
reliance on the uniformity of human nature.  This  reading fits  well  with the context  of  Hume's
discussion of testimony.  Hume's view is developed in his discussion of miracles.  Hume observes
that any miracle would, by its very nature, have to be a violation of the uniformity of nature caused
by a supernatural being. However, according to Faulkner's reading of Hume, our basis for believing
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testimony rests on an assumption of the uniformity of human nature.  Thus, any testimony reporting
a miracle would undermine its own support (since the uniformity of human nature is just part of the
general uniformity of nature).  This is not the place to take a stand on Hume scholarship.  It suffices
for our purposes to observe that  on either reading of Hume there is a focus on honesty and speaker
reliability.  The questions concern whether or not people in general are honest and generally speak
the truth.  There is no concern here for the general reliability of our recovery of testimony, and thus
our  ability  to  reliably  form  testimonial  beliefs.   Indeed,  this  seems  to  be  built  into  the  very
formulation of the problem.  Coady's  Hume is concerned with the reliability of testimony as a
source rather than the reliability of our testimonial belief forming practices in general.  The two can
come apart.  For example, if speakers usually form beliefs reliably and speak with honesty then they
will usually only testify that p if p is true. Thus, testimony will be a reliable source. However, if we
are  incredibly bad at  understanding each-other,  and very often  attribute  false  interpretations  to
speakers,  then  our  testimonial  belief  forming  practices  may be  unreliable  despite  the  fact  that
testimony itself is a reliable source6.  
It is worth mentioning a second objection Coady raises with respect to Hume's project.  Coady later
expands upon this argument in his attempt to vindicate testimony as a source of knowledge.  It is
also perhaps the closest we get to an argument which places emphasis on the processes underlying
communication, since this argument aims to establish that Hume's view is in tension with the very
possibility of  a  shared language by which we are able  to  communicate.   According to  Coady,
Hume's project  presupposes the possibility that  testimony could be completely unreliable  -  that
there might be no correlation whatsoever between the testimony and the truth.  The idea here is that
since Coady's Hume thinks that the only reason we have for accepting testimony is the observation
of true past testimony it must have been possible that we observe the opposite - a complete lack of
connection between testimony and the truth.  Coady argues that this is not possible, for the practices
of testifying and acting on testimony simply wouldn't make sense in a community where this is the
case.  It would be impossible to discover such a community because we would never have reason to
attribute to them the act of testifying, nor would it make sense to attribute meanings to their reports
which consistently render those reports false.  It is important to note that this point does not rest on
6 This of course partly turns on when one is counted as having testified that p.  It might be thought that if one is 
interpreted as having testified that p (and perhaps some other conditions are met) then one has testified that p.  
Views of 'what is said' along these lines exist in the philosophy of language under the heading of 'content relativism'.
On such views 'what is said' is somehow audience dependent.  Such views can (but needn't) be spelled out in such a 
way that a speaker says that p to an audience if the audience interprets them as saying p (other conditions can be 
added to constrain which interpretations determine what is said).  However, it would be a big departure from 
orthodoxy to interpret Coady's Hume, and those who have bee influenced by Coady, to attribute to them the view 
that the facts regarding whether or not a speaker has testified that p very relative to an audience member. 
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the more controversial claim that such a community would be impossible (although Coady does
later provide some arguments in support of such a claim).  Rather, the idea is that even if there were
such a community we would never be in a position to discover that their communicative practices
were disconnected to the truth in this way.  The point is purely epistemic. 
On Coady's positive view testimony is treated as a direct and fundamental source of knowledge, and
the reliability of testimony as a source is vindicated via an argument which builds upon his second
objection  to  Hume.  On the  topic  of  directness  Coady considers  the  claim that  our  testimonial
knowledge must be based on (or mediated by) assessments of the reliability of the speaker.  This
seems intuitive, for we should surely avoid consuming the testimony of unreliable informants, and
surely the only way to do this is by assessing the reliability of other interlocutors. Coady rejects this
hypothesis for two reasons.  Firstly it appears to get the phenomenology of our actual testimonial
belief  forming practices  wrong.   The fact  is  that  we usually do seem to just  accept  testimony
without much critical consideration. For example, Coady describes the experience of ringing the
telephone company in order to inquire about a bill.  Generally you will just accept the word of the
anonymous voice on the other end of the line without thinking twice.  No consideration of the
reliability of this individual takes place7.  Secondly, we are often not in a position to assess the
reliability of our informants.  For example, it might not be clear what considerations we could bring
to  mind in  order  to  gain  knowledge about  the  reliability  of  our  telephone company informant
(although  see  footnote  five  below).   If  our  justification  for  forming  testimonial  beliefs  is  not
mediated by such considerations though it must be direct.  On the topic of fundamentality one might
worry that since perception seems essential for the acquisition of testimonial knowledge it is more
fundamental.  Moreover,  it  seems  that  perceptual  (or  otherwise  non-testimonial)  knowledge  (or
belief)  must be present at  the start  of a  chain of testimony.   Coady rejects  the hypothesis  that
perception  is  more  fundamental  than  testimony.   He draws an analogy between testimony and
inference: we would not consider inference to be any less fundamental than perception, yet it seems
that we need perception to provide the premises for many of our inferences. Moreover, Coady also
points out that our perception seems to be affected by our memories and testimonial beliefs.  That
is,  our  perception  is  theory  laden  (or  cognitively  penetrated).  Thus,  since  testimonial  beliefs
contribute to and shape the content of our perceptual experiences, these experiences should not be
thought  of  as  more  fundamental.   Putting  Coady's  comments  on fundamentality and directness
7 Although it does seem that consideration of the likely reliability of the source is in the background here, for you 
rang the phone company rather than the plumber to inquire about your phone bill knowing that they would likely be 
far more reliable informants with respect to this question.  Moreover, if asked to justify one's trust in the anonymous 
voice on the end of the line most people could easily list a few reasons.  For example, why would the individual lie? 
It is illegal for them to lie about your bill, and many of the calls are recorded, etc.   
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together  it  seems that  testimony provides  a  direct  and fundamental  justification,  in  no need of
justificatory mediation from inference or perception. 
These comments on the structure of testimonial justification don't vindicate testimony as a source of
knowledge however, and it is an important part of Coady's project to do so.  With this in mind
Coady expands on his criticism of Hume in an attempt to establish the reliability of testimony (it is
not entirely clear how Coady's arguments for the reliability of testimony connect up to the actual
justification and justificatory structure of testimonial belief). As noted earlier, Coady complains that
Hume's view seemingly requires that it be possible for us to discover that testimony is completely
unconnected to the truth.  Coady rejected this view on the basis of the fact that we could not come
to discover that a community's practices of testifying were completely unconnected to the truth.
Coady expands on this  line,  drawing on Davidson (1973),  and claims that in order to interpret
another agent we must assume a broad background agreement, essentially as a starting point from
which to make sense of the rest of their behaviour. This fact alone does not tell us much since
agreement does not entail truth.  However, drawing on Davidson, Coady evokes the notion of an
(almost) omniscient interpreter. Such an interpreter would also have to assume a broad agreement in
background belief as a stating point to interpretation.  However, if all the omniscient interpreter's
background beliefs are true then a broad agreement in background beliefs amounts to broadly true
background  beliefs  for  the  individual  being  interpreted.  The  possibility  of  such  an  interpreter
thereby appears to ensure at  least some basic level of reliability.  Of course this is reliability in
background beliefs, not necessarily in the beliefs explicitly assented to.  And, as Coady notes, the
reliability garnered here is minimal, there is still room for a lot of error and unreliability. Thus, it
seems this story must be supplemented.  Coady takes this basic level of reliability to be buttressed
by the over all coherence and cohesion of the majority of the information we receive via testimony.
He expounds this as follows: 
'It  is  not  that  we  somehow  'prove'  from  purely  individual  resources  that  testimony  is
generally reliable  but  that,  beginning with an inevitable  commitment  to  some degree of
reliability,  we  find  this  commitment  strongly  enforced  and  supported  by  the  facts  of
cohesion and coherence' Coady, (1992), 173.
It is not clear to me that the apparent coherence and cohesion with the baseline of truth provided by
the  Davidsonian  considerations  is  enough  to  establish  the  general  reliability  of  testimony.   It
establishes that the beliefs we form by testimony are usually close enough to the truth for us to get
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by,  and  that our testimonial beliefs  do not clash in  obvious ways with our more foundational
beliefs.  Perhaps the truth of the majority of our testimonial beliefs is the best explanation for this
fact.  However, I believe that it is at least theoretically possible that we often form beliefs which
although false are close enough to the truth for us to get by.  I believe that this situation might arise
with at least some degree of regularity from certain types of miscommunication, which I explore in
chapter  three.   That  said,  it  is  also  unclear  whether  the  problems  arising  from  such
miscommunication are enough to raise worries about whether or not coherence can do the work
Coady wants it to do. 
It  is  worth also briefly mentioning Tyler  Burge's  classic  (1993) statement  of  anti-reductionism,
which bears some important similarities to Coady's.  Burge, like Coady, takes testimony to provide
direct justification.  He draws a distinction between two different roles that perception can play in
producing beliefs.  Perception can play either a justificatory role or a merely causal role.  Burge
maintains that perception plays a merely causal role in bringing about testimonial belief.  That is,
perception  allows  us  to  form testimonial  beliefs  by  enabling  the  presentation  of  propositional
contents to audiences.  Our entitlement to form testimonial beliefs can, according to Burge, be made
sense of without any mention of perception.  Burge believes that we have an a priori entitlement to
accept the outputs of sources of truth, and that the very intelligibility of a message provides us with
an a priori entitlement to assume that its source is a source of truth.  This justifies what Burge calls
the 'acceptance principle': 
'A person  is  entitled  to  accept  as  true  something  that  is  presented  as  true  and  that  is
intelligible to him unless there are stronger reasons not to do so.' Burge (1993), 467.
Note that  no inference is  required here,  and the role  of perception is  the mere presentation of
propositional contents as true8.  The justification for the acceptance principle itself is, according to
Burge, purely a priori.  So, like Coady, Burge takes testimony to be a direct and non-inferential
source of knowledge.  Burge places a lot of emphasis on facts about the systems which produce
testimony - whether or not they are sources of truth.  This is usually made sense of in terms of
agents as sources of testimony.  That is, the claim that we are entitled to assume that a system is a
rational  source is  taken to mean that  we are entitled to assume that  the agents  who testify are
rational. 
8 It has been argued by Anne Bezuidenhout (1998) that the processes by which we actually recover asserted contents 
are inferential, meaning that inference plays an ineliminable role in the acquisition of testimonial knowledge.  
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Before moving on to consider objections to the anti-reductionist view it is worth considering a final
form of anti-reductionism - the Assurance view of testimony.  The Assurance view is a development
of anti-reductionism which places an even greater emphasis on the testifier as an honest and reliable
source. It is discussed in greater detail in chapter four, so a few brief remarks will suffice at this
point.  Assurance  theorists,  like  most  anti-reductionists,  object  to  the  notion  that  testimonial
justification is  inferential  - that we infer from generalisations about testimony, or the particular
situation  we are  in,  to  conclusions  about  the likely truth of  what  is  asserted.  To my mind the
strongest consideration offered by the assurance theorists in favour of this conclusion is offered by
Angus Ross (1986).  Ross points out that to form testimonial beliefs by inferring the likely truth of
the testimony from generalisations about testimony one has received in the past one must take a
detached view of the actions of the testifier, fitting them in with a broader pattern of generalisations
about testimony in general (or particular kinds of testimony).  However, to do so would not be to
treat the testimony in the spirit in which it is offered.  Indeed, as Ross points out, it is hard to see
how an asserter could view their own testimony in such a detached way.  
Rather, when we assert we seem to give our word to the audience, or offer an assurance of the truth
of the proposition attested to. In doing so, according to the assurance theorist, we take responsibility
for the audience's testimonial belief.  It is this, for the the assurance theorist, which is the source of
our right to form testimonial beliefs. Instead of inferring from generalisations about testimony as a
source, or even the likely truth of the proposition attested to, we simply accept the speaker's offer of
assurance, and in doing so pass on the responsibility for the truth of that belief to the speaker.  There
is a strong emphasis on the relations of trust between the audience and speaker here - trust in the
speaker to take on responsibility for the content offered as true. However, there is no consideration
of the processes by which contents are actually offered as true, or by which audiences are able to
judge or understand that a particular content has been offered as true. In chapter four it is argued
that  even  the  assurance  theorist,  with  their  strong  emphasis  on  the  interpersonal  aspects  of
testimonial exchanges, can benefit from a consideration of the processes underlying the recovery of
propositional  contents.  This  is  because  the  realistic  possibility  of  miscommunication  allows
speakers to back out of the commitments they undertake when asserting by claiming that they have
been misunderstood. 
This concludes the brief overview of the anti-reductionist  approaches.  I  now turn to Elizabeth
Fricker's objections to the anti-reductionist program, and her local-reductionist alternative.  Fricker
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(1995) frames the question of testimonial knowledge as follows: there are certain conditions which
must obtain for a source of belief (such as perception or testimony) to be functioning properly (call
these  'V-conditions',  or  'veracity  conditions').  The  V-conditions  for  testimony are,  according  to
Fricker, that the speaker is honest, and that what she asserts is true (in later papers Fricker develops
her view in terms of the speaker knowing that what she asserts is true, rather than it simply being
true). These conditions correspond to the first two testimonial defects discussed above (unreliable
belief formation and dishonesty).   So long as these conditions obtain,  Fricker  asks,  what other
conditions (if any) must be met in order for the audience to gain testimonial knowledge?  We could
either side with the reductionist and take it that the audience must have some independent reasons to
hold that the V-conditions obtain, or we could side with the anti-reductionist and conclude that no
such additional reasons are required - as long as these conditions obtain the audience has a right to
form a testimonial belief. Fricker agrees with Coady that Humean global reductionism is a non-
starter.  However, she also objects to the notion that we have a presumptive right to believe p simply
on the basis of the fact that p has been asserted. To form beliefs in such a way would, according to
Fricker, be to exemplify a form of gullibility.  It would amount to uncritical acceptance of whatever
one was told unless one had good reasons for rejection.  
Fricker's alternative is what she calls 'local-reductionism'.  Local-reductionism does not require that
one make inferences from the general reliability of testimony.  Indeed, local-reductionism does not
require that any specific inferences about the reliability of the testimony being offered be made
either.  What local-reductionism does require is that the audience be on the look out for signs of
incompetence with respect to the subject-matter, or untrustworthiness.  Fricker argues that we do
have a right to assume that others are competent and honest with respect to certain subject matters
(for  example,  their  name),  but  in  order  to  avoid  gullibility  we  must  be  sensitive  to  signs  of
dishonesty or incompetence. It is not clear what this monitoring requirement amounts to in practice.
One might not be blamed for thinking that the requirement is that audiences consciously be on the
lookout  for  signs  of  dishonesty.   This  would  be  at  odds  with  Coady's  claim  about  the
phenomenology of testimonial belief formation. However, as Goldberg and Henderson (2006) point
out our sensitivity to signs of dishonesty might be largely subpersonal (Goldberg and Henderson
take such subpersonal monitoring to be consistent with anti-reductiomism. Whether or not such a
view  would  be  properly  described  as  reductionist  or  anti-reductionist  is  unclear,  this  issue  is
discussed futher in Fricker's (2006b) response to Goldberg and Henderson)9. More recently Fricker
9 A similar view to Fricker's is endorsed by Sperber et al (2010), who maintains that a faculty for 'epistemic vigilance' 
toward dishonesty plays an important role in explaining the evolutionary stability of our communicative practices.  
Kourken Michaelian (2010) responds, arguing that work on lie detection in empirical psychology demonstrates that 
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(2006a) has developed her view in a similar way to the assurance theorist,  with a focus on the
speaker  taking  responsibility  for  the  propositions  they  assert.   However,  unlike  the  assurance
theorist  Fricker  still  takes  testimony  to  be  a  form  of  evidence.   The  fact  that  speakers  take
responsibility for what they assert ensures, according to Fricker, that assertions (or a limited subset
of  assertions  called  'tellings')  are  governed  by  the  knowledge  norm  of  assertion.  Thus,  when
audiences are within their rights to assume that the speaker is trustworthy they are in their rights to
assume that  the speaker  knows the truth of what they assert  (not  merely that  it  is  true).   This
development of Fricker's view will be discussed in chapter four. 
Finally, a third approach to testimonial justification is offered by Jennifer Lackey (2006, 2008) who
brings together elements of reductionism and anti-reductionism to advocate a hybrid view.  Lackey
endorses the reductionist's necessary condition on testimonial justification - that in order for the
audience's testimonial belief to be justified they must possess reasons to consider the testimony
reliable.  However, as Lackey notes, the necessary condition alone is not sufficient for a reduction.
Testimonial  justification  is  only  reduced  to  these  positive  reasons  if  the  positive  reasons  are
sufficient for testimonial justification.  Lackey denies that they are sufficient.  She presents the
following case which purports to illustrate that one can have positive reasons to accept testimony
without thereby being justified in doing so: 
'Nested speaker: Fred has known Helen for five years and, during this time, he has acquired
excellent epistemic reasons for believing her to be a highly reliable source of information on
a wide range of topics. For instance, each time she has made a personal or professional
recommendation  to  Fred,  her  assessment  has  proven to  be  accurate;  each  time  she  has
reported an incident to Fred, her version of the story has been independently confirmed;
each time she  has  recounted  historical  information,  all  of  the major  historical  texts  and
figures have fully supported her account, and so on. Yesterday, Helen told Fred that Pauline,
a  close  friend  of  hers,  is  a  highly  trustworthy  person,  especially  when  it  comes  to
information  regarding  wild  birds.  Because  of  this,  Fred  unhesitatingly  believed  Pauline
our ability to monitor others for signs of dishonesty is highly unreliable. 
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earlier today when she told him that albatrosses, not the widely believed condors, have the
largest  wingspan  among  wild  birds.  It  turns  out  that  while  Helen  is  an  epistemically
excellent source of information, she was incorrect on this particular occasion: Pauline is, in
fact,  a  highly incompetent  and insincere  speaker,  especially  on  the  topic  of  wild  birds.
Moreover, though Pauline is correct in her report about albatrosses, she came to hold this
belief merely on the basis of wishful thinking (in order to make her reading of The Rime of
the Ancient Mariner more compelling).' Lackey (2006), 163. 
Lackey  argues  that  despite  the  fact  that  Fred  has  very  good  reasons  for  accepting  Pauline's
testimony his belief was not justified, because Pauline is not in any way a reliable source.  If Lackey
is  correct  then  positive  reasons  for  accepting  testimony  are  not  sufficient  for  testimonial
justification, meaning that reductionism is false10.  Lackey postulates that in order for a testimonial
belief to be justified the speaker's testimony must also be reliable. More precisely, she specifies her
view as follows: 
'Dualism: For every speaker A and hearer B, B justifiedly believes that p on the basis of A's
testimony that p only if: (1) B believes that p on the basis of the content of A's testimony that
p, (2) A's testimony that p is reliable or otherwise truth conducive, and (3) B has appropriate
positive reasons for accepting A's testimony that p.' Lackey (2006),  170 . 
The first condition here is intended to rule out cases in which one simply infers a truth from some
fact one observes about the testimony.  For example, if someone asserts something in a soprano
voice then you might infer that they have a soprano voice.  You have not thereby gained testimonial
knowledge that they have a soprano voice. The second condition is spelled out in terms of either the
10  As a side point, it is not clear that Lackey is correct about Fred's belief being unjustified.  This seems to be a gettier
case - Fred's belief is justified but luckily true. Lackey considers and rejects this hypothesis, maintaining that the fact
that Pauline is in no way reliable (rather than usually reliable, but unreliable on this occasion) bars this from being
classed as a getter case.  This strikes me as a weak response.  Consider the following modified version of Russell's
stopped clock case: 
Fred is visiting his parents, who have just refurbished their house.  His parents (who are usually
extremely reliable  and  honest)  have decided  to  play a joke on Fred -  they have purchased an incredibly
convincing replica clock which always shows the time 3:30, and placed it in their lounge. Furthermore, they
have told Fred that they have purchased an incredibly accurate new clock and that they have placed it in the
lounge.  Fred doesn't happen to enter the lounge and see the replica clock until exactly 3:30.  When he does
enter the room he sees the replica and forms the true belief that it is 3:30.   
This case seems directly analogous to Lackey's nested speaker case, since the replica clock is in no way a
reliable source with respect to the time. It also seems to be a clear gettier case. Fred has excellent reasons to believe that
the replica clock is in fact a real reliable clock.  Thus, his belief that it is 3:30 seems to be justified.  Moreover, his belief
is true, yet it still fails to constitute knowledge. 
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speaker  being  honest  and  a  reliable  belief  former,  or  the  speaker  being  disposed  to  make  the
assertion she makes only when the content of that assertion is true.  Lackey lists three types of
positive reason the audience might have in order to  satisfy the third condition (other than past
experience with the particular speaker's true testimony on the particular topic of the testimony). The
audience is likely to have reasons for considering certain types of context more reliable, they will
know that  people  are  usually reliable  and honest  with respect  to  certain  topics  (e.g.  their  own
names), and they will know that certain types of informant are reliable with respect to certain topics
(for example accountants are reliable with respect to financial matters). Once again the focus here
on the reliability of informants (in terms of both honesty and expertise),  not the communicative
process itself.  
I  have  outlined  a  selection  of  views  concerning  testimonial  knowledge  and  justification,  and
emphasised the fact that these views are usually formulated with a sensitivity to the first two forms
of testimonial defect, and not the third. In Coady we saw a deep concern for our ability to gain
inferential knowledge concerning the truthfulness of much of the testimony we receive (which is, of
course, an extremely important topic in its own right), but no consideration of our right to assume
that we reliably recover the correct contents.  With the assurance theorist (and Fricker's later work)
we saw an emphasis  on the commitments  a  speaker  undertakes  when making an assertion (an
element  of  honest  testimony),  and  the  role  these  commitments  play  in  entitling  us  to  form
testimonial beliefs. In Fricker we saw an emphasis on monitoring for signs of untrustworthiness and
incompetence with respect to the topic of the testimony, and in Lackey we find a discussion of the
types of factors we are sensitive to with respect to the honesty and truth conduciveness of the
testimony we receive.   However,  there is  no mention  of  monitoring for  miscommunication,  or
sensitivity to signs thereof.  Indeed, we even saw that the very formulation of these views in terms
of the reliability of testimony, rather than the reliability of our testimonial belief forming practices,
lent itself to such a lack of focus on the processes by which we actually recover the contents of
testimony. 
This doesn't necessarily amount to a deep flaw in the debate.  Many of these views can no doubt be
reformulated to make explicit their assumptions about the extent to which speakers and hearers
reliably communicate, or the extent to which communication must be reliable in order for audiences
to gain testimonial knowledge.  For example, the local reductionist or hybrid theorist might require
that we not only be sensitive to signs of dishonesty or incompetence, but that we must also be
sensitive  to  signs  of  miscommunication.  Likewise,  the  anti-reductionist  might  consider
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miscommunication to be a defeater which blocks testimonial knowledge. It might even be thought
that if miscommunication occurs then the audience's belief  is not properly testimonial (since in
cases of miscommunication the proposition recovered is not the proposition the speaker attested to).
Moreover,  this  lack  of  attention  is  not  especially  worrying  if  there  is  little  to  be  said  about
miscommunication,  if  miscommunication  is  rare,  or  if  we  reliably  identify  instances  of
miscommunication  and  avoid  forming  beliefs  when  miscommunication  has  occurred.   In  the
remainder  of  this  introductory  section  I  will  turn  to  the  philosophy  of  language  and  social
psychology to illustrate that communication is not always as smooth as we might hope.  The aim
primarily being to establish that miscommunication is a relatively frequent occurrence, but also to
indicate the sorts of factors it arises out of, and the fact that it may often go unnoticed.  In the
remainder  of the thesis  I  explore several different issues which arise from consideration of the
processes  underlying  our  communicative  exchanges,  particularly  with  respect  to
miscommunication. 
3. Context Sensitivity and Mismatch.
So far I have described four ways in which testimony can be defective, and I have given a brief
overview of some of the most influential views of testimonial knowledge and justification in order
to illustrate that they are generally formulated with a sensitivity to the trustworthiness and reliability
of  the  speaker,  rather  than  the reliability of  the  processes  by which  we recover  communicated
contents.   I  also  noted  that  miscommunication  (which  I  characterised  as  arising  whenever  the
proposition the speaker intends and the proposition the audience recovers differ) often seems to
block  testimonial  knowledge.   This  would  not  be  of  interest  if  miscommunication  were  an
uncommon phenomenon.   However,  work in  the philosophy of language seems to suggest that
miscommunication  (at  least  fairly  minor  instances  thereof)  might  be  very  common.   This  is
illustrated in a series of arguments concerning our ability to successfully communicate with context
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sensitive terms.  
Intuitively,  communicative  success  occurs  only  when  the  proposition  the  speaker  intends  to
communicate is identical to the proposition the hearer recovers.  A number of theorists have been
led to reject this condition on communicative success on the basis of what I will call 'mismatch
arguments'.  These  arguments  have  lead  some  philosophers  to  conclude  that  recovery  of  the
speaker's intended meaning is not required for communicative success (Sperber and Wilson (1986),
Bezuidenhout (1997), Heck (2002), Recanati (2004), and Carston (2002)), and others, in an attempt
to maintain the hypothesis that communicative success requires recovery of the speaker's intended
meaning, to reject the view that propositions are the objects of speaker meaning in the first place
(Buchanan (2010))11.   There are  two versions  of  the  mismatch  argument.   The  first  draws our
attention to  the seemingly miraculous  nature  of  recovery of  the speaker's  intended meaning in
instances of context sensitivity.  The second draws our attention to cases where it is unlikely that the
speaker and hearer are even able to entertain the same propositions.  I will return to the arguments
and  views  presented  in  this  section  repeatedly  throughout  the  thesis,  so  to  avoid  unnecessary
repetition I will keep this overview relatively short12.  
The first version of the mismatch argument has its roots in the debate over definite descriptions,
going back to Wettstein's (1981) argument against the Russellean theory of definite descriptions.
Wettstein noted that in most cases in which we attributively use a definite description, the explicitly
articulated description is not sufficient to identify a unique referent.  Consider the sentence 'the
book is red' - there are many books in the world, indeed there are many red books, thus the sentence
alone is not sufficient to identify the unique red book intended.  It must seemingly be supplemented
in order to uniquely designate a particular book.  However, there will be many ways in which it can
be supplemented in order to uniquely designate a particular book. Wettstein asks us how Russell's
theory of  descriptions  can  deliver  the  result  that  an  utterance  of  such an  'incomplete'  definite
description  can  possibly  be  determinate,  and  he  offers  us  an  alternative  theory  of  definite
descriptions on which the content is determinate.  However, it has since been observed that similar
problems arise for a large number of context sensitive terms.  For example, Schiffer (1992) notes
11 In this dissertation I am not concerned with the conditions of communicative success.  Indeed, I am not convinced
that much can be gained from studying communicative success since I think it is an extremely vague target of inquiry.
Success is always success at some task - at something with a particular aim.  However, it is not clear that we have a
single aim when we communicate, or that 'communication' picks out a single clear task.  Speakers, hearers, and the
interlocutors as a group may all have multiple separate aims in typical instances of communication.  This is one reason
for focusing on testimonial knowledge rather than communicative success - it provides a far clearer target for inquiry. 
12 For example, chapter three contains a discussion of Buchanan's recent argument that propositions are not the objects 
of speaker meaning, and chapters four and five discuss relevance theory.  For this reason I do not go into much 
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that it arises for belief reports, and Buchanan (2012) notes that it arises for quantifiers and non-
sentential assertions (those are the examples he discusses in detail, however he also maintains that
such problems arises for most context sensitive terms). 
The general problem is that in many cases in which a context sensitive term is used there will be
many very similar semantic values which can be assigned to that term, each determining a different
proposition.  In the case of definite descriptions the sentence in need of supplementation may be 'the
book is red', and two of the competing candidates might be 'the book in this room' or 'the book I
wish you to read'.  In the case of quantifiers the sentence could be 'every beer is in the bucket', and
the competing values could be 'every beer we brought this afternoon is in the bucket' or 'every beer
we purchased from the corner shop is in the bucket'.  It will often be impossible to tell, without
further investigation, which precise proposition the speaker intended to communicate in any one of
these  cases.   The  evidence  provided  by the  speaker's  utterance  and  the  context  will  rarely be
sufficient to grant the audience knowledge that the speaker intended one of these propositions rather
than the other.  Moreover, this will be the case for any use of a context sensitive term where there
are very similar contextual values competing to be assigned - especially in cases where the values
are complex and fine grained.  In the cases of quantifiers and descriptions the relevant contextual
values  were  properties.   However,  values  such  as  comparison  classes,  standards  of  taste,  and
ordering relations on worlds will  generate similar problems.  Thus it  seems inevitable that this
phenomena arises for a very large number of utterances. 
Indeed, according to some views (e.g. Sperber and Wilson (1986), Carston (2002), and Recanati
(2004)), recovery of what is said always involves pragmatic processing.  On such views we employ
pragmatic processing to select the most contextually appropriate concept to assign to a term even
when that term is not standardly thought to be context sensitive.  Competing concepts are weighed
against each other and the concept with the highest level of activation, or the optimally relevant
concept (where relevance is a measure of relevant 'cognitive effects') is selected and assigned13.   If
such views are correct then there will be the same epistemic uncertainty in almost all cases of verbal
communication, since the concepts assigned by the hearer and speaker could always be very similar
but distinct. Such theorists usually adopt the view that communicative success requires only that the
hearer recover a proposition similar to that intended by the speaker. 
The  second  type  of  mismatch  argument  arises  only  for  Fregean  views  of  de  re  utterances.
According to such views, in order to understand certain de re utterances one must come to entertain
13 Chapters four and five contain more complete outlines of these views. 
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a proposition containing a mode of presentation.  However, the way the speaker and hearer conceive
of the object of the utterance is likely to differ, since they occupy different perspectives, and have
different knowledge of the object.  Thus, the proposition the audience recovers will almost always
contain a mode of presentation other than the one the speaker intended.  This argument has been
pressed by Bezuidenhout (1997) and Heck (2002). Heck, concerned with demonstratives, puts the
first point as follows: 
'..utterances of demonstrative expressions can differ, in ways relevant to understanding and 
communication, even when they do not differ in their referential properties: the successful 
communication of information from one speaker to another depends not only upon speakers' 
identifying the right objects as the demonstrata, but also upon their thinking of these objects 
in the right sorts of ways, although it does not depend upon their thinking of the objects in 
any particular ways.' Heck (2002), 25. 
Heck asks us to imagine the following case: we are in a long room with two windows at either end
of the same wall.  Out of one window we can see the bow of a ship, out of the other we can see the
stern.  As it happens they are the stern and bow of the same gigantic ship, but we do not know this.
I gesture toward the window through which we can see the stern of the ship and say "That ship is an
aircraft carrier".  In order for you to understand my utterance it is not sufficient that you come to
entertain the singular proposition attributing the property of being an aircraft carrier to the indicated
ship.  That is because if you  had mistakenly taken me to be gesturing toward the window through
which  we  can  see  the  bow  of  the  ship,  you  would  have  come  to  believe  the  same  singular
proposition.  Yet in this case you would have misunderstood me, since neither of us know that the
ships we can see out of either window are identical.  Thus, you can only understand my utterance by
entertaining a proposition containing some mode of presentation of the ship.  However, it is not
clear that we must grasp a proposition containing precisely the same mode of presentation as that
intended by the speaker.  Indeed, since we both occupy different perspectives it is unlikely we will
be in a position (at the time of utterance) to entertain precisely the same mode of presentation.
Sperber and Wilson (1986) make a similar point: 
'..two people may be able to think of the same man that he has gone, without being able to 
think exactly the same thought, because they might not individuate him in exactly the same 
way.  Similarly, by saying 'He has gone' I may induce in you a thought which is similar to 
mine in that it predicates the same thing (that he is gone) of the same individual, but which 
differs from mine in the way you fix the reference  of 'He'.  It seems to us neither 
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paradoxical nor counterintuitive to say that there are thoughts which we cannot exactly 
share, and that communication can be successful without resulting in the exact duplication 
of thoughts in communicator and audience.  We see communication as a matter of enlarging 
mutual cognitive environments, not of duplicating thoughts.' Sperber and Wilson (1986)  
192-193. 
Heck points to the indexical 'I' as a clear case where the speaker and hearer cannot possibly share
the same mode of presentation: 
'The problem is most dramatic in the case of 'I'. The belief that someone expresses when she 
says "I am a philosopher" is the self-conscious belief that she herself is a philosopher. But 
the belief I form, if I accept what she says as true, is not the self-conscious belief that she is 
a philosopher: I cannot so much as entertain that belief. Her self-conscious belief that she is 
a philosopher, though it involves a thought to which I can refer, one I might well know her 
to believe, is in that sense private to her.' Heck (2002),  20-21.
If these theorists are correct then in some cases it will be impossible for speaker and hearer to share
the same proposition because they will possess different modes of presentation of the object of that
proposition.  The two forms of mismatch argument taken together suggest that miscommunication
(at least, a minor form thereof where similar but non-identical contents are entertained) may be a
very common occurrence. It might be thought that the type of miscommunication discussed here is
benign enough to be easily ignored. After all, it is still taken by many philosophers of language to
be compatible with communicative success.  Indeed, I believe that such miscommunication is often
benign.  However, as I will argue in the main body of the thesis, I think it can also lead to several
interesting  epistemic  problems.  Before outlining  these problems though I  will  briefly outline  a
recent series of psychological studies which also seem to reveal that miscommunication may be a
more common occurrence than we usually assume.  These studies further corroborate the claim that
miscommunication is a relatively common occurrence, which often goes unnoticed, and they are
referred back to at various points in the thesis.
4. Egocentric Processing in Utterance Interpretation.
Recent experimental  research has suggested that the application of theory of mind in utterance
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interpretation  is  not  always  immediate  and  automatic,  and  that  adults  initially  interpret
egocentrically  (appealing  to  their  own  private  knowledge  rather  than  focusing  specifically  on
common ground  information)  before  correcting  this  egocentric  interpretation  by application  of
theory of mind.  However, it has also been suggested that this second stage of processing in which
theory of mind is applied is not perfectly reliable, and can be blocked by a number of factors.  This
leads  to  an  'egocentric  bias'  whereby audiences  settle  on  their  initial  egocentric  interpretation,
failing to apply theory of mind to check that their initial interpretation is correct.  A consequence of
this is that in the circumstances in which the second stage of processing is blocked or otherwise
interfered with the audience will not be sensitive to whether or not they have interpreted the speaker
correctly, meaning that even when they do interpret correctly they would have settled on the same
interpretation even if it were not correct (that is, their correct interpretation is rendered unsafe).  
Worryingly, the factors which block this second stage of processing are not the sorts of factors we
would usually take to affect whether or not we have testimonial knowledge.  For example, it has
been shown that we commit far more egocentric errors when interpreting close friends and relatives
than when interpreting strangers, and we commit far more egocentric errors when in a happy mood
than when we are sad. 
This two stage approach to interpretation (known as the 'Egocentric Anchoring Approach'), and the
phenomenon of of egocentric bias, is motivated by a series of studies carried out in particular by
Boaz Keysar (with a number of collaborators).  It has been believed for a long time that young
children fail to properly take the knowledge of others into account when predicting their actions.
For example, if they are given a piece of information which is not available to another agent they
will predict the agent's actions as if the agent  possessed the child's private piece of knowledge (see
Wimmer and Perner (1983), and Olson and Torrance (1987), Wellman et  al  (2001) provides an
overview and meta-analysis).   It was suggested by Keysar (1994) that this egocentric cognition
actually continues into adulthood, not being straightforwardly replaced by theory of mind14.  
In  order  to  indicate  that  egocentric  processing  continues  into  adulthood  Keysar  presented  two
groups of adult participants with the following case - Jane has told David that a particular restaurant
is good. David then visits the restaurant.  In one version of the case David likes the restaurant, and
in the other he hates it.  In both cases he leaves a note to Jane saying 'I went to the restaurant - it
14 For evidence that young children are able to pass non-verbal versions of the false belief task see Onishi and 
Baillaregon (2005), He et al (2012), and Scott and Baillaregon (2013).  It is not clear yet what consequences these 
results have for the egocentricity hypothesis. 
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was marvellous, just marvellous'.  In one case he is sincere, in the other sarcastic.  In each case
participants were asked whether Jane would sense sarcasm in the note.  Surprisingly, people were
far more likely to say Jane would sense sarcasm when they knew that David was being sarcastic.  If
the participants took Jane's perspective into account however there should have been no difference
in judgements about the cases.  This suggests that egocentric processing is present in adults as well
as  children  (further  evidence  of  egocentric  bias  is  found  in  Ross,  Greene,  &  House  (1977),
Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg (1989), Alicke (1993), Gilovich,  Medvec, & Savitsky (2000),
and Epley, Savitsky, & Gilovich  (2001)).   
A series of experiments were then conducted to determine the effect of this egocentric processing
on our language processing.  On the speaker side of things Horton and Keysar (1996) found that
when  constructing  utterances  without  time  constraints  speakers  took audience  information  into
consideration, but regularly relied on private information unavailable to the audience when under a
time constraint.   This  suggests  that  in  utterance  planning speakers  initially plan  egocentrically,
drawing on private  information,  and then adjust  that  plan sequentially to  take into account  the
audience's information.  
More importantly for our interests similar results were obtained when looking at  the audience's
processing of utterances.  Two relevant studies were carried out.  In the first (Keysar, Barr, Balin
and Paek (1998)) participants were given two sentences describing simple events involving male or
female actors. One sentence gave shared information, the other was private.  The genders of the
actors were sometimes the same and sometimes different.  In each case the participants are asked
something about the actor in the shared case.  Responses took longer, and there were more errors,
when the pronoun used in the question corresponded to the gender of the agent in the private case
(that is, in cases where the gender of the actor in the private case was identical to that of the actor in
the shared case).  This was taken to show that egocentric interpretation interfered with interpretation
and required a perspective adjustment.  The thought being that the responses took longer because
when assigning a referent to 'he' or 'she' the participants had two candidates to choose between, one
from the private case and one from the shared case.  If we initially only appeal to common ground
information then the only available candidate would be the individual from the shared case and
there would be no interference.  
In a second study (Keysar, Barr, Balin, and Brauner (1996)) two participants were placed on the
opposite sides of an array of objects on a series of shelves.  One of these participants (a confederate)
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was to direct the other  participant  to move objects to  different  locations on the shelf  (call  this
second participant the instructee).  However, some of the objects were hidden from the confederate.
This fact was known by the instructee.  The instructee's eye movements were tracked in order to
determined which object he or she looked at first when given a particular command.  It was found
that when the confederate's description of an object fitted an object visible only to the instructee
better than one mutually available the instructee reliably directed their gaze toward the privately
available object, sometimes even causing them to reach for it, before correcting themselves and
reaching for the intended object (call this experiment the 'reference task').  This too suggests that
audiences  initially  and  automatically  interpret  egocentrically,  applying  theory  of  mind  later  to
correct  errors  in  interpretation.  Epley,  Morewedge,  and  Keysar  (2004)  replicated  these  results
performing the test on children and adults.  They found that children and adults were just as likely
to initially focus their attention on the hidden objects, but that adults were far more likely to correct
themselves and select the public object meeting the description.  
These findings alone are not problematic.  However, as I explained at the beginning of this section,
further  studies  have shown that  the application of theory of  mind in utterance interpretation is
sometimes blocked by a number of factors such as mood and relationship with the speaker.  For
example Savitsky, Keysar, Epley, Carter, and Swanson (2010) found that egocentric processing is
more prevalent when communicating with people we know well than it is when communicating
with strangers (similar findings have been presented by Van Boven, Kruger, Savitsky & Gilovich
(2000), and Vorauer & Cameron (2002)).  They constructed a version of the reference task were
some participants were paired up with friends, and others were paired up with strangers.  It was
found that audiences committed a far greater number of errors (for example moving the hidden
object rather than the public object) when paired with a friend than when paired with a stranger.
Participants were also slower to adjust their initial egocentric interpretation under these conditions.
Another experiment was then carried out in which participants were paired up with strangers or
friends  and  asked  to  communicate  ambiguous  messages.  The  speakers  were  given  several
ambiguous phrases with their meanings, and one meaning highlighted for each.  They were asked to
utter the phrase and try to convey the highlighted meaning. The speakers were then asked to judge
whether the audience understood them or not.  It was found that audiences who knew the speaker
were  only  marginally  more  reliable  interpreters  than  those  paired  with  strangers.   However,
speakers judged themselves to be far more reliable communicators when paired with friends than
when  paired  with  strangers,  significantly  overestimating  their  effectiveness  as  communicators.
These  two  studies  are  taken  to  show  that  we  relax  our  application  of  theory  of  mind  when
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communicating with friends and relatives.  
It has also been suggested that egocentric processing is more prevalent when we are happy than
when we are sad.  Converse, Lin, Keysar, and Epley (2008) repeated the reference task with happy,
sad, and neutral participants.  It was found that sad participants were marginally more reliable than
neutral participants, but happy participants were significantly less reliable than neutral participants,
both committing more errors and taking longer to adjust their initial egocentric attention on the
hidden object.  Reliability at the reference task has also been shown to be sensitive to working
memory, suggesting both that we are more egocentric when under a heavy cognitive load, and that
theory of mind application can be an effortful process (Lin, Keysar, and Epley (2010)).
This  suggests  that  there  is  a  range  of  circumstances  in  which  our  processing  is  prone  to
egocentricity, and the application of theory of mind to adjust our initial egocentric interpretation can
be  blocked.   Even  more  worrying  is  that  the  circumstances  under  which  this  occurs  are
circumstances  we  would  not  normally  take  to  be  detrimental  to  our  acquisition  of  testimonial
knowledge.  They include circumstances in which we are happy, those in which we are interacting
with friends, and those in which our working memory is negatively effected15.  The consequence of
this is that we are more prone to egocentric biases under these conditions.  Thus, we are less reliable
at coming to know what we have been told in such circumstances (even if we are no less reliable at
recovering  the  intended  content  in  such  cases).   This  is  because  when  our  initial  egocentric
interpretation gets things right (as it often will) it will often be the case that we would have retained
that interpretation even were we to have been mistaken.  
Of course,  in cases like the reference task where we are interacting with the local macro level
environment mistakes will quickly be corrected by the speaker.  As a result audience's beliefs about
the  speaker's  intentions  will  arguably  still  be  safe  and  sensitive.   Had  the  speaker  intended
something else then the audience would not  have retained their  initial  egocentric  interpretation
because they would have been corrected (this  has a similar  structure to  the cases presented by
15  This final condition may seem less worrying than the others, because it seems fairly reasonable to claim that we are 
less reliable communicators when under a heavy cognitive burden.  However, our working memory can be effected by a
range of factors which we would not normally take to be detrimental to our ability as communicators.  For example, a 
series of studies carried out by Jennifer Richeson has found that executive function is negatively effected by our 
adjusting for implicit racial biases  (Richeson & Shelton (2007); Richeson, Trawalter, & Shelton (2005); Richeson & 
Shelton (2003); Trawalter & Richeson (2006); Trawalter & Richeson (2008); Trawalter, Richeson, & Shelton (2009)).  
If this is correct then agents adjusting for implicit racial bias are likely also to suffer from egocentric bias in 
interpretation, and thus have diminished knowledge of speaker intentions.  See Tamar Szabó Gendler (2011) for a 
discussion of the epistemic import of these findings  in which she suggests that there just are real epistemic costs to 
adjusting for implicit racial bias. 
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Goldberg (2005), discussed in section 1.1).  However, this will not be the case for more fine grained
contextual  values  such as  those  mentioned  in  the  previous  section  (for  example  properties  for
descriptions and quantifiers, comparison classes, ordering relations etc.).  In these cases as long as
the egocentric interpretation is at least relatively close to the speaker's intended interpretation the
initial egocentric interpretation will not usually be corrected in nearby worlds where it is false. 
Keysar et al's findings have not gone unchallenged.  Related studies by, for example Hanna et al
(2003) have provided evidence against the claim that initial  interpretation is wholly egocentric,
suggesting that  although egocentric  perspective does play a  role  in  initial  reference assignment
knowledge of the common ground does as well.  Additionally Rubio-Fernandez (2008) points out
that many of Keysar et al's findings are consistent with a parallel processing view where egocentric
and common ground interpretations  are  processed in  parallel  and compete against  one another.
These responses might undermine the egocentric  anchoring approach to  interpretation,  however
they do not undermine the phenomenon of egocentric bias.  That is, they do nothing to undermine
the  experimental  results  which  appear  to  show  that  in  certain  circumstances  the  egocentric
interpretation is rendered dominant.  Thus, these responses to Keysar et al do not call into question
the claim that our interpretations are, not infrequently, rendered unreliable by egocentric bias. 
I  take the existence of  egocentric  bias,  together  with the mismatch arguments  discussed in  the
previous  section,  to  suggest  that  miscommunication  is  a  reasonably  common  phenomenon.
Moreover,  it  appears  that  miscommunication  involving  certain  types  of  contextual  value  (fine
grained values such as properties or ordering relations on worlds) might often go unnoticed, as the
differing interpretations they determine will often be of little practical consequence. This second
claim is further supported by the studies which appear to indicate that speakers overestimate their
own ability to reliably communicate ambiguous information. Thus, although miscommunication has
received little attention from epistemologists of testimony, it appears to be a reasonably common
phenomenon  which  often  goes  unnoticed.  Thus,  it  is  worth  investigating  the  epistemology  of
testimony with an eye to miscommunication and the processes from which it arises (in particular,
the processes underlying our ability to communicate with context sensitive terms).  It is to this task
which I now turn.
5. Overview of Chapters.
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The remainder of this thesis consists of a collection of essays exploring problems which arise in the
epistemology of testimony once we consider the processes underlying interpretation, and the ways
in which they can go wrong. These essays, although connected by a central theme, are independent,
and can be read separately. 
Many of the problems which seem to arise when we consider the processes underlying our recovery
of communicated contents concern the hearer's ability to reliably recover the correct meaning - their
ability to gain knowledge of what is said. It is often thought that testimonial knowledge requires
knowledge of what is said.  If this is the case then it might be thought that an investigation into the
consequences of such problems is hardly worth conducting, since the consequences are obvious -
we clearly do not gain testimonial knowledge in cases in which miscommunication is an epistemic
possibility.  In chapter two I argue that testimonial knowledge does not require knowledge of what
is said.  I lay out a set of assumptions about the conditions on knowledge, and the determination of
what is said, and then present a series of cases which, on the given assumptions, constitute cases of
testimonial knowledge without knowledge of what is said.  I consider a number of responses to
these  cases,  and  indicate  at  the  end  how  analogous  cases  can  be  constructed  on  different
assumptions about the conditions for knowledge and the determination of what is said.  
In chapter three I begin the investigation into the epistemic impact of possible miscommunication.  I
start  by  suggesting  that  actual  minor  miscommunications  do  not  always  block  testimonial
knowledge  (this  is  a  step  beyond  the  conclusion  of  chapter  two  which  merely  argues  that
testimonial knowledge does not require knowledge of what is said), but I spend the majority of the
chapter explaining a sense in which they often do block such knowledge. Moreover, I argue that
such miscommunications are reasonably widespread and may often go unnoticed.   I do this  by
outlining a form of mismatch argument according to which the factors which give rise to mismatch
are  common  features  of  many  low  stakes  contexts.   I  then  consider  and  reject  a  number  of
responses.  I conclude that a mild scepticism about much low stakes context sensitive testimony
may be warranted.   
The epistemic significance of miscommunication (or the possibility thereof) does not end with its
ability to  block testimonial knowledge however.   In chapters four,  five and six I  explore three
further types of epistemic problem which are revealed by considering miscommunication (and its
sources).  In chapter four I argue that the possibility of miscommunication gives speakers plausible
deniability about a wide range of assertions, even when miscommunication has not occurred.  That
is, speakers often have scope to claim that miscommunication has occurred even when it has not.
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By doing so they are able to avoid undertaking robust commitments when asserting.  I explore the
theoretical consequences of this for theories of testimony which place a particular emphasis on the
commitments speakers undertake when asserting (for example, Assurance theories, and Elizabeth
Fricker's recent development of her reductionist views). 
One of the most important recent developments in the epistemology of testimony has been Miranda
Fricker's discussion of epistemic injustice.  Fricker's approach bears significant similarities to the
approach taken in this thesis.  This thesis explores the consequences of defects in the processes
underlying interpretation.  Fricker explores the ethical and epistemic consequences of a particular
type  of  defect  in  the  processes  underling  our  credibility  judgements.   She  argues  that  these
processes  rely  on  heuristics  and  stereotypes  which  can  encode  prejudicial  judgements  of  the
speaker.  This can lead to certain groups being unfairly assigned a low credibility, and gives rise to a
number of harms.  For example, such speakers are silenced, and disrespected as knowers.  Chapter
five explores a similar phenomenon which arises at the level of interpretation.  Like our credibility
judgements our interpretations are guided by social stereotypes, and this can lead to similar ethical
and epistemic problems.  That is, they can lead to certain groups being disproportionately subjected
to harmful forms of misinterpretation.  I explore the causes of this phenomenon, its harms, and its
relation to epistemic injustice as characterised by Fricker. 
Chapter  six  explores  the  implications  for  cases  such  as  those  discussed  in  chapter  five  for
testimonial anti-reductionism.  The chapter begins  by outlining a recent argument presented by
Susanna Siegel against perceptual dogmatism. Siegel presents cases in which an agent's irrational
belief cognitively penetrates (has a causal impact on the content of) their perceptual seemings.  She
argues that in such cases the agent's beliefs are unjustified, and perhaps even circular. I argue that
analogous cases to those given by Siegel can be given for testimonial belief, and that this causes a
problem for particular  forms of testimonial  anti-reductionism (and some conceavable brands of
reductionism). Views of testimonial justification are taxonomized according to the particular default
rights which are postulated, and the different stances which might be taken on the epistemic rights
of agent in cases of misunderstanding.  Moreover, two forms of cognitively penetrated linguistic
understanding are identified - one in which one's speech perception is penetrated, and one in which
irrational background states have an impact on the assignment of meaning to words.  It is argued
that  cases  of  cognitively  penetrated  linguistic  understanding  cause  a  problem  for  views  of
testimonial justification which postulate a default right for agents to trust their own understanding. 
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Chapter Two: Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of What is 
Said.
0. Introduction.
In this chapter I discuss the following question: what epistemic relation must audiences bear to the
contents  of  assertions  (and  the  fact  that  those  contents  have  been  asserted)  in  order  to  gain
testimonial knowledge from those assertions?   I briefly explain why epistemologists should focus
more  attention  on  this  question,  before  providing  three  counterexamples  to  the  most  intuitive
answer:   that  audiences  must  know that  a  speaker  has  asserted  p  in  order  to  gain  testimonial
knowledge that p. I close by explaining how the argument generalises and can be made to work on
different  assumptions  about  the  conditions  for  knowledge,  and  the  conditions  under  which  a
proposition is asserted.
1. Audiences and Asserted Contents.
Standard formulations of testimonial knowledge rarely make any mention of the relation audiences
must bear to an asserted content (or the fact that it has been asserted) in order to gain testimonial
knowledge.  Rather, focus is usually on the relation the audience must bear to the speaker (i.e. must
audiences have reason to trust speakers?), and the relation the speaker must bear to the asserted
content.  This is perhaps due to the fact that content recovery is usually taken to be unproblematic
by epistemologists.  As Sanford Goldberg puts it: 
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'...so prevalent is the assumption that the comprehension dimension is unproblematic
- that hearers reliably recover the propositions attested to - that there is virtually no
discussion of the comprehension processes in the epistemological literature' Goldberg
(2007), 54.
However, as noted in the introduction,  in the philosophy of language content recovery is not seen
as epistemically unproblematic.  Theorists concerned with context-sensitivity have long recognised
that  audiences  sometimes  struggle  to  recover  the  precise  proposition  intended  by the  speaker.
Anne  Bezuidenhout  lists  the  following  factors  as  contributing  to  audiences'  interpretations  of
context-sensitive utterances.  All of these factors leave space for misinterpretation:
'(i) Knowledge that has already been activated from the prior discourse context (if any).
(ii) Knowledge that is available based on who one's conversational partner is and on what
community memberships one shares with that person.
(iii) Knowledge that is available through observation of the mutual perceptual environment.
(iv) Any stereotypical knowledge or scripts or frames that are associatively triggered by
accessing the semantic potential of any of the expressions currently being used.
(v) Knowledge of the purposes and abilities of one's conversational partner (e.g. whether the
person is being deceitful or sincere, whether the person tends to verbosity or is a person of
few words etc.).
(vi) Knowledge one has of the general principles governing conversational exchanges
(perhaps including Grice's conversational maxims, culturally specific norms of politeness,
etc.)'. Bezuidenhout (2002), 117.
In chapter one we also saw psychological evidence that verbal communication is less reliable than
we often assume. The controversy over communication with context sensitive terms illustrates that,
despite  epistemologists'  assumptions  to  the  contrary,  it  is  not  clear  that  comprehension  is
unproblematic.  Indeed, it may even be that the common assumption among epistemologists that the
recovery of propositional contents is generally reliable is partly due to our general tendency to over
estimate  our  reliability  as  communicators  (discussed  by  Savitsky,  Keysar,  Epley,  Carter,  and
Swanson (2010)).   Thus the question of the audience's relation to what is said is more pressing than
has previously been recognised by epistemologists (we will return to these epistemic problems with
content recovery in more detail in chapters three and four).  
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Moreover, it is important to have some idea of the relation audiences must bear to asserted contents
when investigating the epistemic impact of the processes underlying interpretation.  This is because
epistemic problems arising from these processes will often prevent audiences from bearing more
epistemically demanding relations to asserted contents.  Thus, if testimonial knowledge requires a
very  demanding  relation  to  what  is  said  then  problems  with  the  processes  underlying  our
communicative exchanges will often prevent us from gaining testimonial knowledge. However, if
audiences are not required to bear an epistemically demanding relation to what is said we might find
that the sorts of problems with content recovery discussed in this thesis do not necessarily block
testimonial knowledge (of course, we may still find that they often do, as a matter of contingent
fact, block testimonial knowledge, as I will argue in chapter three). 
Finally, it is important to know what relation audiences must bear to what is said (and the fact that it
has been said) in order to assess the a priori/a posteriori status of testimonial knowledge in general.
For example, if knowledge of what is said is required for testimonial knowledge, and knowledge of
what is said is always a posteriori, then presumably all testimonial knowledge is a posterori.  If
some lesser relation is all that is required we would have to ask about the potential a priori status of
this  lesser  relation.  For  example,  if  mere  propositional  justification  that  p has  been  said  (or
presented as true) is required then we must ask whether or not such propositional justification can
be a priori.  I will not be perusing this question further here, but it does illustrate another sense in
which the question is important. 
Perhaps there is a simple answer to this question:  Hearers must know (or be in a position to know)
that the speaker has said that  p  in order to gain testimonial knowledge that  p16.  After all, if the
audience doesn't even know that the speaker has said that p then why worry about whether or not
the  speaker  is  trustworthy  or  reliable  with  respect  to  p?   This  seems  like  a  highly  intuitive
requirement on testimonial knowledge.  Moreover, when we are told that p, and we are asked why
we believe that p, we will usually state 'S said that p' as our reason.  If the fact that a speaker said
that p is part of our reason for believing that p then surely knowledge that the speaker said that p is
necessary for testimonial knowledge that  p.  Anna-Sara Malmgren (2006) employs this thought in
her argument against Tyler Burge's claim that there is a priori testimonial knowledge.  She claims
that knowledge of what is said is a posteriori, and that knowledge of what is said plays an epistemic
16 This answer is already endorsed by Fricker (1994, 1995, and 2003), Christensen and Kornblith (1997), Malmgren 
(2006), and Goldberg (2007). 
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role in the acquisition of testimonial knowledge,  meaning that a posteriori  knowledge plays  an
epistemic  role  in testimonial  knowledge.   If  Malmgren is  correct  then there cannot  be a  priori
testimonial knowledge (we will return to Burge's arguments for a priori testimonial knowledge in
the final chapter where I provide a new response to his argument). Malmgren sums up the thought
as follows: 
'However, the following consideration gives us a prima facie reason to think that it plays an
epistemic role: suppose John tells me that it is raining, and that I thereby come to know that
it is raining—that is, suppose that I gain knowledge by (John’s) testimony that it is raining.
If you asked me how I know that it is raining, then presumably part of my (pretheoretical)
answer would be: “John told me,” “John said so,” or “John said that it is raining.” Here is a
natural  thought  about  what  I  am doing  in  giving  this  answer:  I  am citing  part  of  my
(epistemic)  reason  for believing that  it  is  raining,  part  of what  makes  me  warranted  in
believing that this is the case. What my answer brings out is that part of my reason for
believing that it is raining is that John said so. But that is just to say that my warranted (or
knowledgeable) belief about what John said plays an epistemic role in the formation of my
knowledge that it is raining.' Malmgren, (2006), 225. 
Furthermore, it might be worried that if an audience doesn't know that p has been asserted then they
would have believed p even if p had not been asserted (and thus in cases in which p is false)17. A
knowledge requirement is also likely to appeal to the accessibility internalist (for example Bonjour
1980). Such theorists hold that in order to know that p one must be able to come to know the basis
for one's knowledge that p.  It is commonly thought that the fact that the a speaker has testified that
p is  at  least  part  of  the  basis  for  one's  testimonial  knowledge that  p.   Thus,  in  order  to  gain
testimonial knowledge that p one must at least be in a position to know that the speaker has said that
p. 
Despite its intuitive plausibility this answer is incorrect.  Audiences needn't be in a position to know
that a speaker has asserted that  p  in order to gain testimonial knowledge that  p.  This is a relief,
since the arguments of the following two chapters suggest that we very often lack strict knowledge
of  what  is  said,  which means that  we would in  principle  be blocked from gaining testimonial
17 Goldberg (2007) pursues this line of argument, and I will consider it in a little more detail in chapter three. 
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knowledge. I will argue that testimonial knowledge does not require knowledge of what is said by
providing three cases of apparent testimonial knowledge of p in which the audience does not know
that the speaker has said that p. 
2. Against the Knowledge Requirement.
The main argument of this chapter rests on two primary assumptions.  Firstly I assume a roughly
Gricean intention based view of communication.  That is, I assume that in order for a speaker to say
that p they must intend to say that p (at least for utterances containing context-sensitive terms such
as demonstratives and definite descriptions). The second assumption depends on the first:  if  an
audience member is not in a position to know whether the speaker intended to say that p then the
audience is not in a position to know that the speaker said that p.  If, for all the audience knows, the
speaker did not intend to say that p, then since the speaker's intention to say that p is necessary for
their having said that p, for all the audience knows the speaker did not say that p.  For the majority
of the chapter  I  also assume that safety is  a necessary condition on knowledge.  I  adopt  these
assumptions because the Gricean view of 'what is said' is the dominant view in the philosophy of
language,  and  the  safety  principle  on  knowledge  is  still  the  dominant  anti-luck  condition  in
epistemology.  Moreover I am sympathetic to both views.  However, as as I note in 2.1.2 and the
conclusion, these assumptions are not essential. This is important since it is easy to worry that I am
attacking a straw man.  That is, it is easy to read the cases presented here and feel that very few
people are committed to the view that testimonial knowledge requires knowledge of what is said
where 'what is said' is spelled out in the terms presented here.  This may be correct (although the
Gricean view certainly seems to be the default position on 'what is said' for many). However, as
long as one employs a notion of 'what is said' in the conditions one gives for testimonial knowledge
one will need to give an account of the conditions under which a proposition counts as 'what is said'.
As I explain in the conclusion cases similar to the ones given here will be available for any set of
conditions which leave space for the audience to be mistaken about whether or not p has been said.  
I will present three cases in which the audience appears to gain testimonial knowledge that p despite
not  being  in  a  position to  know that  the  speaker  intended to communicate  that  p.  If  the two
aforementioned assumptions are correct then these will also be cases in which the audience gains
testimonial knowledge that p without knowledge that the speaker said that p.  I consider three cases
primarily for the sake of clarity.  Considering several cases allows us to identify a common structure
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for counter examples to the knowledge of what is said requirement.  This allows us to see how we
might generate further counter examples based different assumptions about the conditions for what
is  said,  and  the  conditions  for  knowledge.   Moreover,  intuitions  about  cases  are  notoriously
unreliable, especially intuitions about cases involving far fetched sci-fi scenarios or cases with very
complex set-ups.  Thus it is worth considering several cases in order to ensure that we are not led
astray by some misleading feature of one case.  Finally, each case gives rise to a different intuitive
line of response.  These responses are considered and rejected.  However, the reader might not find
all of the counter-responses convincing.  Thankfully, they need only find one of the three counter-
responses convincing in order for the project of this chapter to be successful.   
2.1.1. Case One. 
MAD SCIENTIST18,19: The philosophical mad scientist is at it again.  His victim is
Sally, a car enthusiast. This time, instead of envating his victim, he has implanted a
special chip in her brain.  This chip causes her to sometimes say 'that is a fuel efficient
car' when in the presence of fuel efficient cars, but only when she does not intend to do
so.  It works as follows: whenever Sally is in the presence of a fuel efficient car it turns
on and randomly selects one of two values.  If it selects value 1 it switches off and
becomes inactive again.  However, if it selects value 2 it has the following effect: If
Sally doesn't intend, and doesn't gain the intention, to comment on the fuel efficiency
of the car, then it forces her to utter the sentence 'that is a fuel efficient car'. 
One day Sally and Matt are walking through the city when Sally sees a particularly
fuel  efficient  car.   She  considers  commenting  on  its  fuel  efficiency,  but  hesitates
because she doesn't know if Matt has any interest in cars.  She decides on a whim to
18 Incidentally, this case also constitutes a counter example to Jeff King's (forthcoming) claim that in order to say that
p a speaker must intend to say that p and the audience must be in a position to know that the speaker intends to say
that p.  This is because the speaker in this case clearly says that  p  even though the audience member is not in a
position to know that the speaker intended to say that p. 
19 The following cases are similar to those provided by Federico Luzzi (2010) as counterexamples to counter-closure
(the view that in order to gain knowledge that p by inference from q one must know q).  Indeed, if one held a view
of  testimony  on  which  audiences  make  a  sub-personal  inferences  from  beliefs  like  'S  said  that  p,  and  S  is
trustworthy' to 'I should believe that p', then one would be forced to reject counter closure on the basis of the cases
presented in this chapter.  
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just go for it, and says 'that is a fuel efficient car!'.  On the basis of Sally's assertion
Matt forms the true belief that the car is fuel efficient.  What neither Sally nor Matt
know is that this was a case in which the chip selected value 2, so Sally would have
uttered 'that car is fuel efficient' even if she did not intend to.
I submit that Matt gains testimonial knowledge that the car is fuel efficient. His belief about the fuel
efficiency of the car was formed on the basis of Sally's testimony, and it is safe and sensitive (he
forms the same belief in all nearby worlds, it is true in all nearby worlds, and in the closest words
where it is false neither Sally's intentions nor the chip cause her to utter the sentence 'that is a fuel
efficient car').  His belief is causally related to its truthmaker, and Sally undertook all  the usual
commitments  one  undertakes  when  one  provides  testimony.   Indeed,  as  emphasised  by  Luzzi
(2010), if cases like this don't count as cases of knowledge then they they constitute interesting new
forms of Gettier cases not answerable in any of the standard ways.  
However, Matt does not know (nor is he in a position to know) that Sally intended to communicate
that the car was fuel efficient.  This is because his belief that she intended to communicate that the
car was fuel efficient was neither safe nor sensitive20.  In the closest worlds in which Sally doesn't
have the intention to say that the car is fuel efficient he still forms the belief that she does intend to
say that it  is fuel efficient, because the chip makes her say it.  Moreover, since Sally was very
hesitant about saying that the car was fuel efficient and only decided to do so on a random whim
there are  many nearby worlds in  which she doesn't  form the intention to  comment on the fuel
efficiency  of  the  car.  Thus,  if  assumptions  1  and  2  are  correct  then  Matt  gains  testimonial
knowledge that the car is fuel efficient despite not knowing that Sally said that the car is fuel
efficient. 
2.1.2. Response to Case One.
It  might be argued that this  case,  rather than being a a case of testimonial  knowledge without
knowledge of what is said, is a counter example to the safety principle on knowledge. That is, it
might be argued that although Matt's belief about Sally's intention is unsafe he nonetheless knows
20 One might worry that audiences do not generally form beliefs about speaker intentions when they form testimonial
beliefs.  This worry would be consistent with the view that audiences must be in a position to know the speaker's
intentions in order to gain testimonial knowledge.  However, these cases illustrate that the audience need not be in a
position to know the speaker's  communicative intentions,  since any belief  they may potentially form about the
speaker's communicative intentions will fail to be safe or sensitive. 
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that Sally intended to communicate that the car was fuel efficient.  Indeed, this case does bear some
resemblance  to  a  series  of  cases  which  have  been  employed  as  counterexamples  to  the  safety
condition on knowledge (see Neta and  Rohrbaugh (2004) and Comesana (2005))21.  For example,
Neta and Rohrbaugh present the following case: 
EXPERIMENT: 'I am participating in a psychological experiment, in which I am to report
the number of flashes I recall being shown. Before being shown the stimuli, I consume a
glass of liquid at the request of the experimenter. Unbeknownst to either of us, I have been
randomly assigned to the control group, and the glass contains ordinary orange juice. Other
experimental groups receive juice mixed with one of a variety of chemicals which hinder the
functioning of memory without a detectable phenomenological difference. I am shown seven
flashes and judge, truly and knowingly, that I have been shown seven flashes. Had I been a
member of one of the experimental groups to which I was almost assigned, I would have
been shown only six flashes but still believed that I had been shown seven flashes due to the
effects of the drug. It seems that in the actual case I know that the number of flashes is seven
despite  the  envisaged  possibility  of  my being  wrong.  And yet  these  possibilities  are  as
similar in other respects as they would have to be for the experiment to be well designed and
properly executed.' Neta and Rohrbaugh, (2004), 400. 
I find this case (and others like it) unconvincing, since I find myself unable to shake the feeling that
the agent in such cases does not genuinely know22.  However, the issues at play in this debate are
subtle, and I do not want to rest my case on my own (no doubt theory laden) intuitions.  Luckily I
don't  have  to.   Neta  and  Rohrbaugh  present  a  modified  version  of  their  case  (analogous  to
21 There are further examples provided in Kelp (2009), Baumann (2012), and Bogardus (2014).  However, these cases
bear less resemblance to the cases presented here. 
22 I  feel  differently about  Comesana's  case.   In  Comesana's  case  Juan  is  planning  to  dress  up  as  Michael  for  a
Halloween party, but decides against it at the last minute.  Judy, has been employed to give directions to the party.
She will tell everyone it is in the same location, but if she sees Michael (or someone she thinks is Michael) she will
ring the organiser and the party location will be moved.  So although someone looking like Michael would receive
the same testimony as everyone else, Judy would arrange for that testimony to be false.  Since Juan almost dressed
up as Michael there is a sense in which he almost received false testimony.  However, it strikes me that Juan's belief
in this case is not unsafe.  The world at which he receives the false testimony is just too different from actuality.
Indeed, it is not even clear to me that the worlds in which Juan receives the false testimony are worlds in which the
same belief forming method is employed.  This is because when we form testimonial beliefs we rely on the speaker
to be honest to  us -   the audience.  When Juan comes as himself he relies on Judy to be honest to him - to Juan.
However, if he dresses up as Michael he relies on Sally to be honest to Michael.  Indeed, we could even imagine that
Michael knows of the plan to keep him from the party, and decides to dress up as Juan in order to receive truthful
testimony as to the party's location.  In this case Michael is clearly and intentionally employing a different method
than he would if he approached Judy undisguised. Thus a different belief forming method is employed in each case.
Thus, since safety is always relativised to a method, Juan's belief is safe (for views which place a special emphasis
on this interpersonal relation between the speaker and the hearer see Moran (2005a, 2005b), Hinchman (2005), and
Fricker (2006)). 
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Goldman's (1976) Fake Barns case) in which it seems that the agent clearly does not know that they
have been shown seven flashes.  The case is as follows: 
EXPERIMENT*: 'I am taking part in a long series of psychological experiments, in each of
which I am to report the number of flashes I recall being shown to me after ingesting a glass
of  liquid.  In  this  one case,  I  have been assigned to  the  control  group and the  liquid  is
ordinary orange juice. I am shown seven flashes and judge, truly, that I have been shown
seven flashes. In some of the other trials in which I have participated, I have been assigned
to an experimental group in which the liquid also contains a drug which interferes with
memory, and the beliefs I formed on those trials were false'. Neta and Rohrbaugh, (2004),
402. 
We can modify the mad scientist case in a similar way in order to secure the intuition that Matt does
not know that Sally intended to comment on the car's fuel efficiency.  Imagine that Sally and Matt
have spent the afternoon together, and Sally has commented on the fuel efficiency of many cars.  In
some of these cases she has been caused to vocalise the sentence 'that is a fuel efficient car' as a
result of the chip's interference, in other cases she did so of her own volition.  We can even imagine
that Sally's hesitation to comment on the fuel efficiency of the car was due to her noticing Matt's
seeming lack of interest in her previous comments on fuel efficiency23.  In this version of the case
Matt will have formed many false beliefs about Sally's communicative intentions, and he will have
been lucky in those cases where the beliefs he formed were true.  This is clearly a situation in which
his  faculties  for  assigning  communicative  intentions  are  not  reliable.   Thus  it  seems  highly
implausible to claim that he knows that Sally intended to comment on the car's fuel efficiency.  
Nonetheless, Matt's actual belief about the fuel efficiency of the car is still safe and sensitive.  After
all, the chip never makes Sally utter 'that is a fuel efficient car' when she is not in the presence of a
fuel efficient car.  Additionally, his belief is still  caused by its truthmaker, and the causal chain
which actually lead to his belief was not deviant in any way.  Finally, Sally undertook all the usual
commitments  when she asserted.   Thus,  it  seems that  Matt  still  gained testimonial  knowledge,
despite the fact that he did not know Sally's communicative intentions.  
A second worry about this case may be that when the chip in Sally's brain causes her to say 'that is a
23 We can imagine that the chip retroactively implants in Sally the belief that she intended to comment on the car's fuel
efficiency when she is forced by the chip to do so.
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fuel efficient car' she is not really testifying.  Rather, in such cases she is acting as an instrument.  If
this were the case then Matt's belief would not be formed via the same method in each case.  This is
not a problem.  In all the worlds in which Matt does form a belief about the fuel efficiency of the
car on the basis of Sally's actual intentional utterance his belief is still true.  So his belief about the
fuel efficiency of the car is still safe.  Matt might be thought to be lucky in one sense - he was lucky
that his belief was testimonial.  But he was not lucky that it was true. Moreover, although he might
be thought to gain knowledge about the car via a different method in the worlds in which Sally
never  forms  an  intention  to  assert  that  the  car  is  fuel  efficient,  his  belief  about  Sally's  actual
intentions is formed via the same method, for his evidence regarding Sally's intentions is the same
in each case (his evidence being the fact that she opened her mouth and the words 'that is a fuel
efficient car' came out).  So the chip worlds are relevant to the assessment of the safety of his belief
about Sally's intentions.  
2.2.1. Case Two.
I  take  MAD SCIENTIST to  straightforwardly  establish  that  knowledge  of  what  is  said  is  not
required for testimonial knowledge.  However, it is a rather far fetched sci-fi case.  Perhaps we
shouldn't trust such far fetched cases.  Thankfully a similar case can be given which does not appeal
to mad scientists and their bizarre mind control devices: 
COMPETING INTENTIONS: In this case Sally does not have a chip in her head, rather she
just  impulsively  talks  about  cars.   She  almost  always  comments  when  she  sees  a  fuel
efficient car.  Sally and Matt are walking through the city when Sally notices two cars which
she knows to be fuel efficient.  One of the cars (car A) is partially obscured by a wall, and
has no stand out features.  The other car (car B) is in full view, and has a very striking
design.  It is inevitable that Sally will comment on the fuel efficiency of one of the cars.
Suppose that both cars have the same owner, he takes these two cars everywhere he goes.  If
either car were absent then both cars would be absent.   Suppose further that Sally takes both
cars to be highly salient, because although car A looks rather plain it is actually very rare,
and she falsely takes this to be common knowledge.  Finally, suppose that Car A and car B
are different editions of the same car but with different body work.  Car A is a limited
edition of car B.  Thus they both have identical engines, and everything else related to fuel
efficiency.  As a result, if car B were inefficient then car A would be inefficient too (and vice
versa).  
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Sally is torn as to which car to comment on, but in the end (and in a random manner as in
the first case) decides to comment on car B, stating 'that is a fuel efficient car'.  Car B is the
only car which is salient to Matt, so he correctly takes Sally to be commenting on car B.
However, Sally is a rather poor communicator: if she had decided to comment on car A
(which  she  very  nearly  did),  she  would  have  done  so  by  uttering  precisely  the  same
sentence.  Since the cases are identical from Matt's perspective he still would have taken her
to be talking about car B, and would still  have gained the true belief  that car B is  fuel
efficient. 
This case also seems to be one in which Matt gains knowledge.  Once again his belief is formed on
the basis of Sally's testimony, it is true, and Sally undertook a commitment to the proposition Matt
came to believe.  Additionally his belief seems to be safe - he forms the same belief in all nearby
worlds, and it is true in all these worlds, and sensitive - in the closest worlds at which his belief is
false he would not have formed it, since the closest worlds in which car B is inefficient are worlds
in which car A is inefficient as well, meaning that Sally would never have uttered the words 'that car
is  fuel efficient'.   However,  Matt's  belief  that Sally intended to say that car B is fuel efficient,
although true, does not constitute knowledge due to failing safety and sensitivity.  Sally very nearly
intended to say that car A was fuel efficient, but due to her low competence as a communicator Matt
would still have taken her to be saying that car B was fuel efficient. 
2.2.2. Response to Case Two.
One potential worry about this case is that Sally offers different testimony in the worlds in which
she intends to comment on car A and the worlds in which she intends to comment on car B.  I have
maintained that Matt's belief about Sally's intentions is unsafe because he would have formed the
same (false)  beliefs  in  worlds  where Sally decided to  comment  on car  A.   However,  safety is
standardly relativised to a method.  That is, the important thing is not whether there are nearby
worlds where Matt forms a false belief, but rather whether there are nearby worlds in which Matt
forms a false belief by employing the same method.  If Sally offers different testimony in each case
then surely Matt's belief is not formed via the same method. 
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This objection fails for two reasons.  Firstly, Matt's unsafe belief concerns Sally's communicative
intentions, whereas Sally's testimony concerns the fuel efficiency of a car.  The mechanisms Matt
would use to reach a judgement about Sally's communicative intentions are identical in each case.
Matt has precisely the same evidence in each case, the only difference is that in the one case his
belief about Sally's intentions is correct, and in the other case it is incorrect.  Matt's belief about
Sally's communicative intentions is not a testimonial belief, so the claim that she offers different
testimony in each case is irrelevant (this response, of course, is the same as the response to the
second objection in section 2.1.2).  
Secondly, even if Matt's belief regarding Sally's communicative intentions were testimonial there is
reason to doubt that this objection works.  It seems that when considering the safety of testimonial
beliefs the speaker's communicative intentions should not be built into the method component of
our  safety assessment.  There are  cases  in  which the speaker  has  very different  communicative
intentions, yet it seems clear that the same method is employed by the audience when forming their
testimonial belief.  This is not to say that the speaker's communicative intentions are epistemically
irrelevant, but there are many roles such intentions can play which don't require them to be built
into the method component of our safety assessments for testimonial knowledge.  Consider the
following cases: 
ANCIENT SCHOLAR: Archaeologists have just uncovered a manuscript detailing the rise
and fall of ancient civilisation x.  They have extremely strong evidence that it was written by
Heromomouse, an ancient scholar belonging to a different civilisation – ancient civilisation
y. They know Heromomouse to be extremely reliable.  They read the parchment and learn
many facts about ancient civilisation x. 
Version 1:  Heromomouse wrote the manuscript in order to educate the masses about the
history of ancient civilisation x, and he intended the manuscript to be kept in the great public
library. 
Version 2:  Heromomouse intended the manuscript as a gift for the king's private library, and
he intended it to be read only by the king.  Moreover, he does not expect (or even intend) the
king to believe a word of it.  Heromomouse knows that the king is far too pig headed to
believe that there was ever a civilisation greater than his own. Nonetheless, Heromomouse
ensures that the document is as accurate as possible out of a patriotic desire for his king to
have the greatest private library in the land.  
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Version  3:  This  version  of  the  case  resembles  the  second  in  all  respects  except  that
Heromomouse knows that the king will have him beheaded at any suggestion that there was
a civilisation greater than his own.  However, he also knows that the king is so delusional
that he will interpret Heromomouse's chronicling of civilisation x as a metaphor for the rise
and fall of his own civilisation.  Heromomouse knows that no sane person would read the
manuscript this way, but this doesn't matter since the manuscript is for the king's private
library.  He still wishes for the king to have a great library, thus he still strives for accuracy.
However, he intends to be interpreted as expressing an entirely different message.  
In each version of this case Heromomouse's communicative intentions are rather different.  In the
first case he is openly offering testimony regarding the rise and fall of civilisation x.  In the second
case he does not intend his manuscript to be read by anyone other than the king, and he does not
intend to be believed.  In the final case he does not even intend to be interpreted the same way, he
intends to communicate something completely different to the other two cases.  If we wish to claim
that  the  audience  employs  a  different  belief  forming  method  in  cases  where  the  speaker's
communicative intentions are different then we must claim that the archaeologists employ different
methods in each of these cases.  Yet, this is surely false.  In each case the archaeologists employ the
same  method  to  learn  about  civilisation  x.   Thus,  the  fact  that  the  speaker  has  different
communicative intentions in each case does not entail that the method employed by the audience in
each  case  is  different.   So  there  are  two  reasons  to  reject  the  'different  methods'  response  to
COMPETING INTENTIONS.  Firstly Matt's knowledge of Sally's intentions is not testimonial, so
the difference in communicative intentions is irrelevant.  Secondly, although they no doubt do play
an  important  epistemic  role,  communicative  intentions  should  not  be  built  into  the  method
component of safety judgements about testimonial knowledge. 
2.3.1. Case Three.
COMPETING INTENTIONS is less far fetched than MAD SCIENTIST.  However, it is still rather
complex.  Thus, I imagine that the dedicated proponent of the knowledge condition might well
remain unconvinced24. Additionally, the question of the audience's knowledge of what is said is of
24 Another  strategy my opponent  could take  would be to  question whether  the knowledge gained  in  this  case  is
genuinely testimonial, since it depends on so many outside factors (thanks to Brian Weatherson for this point).  Here
is how I think we should conceive of testimonial knowledge:  testimonial knowledge is a testimonial belief which
counts as knowledge. A testimonial belief is a belief formed on the basis of testimony, which means something like
the following: Someone has said that p, or made an utterance with the content p, or intended to say that p and had
their intention recognized, or said something sufficiently similar to p and the audience reasonably recovered p etc.
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interest due to worries raised in the philosophy of language about the successful recovery of the
speaker's intended meaning. Yet, neither of the cases so outlined so far bears any similarity to the
problematic cases discussed in the philosophy of language.  Thus it is worth considering a final case
which bears directly on problems of context-sensitivity25. 
The  reader  will  recall  the problem from section  one.  The problem is  that  in  cases  of  context-
sensitivity there will often be several similar values which can be assigned to a context-sensitive
term, each determining a different proposition26.  The audience's evidence will often be insufficient
to grant them knowledge that the speaker intended one of these propositions rather than another.
However, as the final case indicates, these epistemic difficulties do not always rule out testimonial
knowledge
As  noted  in  the  introduction,  Wettstein  (1981)  provides  the  following  argument  against  the
Russellean  view of  definite  descriptions:  in  most  attributive  uses  of  a  definite  description  the
explicit content underdetermines the referent.  That is, it is not sufficient to determine a unique
referent.  For example, take the sentence 'the statue is broken' - the world contains many statues,
thus 'the statue' is not enough by itself to select a unique statue.  Those words could be used in
different contexts to identify very different statues. The description must be supplemented in order
to designate a unique statue.  However, there will be many potential supplementations which would
uniquely identify the intended statue.  For example the description might be supplemented as 'the
statue  belonging  to  Alex',  or  'the  statue  of  a  frog'.  Wettstein  argues  that  this  will  make  the
proposition expressed indeterminate on the Russellean view.  He takes this to be an unacceptable
consequence and provides an alternative view of definite descriptions on which the meaning is
determinate.  However, the problem seems to arise for a wide array of context sensitive terms, not
just descriptions. Similar cases can be given involving quantifier domain restriction, non-sentential
assertion,  and  a  whole  host  of  other  context  sensitive  terms.  Thus  Wettstein's  response  seems
unsatisfactory, for it is unlikely that a unified account can be given which secures determinacy for
and on the basis of this fact the audience came to believe p.  On this conception of testimonial knowledge Matt's
knowledge is genuinely testimonial. 
25 The cases  discussed  so far  have also been  cases  of  context  sensitivity.   However,  they are cases  of  reference
assignment which seems less epistemically problematic than many other forms of context sensitivity.  In cases of
reference assignment there are usually fewer candidate meanings for the audience to choose between.  In the cases
which are generally seen to be problematic there are a large number of similar meanings for the audience to choose
between.  It  is  seen as mysterious how the audience could select the correct  meaning from amongst the many
available candidates. 
26 This will  not  generally be the case when context merely supplies a referent (as is  the case with,  for  example,
demonstratives or referential uses of definite descriptions).  However, it will be the case when context must supply a
more complex value such as a property, comparison class, modal base, ordering relation on worlds, standard of taste
etc, and in cases of loose talk or non-sentential assertion. 
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all context sensitive terms.  Thus a better response seems to be to accept that such indeterminacy is
a feature of context sensitive terms. This can lead to problems concernig knowledge of what is said
however.  Consider the following case (adapted from Donnellan (1966)):
MURDERER: Sally and Matt are investigating a chain of murders they know to be related.
Sally is standing over the mangled remains of Frank - the latest victim.  Frank has clearly
been murdered in a rather brutal way, and the scene has been covered in insane etchings and
other clear indicators that the murderer is insane.  Additionally, both Sally and Matt know
that Frank was murdered by the murderer they are investigating (that is, the individual who
committed  the  previous  murders).   Sally  phones  Matt  and says  'the  murderer  is  clearly
insane'.   The description used here  is  incomplete,  and could  be rendered  complete  in  a
number of  different  ways.   For example,  Sally could have intended the proposition 'the
murderer (of Frank) is clearly insane', or 'the murderer (who we are investigating) is clearly
insane'.  Matt recovers the proposition 'the murderer (who we are investigating) is clearly
insane' (which happened to be the proposition intended by Sally), and comes to believe it on
the basis of Sally's testimony.  
Once again I think that it is clear that Matt gains testimonial knowledge in this case.  The belief he
forms is true, safe, sensitive, and caused by its truth maker.  Additionally, Sally undertook all the
usual commitments to the proposition that Matt comes to believe.  However, since as far as Matt
can tell Sally might have intended the other (very similar) proposition, Matt does not know that
Sally intended the proposition he recovered.
2.3.2. Response to Case Three.
There are several possible responses to this case, however each response fails.  Firstly one might
attempt to maintain that this case involved a referential use of the definite description.  If this were
the case then there would not be multiple competing candidate meanings, there would be one single
proposition expressed.  This response does not seem promising since neither Sally nor Matt know
who the murderer  is,  they merely know that  there  is  a  single  murderer  responsible  for  all  the
murders they are investigating.  Thus, it does not appear that Matt or Sally have the resources with
which to singularly refer to the murderer.  Nonetheless, this may just push the proponent of the
knowledge of what is said condition to adopt a very liberal view of the conditions required for
56
singular reference.  Thankfully we needn't rest on the claim that this case involved an attributive use
of the definite description, for a directly analogous case can be given with quantifiers.  Consider the
following:
MURDERER*:  In this case Sally and Matt are once again investigating a chain of murders
they know to be related.  Every victim is a member of 'The secret Society of Evil', and the
same insane etchings have been found at each crime scene.  However, in this case there is
significant dna evidence which suggests that (and which leads Matt and Sally to believe
that)  different  murderers  committed each crime.   This  time Sally phones  Matt  and says
'Every murderer is clearly insane'.  Clearly Sally is not saying that every murderer in the
world is insane, rather she is saying that a certain group of murderers are insane.  Thus, in
this case a property must be supplied to restrict the quantifier.  However, there are several
equivalent  properties  which  Sally  could  intend.   For  example,  she  could  intend  'Every
murderer (we are investigating) is clearly insane', or 'Every murderer (of a secret society of
evil member) is clearly insane'.   Matt recovers 'Every murderer (we are investigating) is
clearly insane', and as it happens this is the proposition Sally intended.  
Once again it seems clear that Matt gains testimonial knowledge.  However, it also seems clear that
he did not know Sally''s  communicative intention,  for she could,  for all  he knows, easily have
intended to communicate 'Every murderer (of a secret society of evil member) is clearly insane'.
However, this time the referential use response is not available27.
A second response might be to hold that in a case like this Sally really asserted both propositions.
One might hold that in typical cases a speaker actually asserts many different propositions (for a
view like this see Cappelen and Lepore (2006)).  This seems intuitive,  since it certainly seems
strange to imagine Sally specifically intending one of the above readings and not the other.  They
seem to come together. I do not believe that this undermines the case however.  The case is a
simplification, and we can see that when the case is rendered more realistic the problem remains.  It
is unlikely that Sally intended or asserted only one proposition.  It is more likely that there is a set
27 One might worry that context does not supply a property to restrict the quantifier, but rather supplies a the domain 
restriction in the form of a set.  This would be a version of the referentialism response for quantifier domain 
restriction. Indeed, through much of Stanley and Szabó's seminal (2000) paper on quantifier domain restriction they 
speak as if this is their view.  However, as they explain, this is a simplification.  They ask us to consider the 
following case: John buys 70 bottles of beer every time he goes to the supermarket.  This time there are only 70 
bottles of beer on the shelf, and so he buys every bottle of beer.  However, someone could truly utter 'If there were a 
few more bottles on the shelf John would not have brought every bottle'. If quantifier domain restriction merely 
provided a set this sentence could not be truly uttered, because 'every beer' would pick out the same set of beers in 
worlds where there were more than 70 beers on the shelf (Stanley and Szabó )2000), p 252) .  
57
of propositions consistent with Sally's communicative intentions.  However, just as there seemed to
be  a  problem with Matt  recovering  the precise proposition  Sally intended there seems to be a
problem with  him recovering  the  precise  set  of  propositions  which  are  consistent  with  Sally's
intentions, or with him recovering only propositions which are in this set.  We can conceive of cases
in which, for all Matt knows, the proposition he recovers might not be in the set of propositions
consistent with Sally's intentions.  For example, imagine that Sally and Matt both have access to a
huge amount of information about the murderer, and this causes them to think about the murderer in
different terms at different times.  Matt has spent all day looking at the connections between the
murders and several gangs, and has been thinking of the murderer as 'the gang affiliated murderer'.
He has not been thinking about  the murderer  in terms of the many financial  crimes which the
murderer has committed.  Although he knows the murderer has committed a set of financial crimes
he often has to do some cognitive work to recover this information.  Sally on the other hand has
spent all day thinking about the financial ties in the case.  However, just before she phones Matt she
sees a gang sign on the victim's arm and this raises the gang affiliations back to salience.  As a result
the  resolutions  of  the  description  which  relate  to  gang  affiliation  do  happen  to  fall  under  her
intention,  and thus the proposition Matt recovers does fall under Sally's intention.  However, it
easily could have failed  to  do so.   And in this  situation  Matt  still  would resolved the context
sensitivity in the same way. So, for all Matt knows the proposition he recovers is not in the set of
propositions  consistent  with  Sally's  communicative  intentions.   Yet,  it  still  seems  he  gains
testimonial knowledge. 
3. Conclusion.
It has been argued that despite its intuitive appeal, the claim that audiences must know what has
been said in order to gain testimonial knowledge is false.  The argument presented here assumed
that a speaker must intend to say that  p in order to say that  p (at least in cases involving context
sensitivity).  I also assumed a safety condition on knowledge through most of the chapter.  I adopted
these assumptions because the Gricean view of 'what is said' is the dominant view in the philosophy
of language,  and the safety principle  on knowledge is  still  the dominant  anti-luck condition in
epistemology.  Moreover I am sympathetic to both views.  However, we are now in a position to see
that these assumptions were not essential.  The cases I presented all have the following features: a
speaker asserts a proposition p, the speaker meets all the normal requirements for the transmission
of  knowledge (e.g.  the speaker  knows that  p,  and commits  to  p  etc.),  the audience recovers  p
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through the usual means, is justified in believing that p has been asserted, and forms a belief that p.
Moreover,  the  audience's  belief  that  p meets  the  usual  conditions  on  knowledge  (e.g.  safety,
sensitivity, being caused by its truthmaker, local reliability etc.).  However, there is some necessary
condition C for a speaker's saying that p such that the audience is not in a position to know that C is
met.  
In the cases I presented C was a speaker intention requirement.  However, as long as it is possible
for a speaker to say that p without the audience thereby coming to know that p has been asserted it
seems that it  will  likeley be possible to generate similar cases with different C conditions. For
example, if we confined ourselves to cases involving demonstratives and adopted a view on which a
demonstration is required to pick out the referent of a demonstrative (for example, Reimer (1991)),
then we could produce cases in which an audience is not in a position to know what object the
demonstration picks  out,  but  in  which the testimonial  belief  they form  nevertheless  meets the
conditions  on  knowledge.   Alternatively  we  might  suppose  that  very  small  differences  in  the
patterns  of  use  give  rise  to  subtle  changes  in  meaning (see  Dorr  and Hawthorne  (2014) for  a
discussion of the consequences of such views). Then we might consider cases in which the audience
is not in a position to know that the pattern of use is such as to determine the meaning they assign,
but in which they still seem to meet the conditions for knowledge with respect to the object of their
testimonial belief.  These will all be cases in which any belief an audience might potentially form
regarding condition C will fail to meet some condition on knowledge (be it safety, sensitivity, local
reliability, some causal condition etc.), but in which some feature of the environment guarantees
that their belief in the proposition testified to does meet all the conditions for knowledge.  This is
important, since it is easy to worry that the argument presented in this chapter attacks a straw man.
That is, it is easy to worry that no epistemologists of testimony explicitly endorse the view that
testimonial knowledge requires knowledge of what is said where  p must be intended in order to
count as 'said'.  This might be true, but as long as epistemologists of testimony appeal to a notion of
'what is said' they will need some account of the conditions under which  p counts as being said.
And an  argument  along the  lines  of  the  one presented  here  will  be available  for  most  sets  of
conditions which leave open the option of p being said without the audience to be in a position to
know that p has been said. Moreover, the most natural fall back position would be to move away
from the notion of 'what  is  said'  and formulate  theories  of  testimony in terms of  the speaker's
intended meaning.  However, such an approach would also face the arguments presented here, since
they show that knowledge of the speaker's communicative intentions is not required for testimonial
knowledge. 
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Thus, attempts to solve the problem by adopting a different metasemantics for context sensitivity, or
by  rejecting  the  safety  condition  on  knowledge,  seem  unpromising28.   One  might reject  the
assumption that a speaker can say that p without the audience being in a position to know that they
have said it (a similar condition is endorsed by King (2014, forthcoming)).  However, in order to do
so one would have to not only deny that testimonial knowledge was gained in any of the cases
outlined in this chapter, but also deny that anything was said.  This seems like a radical move.  So, it
seems the best response is to embrace the notion that knowledge of what is said is not required for
testimonial knowledge.  It is not clear what alternative relation (if any) an agent must bear to the
object of testimony in order to gain testimonial knowledge. However, in order for a proposal to be
immune to the sorts of counterexamples presented here it seems the best strategy will be to search
for a relation which is  entailed by the collective presence of the other preconditions for testimonial
knowledge (including the speaker's having said that p).  Otherwise there will be space to present a
case in which the other conditions for testimonial knowledge are met (including the causal, anti-
luck, and reliability conditions on knowledge) in which the condition does not apply.  In such a case
we will need strong reasons to deny that testimonial knowledge is gained.
28 This is not to say that no such view can be given at all, merely that it is likely that similarly structured cases will be 
applicable to a range of different views of knowledge, and what is said.  Thus, a wide range of theorists will be 
committed to rejecting the knowledge of what is said requirement on testimonial knowledge 
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Chapter  Three:  Testimony  and  the  Epistemic  Uncertainty  of
Interpretation.
0. Introduction
In chapter two it was argued that testimonial knowledge does not require knowledge of what is said,
so problems with content recovery do not necessarily block testimonial knowledge.  However, there
are different ways for content recovery to be rendered problematic, and it is still possible that some
problems with content recovery often do block testimonial knowledge. My aim in this chapter is to
outline one such problem (which I call the 'recovery problem'), and explain why the most obvious
solutions  to  the  problem fail.   The  problem is  roughly as  follows:   In  many cases  of  context
sensitivity audiences will not be in a position to know which precise proposition was intended by
the speaker,  and the speaker will  not be in a position to know precisely which proposition the
audience will recover.  This is due to the contextual factors which determine particular resolutions
of context sensitivity being too fine grained (or hidden in other ways) for audiences and speakers to
quickly  and  reliably  resolve  such  context  sensitivity  correctly.  As  a  result,  in  many  recovery
problem cases the beliefs audiences form will fail safety and sensitivity conditions on knowledge.
This appears to hold even in cases in which the speaker is a reliable belief former (with respect to
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the topic of their testimony) and has no intention to deceive.  
I start by outlining the recovery problem, and differentiating it from several related problems in the
philosophy of language.   Next I  explain how the recovery problem relates to (and is a serious
problem for) the theory of testimonial knowledge.  The relation is not as straightforward as one may
think,  since  the  recovery  problem  concerns  audiences  beliefs  about  what  testimony  has  been
offered, whereas most theories of testimonial knowledge concern only the testimony which actually
has  been offered.   Finally,  in  the  second half  of  the  chapter  I  consider  and reject  a  series  of
responses.
However,  before  continuing it  is  worth  briefly mentioning a  related  worry raised  by Goldberg
(2007).  Goldberg considers cases in which audiences either recover a content other than what is
said, or are at risk of doing so.  Call these cases of mismatch.  The problem I raise also concerns
cases of mismatch.  However, Goldberg thinks that mismatch always blocks testimonial knowledge.
He gives the following reasoning: 
'Suppose S tells H that p, but that for some reason or other the process by which H recovers
the proposition attested to  is  not  reliable.  In  that  case,  even if  H  correctly recovers  the
content  of  S’s  telling,  this  process  of  recovery  will  involve  a  knowledge-undermining
element of luck. To see this, suppose that the content of S’s actual telling was that p. There
are nearby worlds in which what S told H was something else – that r, say. In that case, so
long as p is a contingent proposition, in some of these worlds p will be false. Even so, in a
good many of those worlds in which p is false, H will accept p, taking this (incorrectly) to be
the upshot of what S said.' Goldberg, (2007), 44.
Goldberg is mistaken to claim that so long as p is contingent there will be nearby worlds at which it
is false. Chapter two clearly illustrates that Goldberg's argument fails, at least when speakers and
hearers do happen to coordinate on the same content. However, Goldberg's claim seems false for
some cases where speakers and hearers fail to coordinate on the same content as well. For example,
p and r might be truth conditionally equivalent and just differ in Fregean sense.  Or, if the speaker
knows that she may be misinterpreted as asserting p, but knows that p is true and and close to r, then
she might allow the audience to misinterpret her.  In such a situation it seems that the audience's
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belief is a candidate for knowledge.  We can also imagine that in some cases the proposition the
speaker asserts will be related to the proposition the audience recovers in such a way that they only
diverge in truth value at distant worlds29.  Indeed, in general the mere contingency of a proposition
doesn't entail that there are nearby worlds at which that proposition is false.  Moreover, several well
motivated theories in the philosophy of language and psycholinguistics (for example, Bezuidenhout
(1997), Recanati (2004), Heck (2002), Carston (2002), and Sperber and Wilson (1986)) seem to
entail that  mismatch is extremely common (this was illustrated in the brief discussion of mismatch
arguments in chapter one).  If this is the case then we would be forced to either adopt a rather
widespread skepticism about testimony, or reject these seemingly well motivated theories.  I am
hesitant  to  reject  such theories  without  a  detailed  investigation into the  precise ways  in  which
mismatch is epistemically problematic.  This chapter constitutes part of such an investigation.  I
illustrate a particular way in which mismatch often does seem to block  knowledge.  However, it is
far from clear that all cases of mismatch will block knowledge.  Thus, although the problem I raise
does sanction a sceptical view of many of our seemingly testimonial beliefs, it is not clear that it
sanctions the sort of widespread scepticism necessary to reject otherwise well motivated theories of
linguistic communication.  
1. Context Sensitivity.
In order to get clear on the recovery problem it will be instructive to consider a slightly broader
range of issues.  This will be useful both in distinguishing the problem from several related issues,
and also in highlighting the fact that it is one amongst a web of related issues in the philosophy of
language, all of which may raise difficult questions in the epistemology of testimony.  
Normal  Communication  is  rife  with  context  sensitivity.   That  is,  often  assertions  of  the  same
sentence in different contexts will communicate different propositions.  As a result, audiences must
rely  on  their  knowledge  of  the  conversational  context  to  understand  the  speaker.  There  is
disagreement  about  the form this  context  sensitivity takes.   Many theorists  identify speech act
content with semantic content, accounting for context sensitivity by maintaining that the context
29 Goldberg considers similar responses, and maintains that if the audience believes anything other than the proposition
asserted then their belief is not properly testimonial, since it does not involve the correct sort of reliance on the 
speaker.  I am happy to accept this consequence.  As I explain in section 2 the problem I raise concerns beliefs 
audiences form whilst attempting to form testimonial beliefs.  It does not matter for the discussion here whether 
such beliefs are properly testimonial.  
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invariant  semantic  content  of  a  sentence is  often insufficient  to determine a fully propositional
content.  For the majority of this chapter I will be assuming this view.  However, this assumption is
not  essential,  and it  is  not universally held.  Some theorists  maintain that  semantic  content  and
speech act content come apart.  For example, Borg (2012, p14) maintains that the sentence 'there is
nothing  to  eat'  semantically  expresses  the  proposition  that  there  is  nothing  to  eat  (in  some
unrestricted domain), but that  that sentence will typically be used to assert that there is nothing to
eat in some restricted domain (e.g. in the fridge).   This distinction between speech act content and
semantic content has been embraced by semantic minimalists (e.g. Borg (2004, 2012), Cappelen
and Lepore (2004)), who claim that outside of a small set of cases the invariant semantic content of
a sentence does determine a propositional content.  By drawing this distinction they are able to
maintain that speech act content is highly context sensitive whilst denying that semantic content is
context sensitive.   
In this chapter the recovery problem is framed in terms of an audience's ability to reliably assign the
correct value to a context sensitive term (thus, a close relationship between speech act and semantic
content  is  assumed).   However,  what  really  matters  is  that  asserted  content  is  highly  context
sensitive.  When we acquire testimonial beliefs we come to believe the proposition we take the
speaker to have asserted30. The problems which are raised here concern the recovery of asserted
contents. So, for example, when this chapter discusses the difficulties of assigning the correct value
to a context sensitive term it may  be controversial whether that term really is semantically context
sensitive.  However, those who deny the semantic context sensitivity will often agree that its use is
typically context sensitive. Thus analogous problems will arise concerning the audience's recovery
of the speaker's intended meaning. Thus, although the framing of the problem assumes the falsity of
semantic minimalism, the main point holds for minimalist views and contextualist views alike, as
long as it is acknowledged that asserted content is context sensitive (we will consider minimalism
about asserted contents in section 5).  
The context sensitivity of asserted contents raises several important questions.  There is a question
regarding which  additional  factors  determine  the  proposition  expressed  by an  assertion  of  that
sentence in context.  Moreover, there is a related epistemic question concerning how and when
30 Cappelen and Lepore hold that minimal propositions are always asserted along with many other propositions.  On their
view we might well take the minimal content to be asserted, however we would not treat it as the only, or even the
primary content of the assertion.  
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audiences are in a position to know what has been asserted (and a related psychological question
concerning the actual mechanisms by which audiences recover that content).  
In the case of simple indexicals (such as 'I', 'here', and 'now') these questions do not seem especially
challenging.   Although  the  value  assigned  to  'I'  varies  with  context,  its  value  is  seemingly
determined by a simple rule which is, in most cases, easy to apply31.  However, the metaphysical
and  epistemic  questions  become  more  challenging  when  we  move  beyond   simple  indexicals.
Consider demonstratives such as 'that', and pronouns such as 'she'.  It is not clear that there is a
simple  rule  (like  ''I'  refers  to  the  speaker')  which  relates  an  occurrence  of  a  pronoun  or
demonstrative to its referent.  In the case of pronouns there are certainly constrains on suitable
referents  (for  example,  'she'  can  usually  only  be  used  to  refer  to  a  female).   However,  these
constraints alone are not sufficient to determine a referent.  Some further contextual factor must
supplement the meaning of the term in order for a referent to be assigned.  I follow King (2013,
forthcoming  a,  forthcoming b)  in  calling  terms  which  require  such contextual  supplementation
'supplementives'. 
Most views of the meta-semantics of context sensitivity raise epistemic questions.  However, when
the value to be assigned is simply a referent (as in the case of demonstratives and pronouns) these
epistemic questions will usually be fairly easy to resolve, for there will not usually be a proliferation
of  candidate  referents  to  choose  from.   However,  more  difficult  epistemic  and  metaphysical
questions arise when we consider supplementives with more complex contextual values (call such
terms 'complex supplementives').  Consider quantifier domain restriction: usually when someone
utters 'every beer is in the fridge' they do not intend to communicate that every beer in the universe
is in the fridge.  Rather, they intend to communicate that every beer in some more restricted domain
is in the fridge.  The context must supply a domain restriction, and it is standardly thought that this
restriction is supplied in the form of a property  (Stanley & Szabó (2000))32.   In the case of 'every
beer is in the fridge' the restriction might be a property such as '..for the party'.  So the proposition
expressed might be 'Every beer  for the party is in the fridge'.  The problem with such contextual
values is that there will usually be many very similar values which could be assigned in a given
instance.  
31 Although, see Sidelle (1991), Predelli (1998a, 1998b, 2002, 2011), Romdenh-Romluc (2002, 2006), Corazza, Fish, 
and Gorvett (2002), Gorvett (2005), and Cohen (2013).
32 Stanley and Szabó explain that only a property (or other intensional restrictor) will give the correct modal profile for
the proposition expressed. 
65
This gives rise to both metaphysical and epistemic questions.  For example, imagine you arrive at a
party and I say 'every beer is in the fridge'.  Is the correct restriction 'every beer for the party is in
the fridge', 'every beer I am free to offer is in the fridge', or some other proposition?  Whatever one's
meta-semantics for supplementives it seems unlikely that one will be able to easily account for the
fact that one of these restrictions is correct and the others are incorrect.  For example, it seems
unlikely that a speaker would intend one of these restrictions over any of the others33.  This suggests
that it  may often be indeterminate what is asserted.   This indeterminacy about what is asserted
raises  interesting  questions  for  the  epistemology  of  testimony,  since  theories  of  testimonial
knowledge are usually formulated in terms of a speaker having asserted (or said, or testified that
etc.) a particular proposition.  However, I will not be focusing on these questions here, rather I will
be focusing on a purely epistemic problem.  
Assume for the moment that speakers do generally assert particular propositions, and that audiences
aim  to  recover  the  proposition  asserted34.   An  epistemic  problem  arises.   When  complex
supplementives are used there will  be a multitude of potential values which could be assigned.
Some  of  these  values  will  be  extremely  similar.   Thus,  the  contexts  which  determine  one
proposition over another will differ only very minimally35.  The features of such contexts which
determine  that  one  proposition  rather  than  another  is  asserted  will  be  extremely  fine  grained.
Indeed, such contexts will often be close to indiscriminable36.  This will be true regardless of one's
meta-semantics of context sensitivity.  Unfortunately,  the audience's knowledge of the context is
comparatively coarse grained.  Audiences interpret extremely quickly, and without much conscious
consideration of the evidence (especially in low stakes or casual situations).  It would take more
time and processing power than a normal audience has at their disposal to make the sorts of very
fine grained distinctions required to eliminate all the competing interpretations. The situation seems
even  more  severe  if  one  adopts  the  speaker  intentions  view  assumed  in  chapter  two:  speaker
33 The dominant view is that a speaker's intention that a particular value be assigned is at least a necessary condition on 
that value being assigned.  See Donnellan (1966, 1968), Kaplan (1989), Åkerman (2009, 2010), Stokke (2010), and 
King (2013, forthcoming a, forthcoming b).
34 This assumption seems common in the epistemology of testimony. However, I will argue at the end of section 5 that
we can do away with it and still get the problem.
35 Its unclear which aspect of the context determines the proposition expressed.  The default view is that  speaker 
intentions determine the asserted proposition. Thus, the 'fine grained aspects of the context' which determine 
different asserted contents might be slight differences in the speaker's intentions. The recovery problem will thus 
concern our ability to discern contexts at which speakers have slightly differing intentions.
36 This argument is similar to what Dorr and Hawthorne (2014) call an 'argument from abundance'.  A similar line is 
pushed by Williamson (1997).
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intentions are internal and only revealed via the linguistic clues they provide, thus it is not clear that
any amount of time or processing power would allow the audience to select the correct value37.  
So, fine grained aspects of the context determine the values complex supplementives are assigned,
yet the audience's knowledge of the context is comparatively coarse grained, meaning that there will
often be multiple propositions which, for all the audience knows, could have been asserted (call
these propositions  'epistemic candidates for what  is  said'  or just  'epistemic candidates').   These
epistemic candidates will  not be constrained by the speaker's communicative intentions (or any
other relevant aspect of the context) since they are precisely candidates which, for all the audience
knows, may have been intended (or determined by some other aspect of the context).  That is, even
if  the  speaker's  intentions  suffice  to  determine  that  one  proposition  is  asserted,  the  audience's
contextual knowledge may not be sufficient for them to identify precisely which proposition this is
(as the audience's access to the speaker's intentions will be limited). Since we are assuming that
audiences do reach a somewhat determinate interpretation, the psychological processes underlying
understanding  must  select  one  of  these  epistemic  candidates  over  the  others.  Although  these
processes will no doubt reliably track epistemic candidates, there is no reason to think that they
would reliably result in the audience entertaining the precise proposition asserted, for it is unclear
how they could do so.
In order to get clear on the problem it is worth considering an example.  Matt and Sally are at Matt's
house. Sally says 'I am hungry, is there any food?', to which Matt responds 'Sorry, there isn’t any
food, lets order a pizza'.  Sally agrees, and they order a pizza.  Clearly Matt was not saying that
there isn't any food  anywhere.  He was saying that there is no food in some restricted domain.
However, there are many similar ways the domain could be restricted, here are a few: 
1. There isn't any food belonging to Matt.
2. There isn't any food belonging to Matt or  Tom (Matt's house mate).
3. There isn't any food that Matt is willing to share.
4. There isn't any food which Sally likes and which meets the above criteria.
37  Indeed, supposing that in order to rationally intend to communicate p a speaker must have a reasonable expectation
that the audience will recognise that intention, it seems irrational for a speaker to intend any particular value, for the
audience will rarely ever be in a position to recognise which particular value was intended.  This leads Buchanan (2010)
to conclude that propositions cannot be the objects of speaker meaning. 
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5. etc38.
How could  Sally  reliably conclude  that  one  of  these  restrictions  was  is  correct?   In  a  typical
situation  Sally  would  process  and  respond to  the  assertion  extremely quickly,  without  explicit
reflective consideration of the evidence.  She would likely assign a restriction similar to the ones
listed above, but she would be lucky if she assigned the precise correct one. This is true regardless
of Matt's communicative intentions (or any other objective features of the context) since Sally's
evidence (in a typical situation) would not allow her to distinguish between a context in which, say,
1 was intended (or otherwise determined) rather than 2.  
This  concludes  my basic  outline  of  the  recovery  problem.   Before  showing  that  the  recovery
problem generates a problem in the epistemology of testimony  it will be necessary to say a word
about epistemic norms in order to get clear how exactly the recovery problem relates to current
views of testimonial knowledge and justification.  
2. Testimony and Uptake Norms.
The recovery problem primarily concerns our ability to reliably recovery what is said.  However, as
noted  in  the  introduction  the  conditions  for  testimonial  justification  or  knowledge  are  usually
formulated in terms of a speaker having said that  p  and certain other conditions being met.  For
example, most theorists accept something at least as liberal as the following39:
Uptake: A hearer H has the epistemic right to accept speaker S's testimony that p if (i) there
are no (doxastic or normative40) defeaters, and (ii) H monitors S for trustworthiness (and is
thus sensitive to the speaker's trustworthiness).
38 It might be thought that the correct restriction is 'relevant food', or 'available food'.  However, it is not clear what 
actually counts as available or relevant.  Does food that Sally dislikes count as relevant or available?  It is not clear, 
thus the epistemic problem will still occur on such restrictions.  
39 With anti-reductionists usually accepting a far more liberal norm which doesn't require condition (ii) (or  a similar 
condition) to be met.
40   A normative defeater is a proposition an agent should believe, which would undermine their belief.  
68
Thus, it may not be clear how the recovery problem relates to the epistemology of testimony.  After
all,  the recovery problem simply illustrates  that  sometimes audiences will  end up recovering a
proposition other than what is said.  As formulated above, norms such as Uptake do sanction belief
in those recovery problem cases where the audience does happen to recover what is said41, so it is
worth considering the epistemic status of the beliefs formed in such circumstances.  However, most
uptake norms are silent on what the audience should do in the majority of recovery problem cases,
since it is unlikely that audiences will recover the precise proposition asserted in such cases. 
In order to see why the recovery problem is of interest we must briefly consider the way epistemic
norms relate to epistemic practices.  Epistemic norms often hold that an audience should form a
belief only under certain conditions.  However (at least for externalist norms) agents are not always
in a position to know that those conditions obtain.  Thus, the epistemic practices of a normal agent
attempting  to  follow such  norms  will  sometimes  deviate  from the  practices  of  an  ideal  agent
attempting to follow such norms.  If an agent frequently ends up in situations where it misleadingly
appears that the conditions for justified belief (or knowledge) obtain then, whilst trying to follow
aforementioned epistemic norms, agents will violate said norms and form unsanctioned beliefs.  If
we find out that agents do (with some degree of regularity) find themselves in such situations then it
is  worth considering the epistemic status of the beliefs thereby formed.   If  such beliefs fail  to
constitute knowledge then we will have identified a set of beliefs normal, seemingly responsible
agents  (ourselves  included)  tend  to  form  in  particular  circumstance,  which  fail  to  constitute
knowledge.  Thus, we will be warranted in adopting a more sceptical stance to beliefs formed via
that method in those circumstances.   
This is precisely the situation which arises with respect to the recovery problem.  Although the
epistemic norms endorsed by most epistemologists don't sanction belief in the majority of recovery
problem cases, normal epistemic agents attempting to form beliefs in accordance with such norms
will form unsanctioned beliefs in cases where the recovery problem arises.  If such beliefs fail to
constitute knowledge then we will have discovered a set of unremarkable circumstances in which
seemingly  responsible  agents  regularly  go  wrong  when  attempting  to  acquire  testimonial
knowledge. 
41 This result could be avoided by adding a condition requiring that audiences know what has been said.  In the 
objections and responses section I will argue that this response is unsatisfactory. 
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3. The Recovery Problem and Testimonial Knowledge.
In order to see why the recovery problem often blocks knowledge we must consider not only the
audience's knowledge of context, but also the speaker's knowledge of context.  An idealised speaker
would know which interpretations they leave open to the audience.  Thus, a trustworthy idealised
speaker would only leave open epistemic candidates which they knew to be true.  So, testimony
from such a speaker would usually yield safe and sensitive beliefs even in cases where the recovery
problem occurred.  Unfortunately actual speakers fall short of this ideal.  Ordinary speakers are
limited in many of the ways that audiences are.  The psychological factors that lead an audience
member to select one epistemic candidate over another are internal, thus the speaker will not know
which interpretation the audience will select.  Moreover, like audiences speakers have neither the
time nor the cognitive resources with which to consider all the interpretations they may be leaving
open.  Rather, speakers will often make an assertion on the basis of their knowledge of a particular
proposition, with little consideration of ways in which the audience might misinterpret them.  The
extent to which speakers monitor for potential misinterpretation will, of course, vary with context –
when  the  message  is  extremely  important  and  misinterpretation  carries  a  high  degree  of  risk
speakers will be far more careful about what they say.  However, the majority of our everyday
communicative interactions are not like this.  We assert quickly and move on. This is corroborated
by the studies by Keysar et  al  discussed in chapter one.   Those studies indicated that speakers
generally over estimated their ability to reliably communicate ambiguous information.  If this is
correct even in experimental conditions where participants are made explicitly aware of the fact that
they are communicating with ambiguous terms then it  seems likely that  speakers are even less
sensitive  to  small  errors  in  comprehension  in  normal  cases.  Thus,  in  recovery  problem cases
speakers will often run the risk of leaving open interpretations which are false, or not known to be
true.
Consider a case where the speaker does inadvertently leave open some false epistemic candidates.
In such cases the audience will select from a group of propositions, some of which are true, and
some of which are false.  The cognitive mechanisms which lead them to select one interpretation
over another will not be sensitive to the truth of the epistemic candidates (it is hard to see how they
could be).  Thus, if the audience selects a true proposition from amongst the epistemic candidates it
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will largely be a result of luck.  To illustrate this, consider Matt and Sally again:  Matt left open the
following epistemic candidates: 
1. There isn't any food belonging to Matt.
2. There isn't any food belonging to Matt or  Tom (Matt's house mate).
3. There isn't any food that Matt is willing to share.
4. There isn't any food which Sally likes and which meets the above criteria.
5. etc.
He might  have  asserted  'There  isn't  any food'  on  the  basis  of  his  knowledge of  any of  these.
Imagine that he asserted it on the basis of his knowledge of 1.  Would the falsity of, say, 2 prevent
him from asserting 'There isn't any food'?  In many cases it would not.  Suppose that Tom does have
some food, and that he is generally very open about sharing his food.  In such a circumstance 2
would be false.  Yet its falsity would not reliably block Matt's assertion because, given the limited
time and cognitive resources he has at his disposal whilst planning his utterance (together with the
inattentiveness which typifies casual low stakes utterances), it could easily fail to occur to him that
a reasonable audience might interpret him this way.  Yet, an audience member who knew about
Tom's liberal attitude toward sharing may well interpret Matt this way, especially if Tom is salient to
the audience at the time of interpretation. In such a case the audience would form a false belief.
Indeed, even if they selected a true epistemic candidate it would largely be down to luck, since they
could  have  easily  selected  the  interpretation  determined  by  2  instead.   In  such  a  case  belief
formation  is  reminiscent  of  pulling  propositions  out  of  a  hat  containing  both  true  and  false
propositions.  The psychological mechanisms which guide interpretation will no doubt ensure that
the hat contains no obviously false propositions.  However, it is hard to see how they could filter out
propositions like 2 in cases where they are false.  
So, in some recovery problem cases the speaker will leave open false epistemic candidates, and the
audience will not gain knowledge.  But what about cases in which all the epistemic candidates are
true?  It appears that these cases are also problematic.  Consider a version of the Matt and Sally case
in which every epistemic candidate  is  true;  as  it  happens there is  no food at  all  in  the house.
Suppose that Sally comes to the true belief that there is no food owned by Matt or Tom, but Matt
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made his assertion on the basis of his knowledge that he himself had no food.  In such a situation
Sally's belief will fail both sensitivity and safety conditions on knowledge.  Consider Sensitivity
first:
Sensitivity: 'A belief by S that p is 'sensitive' iff were it not so that p, S would not believe
that p'. Sosa, (1999), 141.
That is, a belief that  p is sensitive iff in the closest possible worlds where  p is false S no longer
believes that  p.  Sally's belief that there is no food belonging to  Matt or Tom fails this condition.
Many of the closest worlds at which it is false, for example worlds where Tom has some food, are
worlds at which Matt still says 'there is no food'.  After all, he asserted it only on the basis of his
knowledge that he had no food, he never considered Tom's food.  Thus many of the closest worlds
at which p is false are worlds at which Sally still comes to believe p.  Next consider Safety:
Safety: 'A belief by S that p is 'safe' iff: S would believe that p only if it were so that p'. Sosa,
(1999), 142.
Sally's belief also fails safety (at least, in many cases).  Supposing that it is normal for Tom to keep
food in the house it could easily have been the case that the proposition Sally came to believe was
false.  That is, supposing that Tom normally keeps food in the house, there are plenty of nearby
worlds  in  which  he  does  have  food.  However,  since  Matt  asserted  only  on  the  basis  of  his
knowledge that he himself lacked food (without ever considering Tom) he would have still uttered
'There isn't any food' in these worlds.  Moreover, since the two situations are  phenomenologically
indistinguishable to Sally she will form the same belief (that neither Matt nor Tom have any food)
in these worlds.  Thus, there will be a significant number of nearby worlds in which Sally forms the
same belief via the same method, in which her belief is false.  More generally, in recovery problem
cases in which the proposition the audience comes to believe differs slightly from the proposition
the speaker intends, there will often be nearby worlds in which the audience forms the same belief
but in which the belief is false.  That is, in such cases the truth of the proposition believed by the
audience will not be strongly tied to their reason for belief - the speaker makes an utterance on the
basis of their knowledge of a proposition p1, the truth of which is independent of the proposition p2
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which the audience comes to believe.  It will often be a matter of mere luck when both propositions
turn out to be true42.   
It is worth noting that this problem does not depend on any particular view of the meta-semantics of
context sensitivity.  Essentially the problem is that in certain cases speakers will be disposed to utter
a  sentence  S on  the  basis  of  their  knowledge  of  a  proposition  p  (and  with  the  intention  to
communicate  p),  in  circumstances  where  a  similar  proposition  q  is  false,  and  in  which  some
competent audiences might interpret an utterance of S as expressing q.  If one has an intention based
meta-semantics then this will  be a situation in which a speaker asserts  p  and is misinterpreted.
However, if one thinks that what is said is audience sensitive then it might be a situation in which
the speaker accidentally asserts q, or in which it is indeterminate what is actually said. As long as
the audience thinks something has been asserted, and the speaker takes themselves to have made an
assertion, the problem can occur. 
It is an empirical question just how often the recovery problem arises.  It will likely arise in many
contexts where complex supplementives or loose talk are present, and in which speakers are not
optimally  attentive  to  possible  misinterpretation.   To  get  a  grasp  on  just  how  common  such
situations seem to be we need merely reflect on the sort of situations we find ourselves in every day
when we socialise at the pub, relax at home with our partners, or engage in passing small talk in the
department.  These situations make up a significant percentage of our communicative interactions,
yet they are precisely the sorts of situations in which we speak loosely and reflect little on how we
might be precisely interpreted.  Thus, the recovery problem is not confined to a small class of cases
we can safely ignore43.
42  The situation gets worse when we consider chains of testimony, which have the potential for a Chinese whisper
effect.  Even if the first audience member entertains the proposition the speaker intended, it is unlikely the final member
of the chain will.  Whatever epistemic value there was in the first testimonial belief will be diluted further down the
chain.  Things are worse still if a speaker is required to know  p in order for an audience to gain knowledge that  p
(although, see Lackey (1999)), for a single problematic utterance could cause all the following testimonial beliefs to fall
short of knowledge. 
43  It seems that the problem is less likely to arise in high stakes contexts (where misinterpretation carries a risk of
meaningful repercussions).   There are two reasons for this.   Firstly,   hearers accept testimony less readily in such
contexts (and hedge their beliefs more).  Secondly, speakers are more careful about what they say in such contexts.  
73
4. Response: Defeaters.
Uptake contains a no (normative or doxastic) defeater condition.  Thus, if there are doxastic or
normative  defeaters  present  in  recovery problem cases  then  audiences  attempting  to  behave in
accordance with Uptake will not form beliefs.  This response faces several problems.
Firstly, normative defeaters are facts or propositions which defeat an agent's belief and which the
agent  should  be aware of.   This  suggests  that  agents  are  blameworthy for  not  being  aware  of
normative defeaters.  If this is correct it seems that if a fact is to count as a normative defeater then
it should be something an ordinary agent can be reasonably expected to grasp.  If we have to do a
lot of theoretical work in order to discover p, work which the average agent is not in a position to
do, then p is not a normative defeater.  However, the recovery problem, and the problems it causes
for  testimonial  belief  formation,  have  not  been  widely  recognized  by even  epistemologists  of
testimony.  If the experts on testimony have not recognized the phenomenon or its problematic
nature then it seems far fetched to claim that average audience should.  Thus it seems far fetched to
argue that there are normative defeaters available in recovery problem cases.  
Secondly, it is not clear how normal audiences would come to possess doxastic defeaters which
would block belief in recovery problem cases.  The most plausible approach would be to follow
Lackey  (2006)  in  claiming  that  audiences  possess  inductive  grounds  for  considering  certain
conversational contexts to be epistemically unsafe, and argue that these contexts include the sorts of
situation in which the recovery problem is likely to arise.  Lackey is surely correct that audiences
posses inductive grounds for considering certain contexts to be unsafe. For example, we are far
more trusting of assertions made in the doctors office than at the poker table.  Moreover, it does
seem that the recovery problem will be more prevalent in certain types of context.  These will be
contexts in which the stakes are low, and the information communicated is relatively unimportant.
In such contexts loose talk and context sensitivity will be more common, and speakers will dedicate
fewer resources to checking for potential misinterpretation.  Do audiences possess evidence that
such contexts are epistemically unsafe?  It is hard to see how they would.  We rarely become aware
of minor miscommunications.  In the sorts of situations I have been discussing the conversation will
usually carry on smoothly despite the slight miscommunication. Indeed, it might even be thought
that audiences possess positive (misleading) reasons for thinking such contexts are unproblematic.
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The  propositions  left  open  in  most  recovery problem cases  will  usually  be  close  to  the  truth,
especially in relevant practical consequences44.  Thus, when agents act on their testimonial beliefs it
will be, in most recognisable respects, as if those beliefs were true.  This generates the illusion that
low stakes contexts are epistemically safe environments (a similar point is made by Keysar (2007)
who points out that, from all we know by engaging in normal communicative behaviour, linguistic
communication could actually be significantly less reliable than we generally assume).  
Indeed, as discussed in more detail in chapter one, and as mentioned earlier in this chapter, there is
even experimental evidence that we overestimate our own effectiveness as communicators.  Boaz
Keysar  and  Anne  Henley  (2002)  found  that  speakers  regularly  overestimate  their  own
communicative  abilities  when  making  ambiguous  utterances.   Even  when  made  aware  of  the
specific  ambiguity  in  their  utterances  speakers  were  found  to  significantly  overestimate  the
reliability  with  which  audiences  were  able  to  recover  their  intended  message.   If  such
overestimation  of  reliability  is  significant  even  under  experimental  conditions  where  the
participants are made explicitly aware of the possibility of miscommunication, then it is likely even
more prevalent in ordinary contexts where the possibility of miscommunication is not made salient.
Thus, the defeater strategy does not seem promising. 
A related response is that uptake norms should be formulated with the requirement that the audience
be in a position to know that  p has been asserted (or intended).  In chapter two we saw that the
knowledge of what is said requirement on testimonial knowledge should be rejected.  However,
there are two further problems with this as a response specifically to the recovery problem.  Firstly,
it usually appears to us that we know what the speaker has said (even in cases of loose talk and
context sensitivity).  Thus, audiences attempting to follow such modified norms would still form
beliefs in recovery problem cases.  Secondly, the sceptical result emerging from this view is actually
even more extreme than the sceptical view which seems to arise from the recovery problem as I
have  formulated  it.   I  argue  that  audiences  often  lack  knowledge  in  recovery  problem cases.
However, if we were to accept the 'knowledge of what is said' requirement then we would be forced
to claim that  audiences  are  never  even justified in  forming testimonial  beliefs  in  any recovery
problem cases – even when the speaker knows which epistemic candidates have been left open, and
knows each candidate to be true. 
44 What I mean by this is that given the aims and interests of the conversational participants similar courses of action 
will usually be sanctioned by each epistemic candidate.  True and false candidates alike.  This is the sense in which they
are close to the truth.
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5. Response:  Alternative Propositional Objects of Assertion45.
So far it has been assumed that speakers generally intend to assert, and audiences generally recover,
single  fine  grained propositions.   This  assumption  can  be  questioned.   Perhaps  the  testimonial
beliefs we form, and are justified in forming, are coarse grained.  If the propositions audiences
recover are highly coarse grained then we might be able to avoid the recovery problem.  This will
be the case if the propositions believed are true at all (or almost all) the worlds at which any of the
fine grained epistemic candidates are true (such a proposition would be equivalent to the disjunction
of the fine grained epistemic candidates).  Beliefs in such propositions will not be as vulnerable to
failures of safety and sensitivity.  This response gains intuitive support from the fact that we don't
seem to explicitly form the sorts  of fine grained beliefs I  have been discussing.   For example,
thinking back to the Max and Sally case, it seems unrealistic to claim that Sally explicitly entertains
the restriction “food which belongs to either Matt or Tom”.  
There are three ways of developing this response: Firstly we might maintain that audiences only
form a very general testimonial beliefs.  Secondly, we might maintain that the audience comes to
believe a coarse grained proposition in addition to some more fine grained proposition.  Finally,
these responses can be combined by maintaining that we only form testimonial beliefs in very
general propositions, but merely accept, or assign raised credences to, fine grained propositions.  
Before discussing these responses it is important to consider the intuitive claim that we don't form
the sorts of fine grained beliefs that give rise to the recovery problem. I think that it is true that we
don't  explicitly form such beliefs.  However, this does not undermine the problem.  To see this,
consider the commonly drawn distinction between occurrent (or explicit) and dispositional beliefs
(a similar distinction is drawn by Buckwalter, Rose, and Turri (forthcoming)).  Often when we form
a belief  we explicitly represent  the  proposition  we come to believe,  and mentally assent  to  it.
Clearly Sally  would  not  explicitly represent  and assent  to  the  proposition  'there  isn't  any food
belonging to Matt or Tom' in response to Matt's assertion.  Indeed, her explicit mental representation
may be somewhat indeterminate in the same way Matt's assertion is.  However, the mere fact that
45 This section has benefited from discussions and comments from Don Fallis, Jennifer Lackey, Nick Hughes, and 
Torfin Huvenes.  
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she does not explicitly represent and assent to the proposition does not mean that she does not
believe it.  Many of our beliefs are merely dispositional, or implicit. For example, you no doubt
believe that there are no plastic mice on Mars.  However, it  is unlikely that you ever explicitly
represented and assented to this proposition (until now).  Likewise, if I see what appears to be a
racing car approaching I might explicitly represent and mentally assent to the proposition 'there is a
racing car approaching'.  Yet, it is unlikely that this exhausts the beliefs I form upon seeing the car.
For example, although I may not explicitly represent and assent to the proposition 'that car will be
loud', I might still cover my ears, or exhibit surprise if it were to pass by without making a sound.
The mental state that gives rise to these dispositions (or perhaps consists in these dispositions) is
formed in response to the evidence of my senses, and it interacts with my desires (for example my
desire not to be deafened) in order to bring about action.  So, although I never explicitly entertain
the thought 'the car approaching will be loud', it certainly seems that I have a belief along those
lines.  My claim is that we often form relatively fine grained dispositional beliefs in response to
testimony.   These beliefs are revealed through the dispositions we acquire  when confronted by
another's testimony. 
It is conceivable that one might wish to save the word 'belief' for mental states involving explicit
representation of, and assent to, propositions. We might label unconscious mental representations
belief*.  Such a change would not make a substantial difference.  My belief* will represent the
world as being a certain way, this representation will guide my behaviour, and it will be evidence
responsive46. Thus, it is hard to think of a reason to worry about unjustified, false, or unsafe beliefs
which are not also reasons to worry about unjustified, false, or unsafe beliefs*.  If the fine grained
representations I am claiming we acquire in response to testimony are in fact beliefs*, then the
recovery problem will be just as worrying.  For that reason I will continue to call these unconscious
mental states simply 'beliefs'. 
The first version of the coarse grained proposition response maintains that the only beliefs normal
audiences form in recovery problem cases are highly coarse grained.  This, entails that it would be
unusual for Sally to form a belief such as 'there is no food belonging to Matt or Tom'.  Of course, it
would be unusual for her to explicitly form such a belief.  However, we have just seen that not all
the beliefs we form are fully explicit. Many of our beliefs are reviled through the dispositions we
46 Indeed, as Rose and Schaffer (2013), and Buckwalter, Rose, and Turri forthcoming argue, they are capable of 
constituting knowledge. 
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acquire upon forming them.  If Tom's open food policy were salient to Sally at the time of Matt's
assertion then she would, in many cases, acquire the disposition to be surprised upon finding her
favourite foodstuff in the fridge labelled 'Property of Tom'.  This suggests that it  would not be
unusual for her to form a dispositional belief concerning Tom's food, meaning that standard practice
does not involve only forming highly coarse grained beliefs.  Such a reaction would be unusual if
we normally form only highly coarse grained beliefs in recovery problem cases.  So this response
fails47.
A second way to push this objection is to maintain that audiences form highly general beliefs in
addition to more fine grained beliefs.  Since these coarse grained beliefs will usually be safe and
sensitive audiences  will  usually gain  some knowledge in  addition to  some unsafe  fine  grained
beliefs.  It is unclear whether this constitutes really a response at all.  We retain the consequence
that ordinary agents form many false or luckily true beliefs in recovery problem cases, and merely
add that we do at least gain some minimal knowledge in addition.  It is not clear that the additional
knowledge adds much of value, since we will still act on our more fine grained beliefs.  
To get a feel for just how unsatisfying this response is consider an analogous skeptical argument
concerning perception.  Suppose it is argued that many of the perceptual beliefs we form in certain
circumstances  are  the  result  of  potentially  misleading  cognitive  penetration  (the  influence  of
expectations, beliefs, and biases on the content/character of one's perceptual experience), and  are at
best luckily true (see Siegel (2012, 2013, and forthcoming) for discussion of the actual epistemic
impact of cognitive penetration).  One might argue that my current belief that there is a water bottle
in front of me is likely to be either false or luckily true because, as a result of cognitive penetration,
I would have had the belief that there was a water bottle in front of me even if it were in fact a beer
bottle.  In such circumstances I would still form the true beliefs that there is a bottle in front of me,
and that I would be refreshed if I were to consume its contents.  However, this observation should
provide little comfort, since I still have a fine grained false or luckily true belief which I am likely
to act on.  Likewise, it is of little comfort to maintain that Sally at least gains  some  testimonial
knowledge, since she also forms a significant belief which she may well act on, and which falls sort
of knowledge. 
A third version of the coarse grained proposition response runs as follows: the object of testimonial
47 Additionally, there will still be a proliferation of very similar coarse grained epistemic candidates.  Coarse grained
propositions can differ in fine grained ways.  It is not clear how the audience could reliably recover the correct coarse
grained proposition over one of the many similar coarse grained propositions, thus the recovery problem will still arise.
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belief is coarse grained, so testimonial beliefs are safe and sensitive.  However, we adopt weaker
attitudes  to  the  fine  grained  epistemic  candidates.   These  weakened  attitudes  explain  the
dispositions we acquire as a result of uptake.  There are two ways to develop this line – either in
terms of mere acceptance (perhaps as discussed in Bratman (1992), or Van Fraassen (1980)), or in
terms of a raised (but sub-belief) credence.  The main reason to be skeptical of the mere acceptance
response is  that  acceptance seems to  be a  reflective attitude  – a  way of  hedging our  beliefs48.
However, we seem far less prone to hedging in sorts of context in which the recovery problem
arises (low stakes casual contexts where miscommunication carries little practical risk).  Uptake in
low stakes contexts is usually fast, automatic, and unreflective.  Thus it is unlikely that our default
reaction in such contexts is mere acceptance.  
The second version of this response does not seem to capture the full extent of the dispositions we
acquire on the basis of testimonial uptake.  Perhaps a raised (but sub belief) credence is enough to
explain  Sally's  surprise  at  finding  her  favourite  food  in  the  fridge.   However,  there  are  more
problematic dispositions Sally may acquire acquire.  Consider the following continuation of the
Matt ad Sally case: Matt tells Sally 'there isn't any food'.  Tom's partner then enters and asks if there
is any food. Sally responds 'no, there isn't any food, but we're ordering a Pizza'.  This is a fairly
natural exchange.  However, Tom's food would be considered available to his partner if he had any.
This suggests that the mental state which triggers Sally's assertion disposes her to assert as if Tom
doesn't have any food.   It is unusual to assert on the basis of mere high credences, such actions
generally require (at least) all out belief49.  If Sally's assertion is not unusual then all out belief in the
fine grained proposition is not unusual either.  Thus the problem remains. 
One might worry that this exchange only seems natural because Sally interpreted Tom's partner as
asking about food which Sally or Matt were in a position to share, or because Sally might not think
about Tom's food when replying.  The second interpretation seems unpromising because we have
already postulated that Tom, and his food sharing policies, are salient to Sally.  With respect to the
first interpretation; we can imagine Tom's partner asking 'Does anyone know if there is any food?'.
This question is more naturally read as concerning food available to Tom's partner, rather than food
Matt and Sally are in a position to share.  Yet Sally's response would still not be unusual. 
48  This is not merely an intuitive point – there appears to be psychological evidence which points toward our default
attitude being belief.  For example, Gilbert (1991) argues that when we adopt an attitude like disbelief, or some weaker
intermediate state, we start by forming a belief and then weakening it.
49 Indeed, it has been argued by Mark Kaplan (1996) that to have a belief in p simply is to be disposed to assert that p 
if forced to assert either p or not-p.
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A slightly different version of the coarse grained proposition response runs as follows: the object of
testimonial belief is a coarse grained proposition, thus our testimonial beliefs are safe and sensitive.
However, we often move from our coarse grained testimonial belief to more fine grained beliefs
which  fail  safety and  sensitivity.   These  beliefs  are  reached  by combining  our  coarse  grained
testimonial belief with our background assumptions (and other psychological factors),  thus they are
not truly testimonial.  This response is unsatisfactory, for it seems to be a merely taxonomical point.
Whether these beliefs are in the strictest sense testimonial is not very important once we recognise
that they are still problematic, and still commonly arise as a result of testimony.  Indeed, my claim
has   been  that  in  many recovery  problem cases  the  proposition  recovered  is  not  the  asserted
proposition any way.  So it was antecedently unclear whether or not we should, strictly speaking,
call them 'testimonial beliefs' any way.  
It  is  worth considering whether semantic minimalism offers a response to our problem.  If the
context invariant semantic content of a sentence is fully propositional, then this proposition seems a
natural  candidate  for  the object  of testimony.   For  Cappelen and Lepore the minimal  semantic
content of a sentence is the proposition expressed by every assertion of that sentence50. There are
two related reasons to be skeptical of the claim that such minimal propositions are the objects of
testimony.   Firstly,  these  minimal  propositions  do  not  convey  much  information,  and  the
information they do convey seems to be of limited value.  Imagine that Matt and Sally are about to
go for a walk.  Matt is waiting, and Sally shouts 'I'm ready'.  Matt is interested in the information
that Sally is ready to go for a walk.  However, this is not the minimal semantic content of the
utterance.  Rather, the minimal content is simply that Sally is ready.  This is the same minimal
content which would be expressed by an utterance of 'I'm ready' in a context where Sally is ready to
convert to Buddhism, or to give up drinking.  It is not clear why Matt would be interested in this
information, or how his knowledge of this minimal proposition alone would guide his action.  Thus,
if the objects of testimonial knowledge are minimal propositions, then testimonial knowledge seems
ill suited to play the sort of central role we assign it in our every day lives.
Secondly, assuming that testimony is our central means of sharing knowledge it would be hard to
explain  the  importance  of  labels  such  as  'liar'  if   they  do  not  track  testimonial  wrongdoing.
However, as Jennifer Saul (2012) argues, our assessments concerning whether or not someone has
50 Borg (2012) holds that the minimal content of an otherwise sincere truthful assertion is often false, making it a poor
candidate for the object of testimony.
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lied do not track minimal propositions.  Saul asks us to consider Bill Clinton's assertion of 'there is
no improper relationship', shortly after  his affair with Monica Lewinsky.  Technically Clinton was
not lying since the affair was over. However, if Joe Blogs, a current adulterer, were to respond the
same way to similar  allegations  he would be lying.  Precisely the  same minimal  proposition is
expressed in each case.  Thus if our assessments track minimal contents then we should reach the
same verdict about each case.  Since verdicts about each case differ it appears our assessments don't
track  minimal contents.  If our most central normative assessments of assertions don't track the
contents  of  testimony,  but  rather  some other  level  of  content,  then  this  calls  into  question  the
relative importance of testimony to ordinary agents. So, once again, the minimalist response calls
into question the central role testimony seems to play in our lives.  
I think that all versions of the coarse grained propositions response fail.  However, there is a related
response which already has some support in the literature on context sensitivity - the view that
typical  utterances  have  multiple  contents (this  view  is  known  as  'speech  act  pluralism'  or
'propositional profusion' and was discussed briefly at the end of chapter two).  This view can take
several forms, from the view that only extremely similar propositions are expressed (discussed in
Dorr and Hawthorne (2014)) to the view that a huge number of different propositions are expressed,
propositions which the speaker needn't even be aware of expressing.  Such a view is endorsed by
Cappelen  and Lepore  (2004)(2006).  Cappelen  and Lepore  motivate  their  view by drawing our
attention to the different ways in which we report speech, for example, they ask us to consider
Richard Nixon's 'smoking gun' utterance: 
'When you get in these people, when you get these people in, say: ‘Look, the problem is that
this will open the whole, the whole Bay of Pigs thing, and the president just feels that,’ ah,
without  going into the  details…don't,  don't  lie  to  them to the extent  to  say there is  no
involvement, but just say this is sort of a comedy of errors, bizarre, without getting into it,
‘the president believes that it is going to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing up again, and ah
because these people are plugging for, for keeps and that they should call the FBI in and say
that we wish for the country, don't go any further into this case’. Period. That's the way to
put it, do it straight.'
They then note that this single utterance has been reported the following ways: 
'Nixon told Haldeman to tell the CIA to tell the FBI not to pursue their investigation into the
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Watergate Burglary.
Nixon is clearly heard telling his chief of staff, Bob Haldeman, to implement John Dean's
idea that the CIA be used to pressure the FBI to limit the Watergate investigation.
Nixon wanted the CIA Director Richard Helms to thwart the FBI's probe of theWatergate
Burglary by saying it was a CIA operation.
Nixon  told  Haldeman  to  tell  Helms  that  Nixon  wanted  him  to  stop  the  Watergate
Investigation.
Nixon told Haldeman to break the law.' Cappelen and Lepore (2006), 1049-1050.
These  reports  all  have  different  contents,  yet  each  report  seems  reasonable.   So  the  most
straightforward thing to conclude is that all of these contents were asserted. Indeed, speech act
pluralism is  also one  constituent  of  Cappelen  and Lepore's  solution  to  the  problem of  content
sharing,  which  is  closely related  to  the  recovery problem.   The problem as  they put  it  is  that
contextualist views make communication miraculous - we would be incredibly lucky to regularly
coordinate on precise contents when communicating with context sensitive terms given the many
ways in which we must rely on our knowledge of the context (this argument is discussed further in
chapter four).  They reject contextualism for all but a very limited set of terms, and argue that there
is  always  a  fully  propositional  context  invariant  semantic  meaning  which  is  shared  amongst
utterances and which is thus easily recoverable.  However, as we have just seen, it is unlikeley that
this  minimal content exhausts the asserted content. We usually communicate far more than this
minimal proposition.  This is where speech act pluralism comes in.  Many other propositions are
also expressed, and the audience's representation of the context determines the propositions they
recover.   It  might be thought that  speech act  pluralism would offer  a response to  the recovery
problem.  For a start one might adopt Cappelen and Lepore's whole view and maintain that in the
cases discussed above (for example the cases of quantifier domain restriction) there was a minimal
semantic content which is shared, and many other propositions expressed as well.  Or one could
reject semantic minimalism but still maintain that all the epistemic candidates were in fact asserted.
If one took the first line it would be similar to adopting the view that audiences typically form a
highly  coarse  grained  belief,  but  also  form  a  fine  grained  belief  as  well.   We  have  already
encountered reasons to reject this view.  However, if one adopted the latter view one might maintain
that when forming testimonial beliefs we do not simply come to believe one single proposition,
there are several epistemic candidates, and may even be several propositions expressed, so we come
to believe many fine grained propositions on the basis of a single utterance.  Some of these beliefs
will be problematic (unsafe or even false), but some will constitute knowledge, and that is good
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enough.  This response faces many of the problems I have already discussed, for example it is
unclear the extent to which it is a genuine response - it still has us forming many false beliefs.
However, it also has problems of its own.  For example, it seems unclear whether any of these fine
grained beliefs, considered alone, would satisfy the safety or sensitivity conditions on knowledge.
Moreover, this response fails if we endorse an agglomeration principle for belief.  That is, we run
into problems if we maintain that if I form a belief in p and a belief in  q on the basis of a single
stimulus then I have formed a belief in (p & q).  If such an agglomeration principle were correct
then audiences would typically form beliefs in a conjunction of epistemic candidates,  and thus
would be at even greater epistemic risk.  However, if we deny the agglomeration principle then this
response does have one redeeming feature:  it establishes that, even in the sorts of context where the
recovery problem occurs, testimony produces a baseline of true fine grained beliefs.  This baseline
of truth may be sufficient to explain why the norms of testimonial belief formation in low stakes
contexts  have  not  adapted  in  response  to  the  epistemic  problems which  seem to  arise  in  such
contexts.  More generally however, it is not clear that speech act pluralism can offer a response
simply because its only practical consequence for the recovery problem is whether or not we say
that  the  epistemic  candidates  for  what  is  said are  in  fact  said.   Speech act  pluralism does  not
guarantee that only true propositions will be epistemically available to the audience.   It merely
makes a classificatory point which relates our reporting practices and our ability to share (in some
very minimal sense) contents. 
So far I have considered several attempts to resolve the recovery problem by denying that audiences
come to believe single fine grained propositions (whilst still maintaining that the objects of belief
are propositional).  However, to be clear, it  is a simplification to maintain that audiences entertain
single precise fine grained propositions.  Our communicative intentions, and the testimonial beliefs
we form, are undoubtedly vague and imprecise.  However, it seems they are not imprecise enough
to reliably avoid the problem. This is illustrated by the naturalness with which audiences appear to
gain dispositions we would normally associate with more fine grained beliefs.  This suggests that
some fine grained aspects of the audience's belief state will be relatively settled (settled enough to
have an impact  on the audience's  dispositions),  whilst  others  may be more indeterminate.   For
example, Sally's belief state may be determinate with respect to the question of whether Matt or
Tom have any easily preparable food (for example, frozen pizzas or ready meals), but indeterminate
with respect to the question of whether or not they have any food with a medium preparation time
(for  example,  it  may  be  unclear  whether  a  pre-spatchcocked  chicken  would  be  considered
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contextually relevant).  Thus, the recovery problem does not rely on the simplifying assumption that
audiences typically form precise/fine grained testimonial beliefs, merely the assumption that the
audience's belief states are usually settled with respect to some fine grained questions.  And this
claim is motivated by the fact that it is far from unusual for audiences to acquire, through uptake,
the sorts of dispositions associated with fine grained beliefs. 
6. Response:  Non-Propositional Objects of Assertion.
Attempts  to  avoid  the  problem by postulating  alternative  propositional  objects  of  assertion  (or
belief) seem to fail.  However, Ray Buchanan (2010) denies that the objects of speaker meaning are
propositional, and he does so on the basis of considerations similar to those raised here. So it is
worth considering whether his view offers a solution to the recovery problem.
Buchanan claims that the objects of speaker meaning are not propositions, but rather properties of
propositions ( incomplete propositional templates with vague restrictions as to how they are to be
completed).   Audiences  grasp these properties  by entertaining  one or  more of  the  propositions
which fit the template.  Buchanan's view is developed partly in response to an epistemic problem
which  bears  many similarities  to  the  recovery problem:   On speaker  intention  based of  meta-
semantic views the asserted proposition must be intended by the speaker.  In order to rationally
intend to assert that p a speaker must have a reasonable expectation that the audience will recognise
their intention to assert  p.  However, due to the proliferation of highly similar propositions which
the audience might attribute in cases of context sensitivity there is no single proposition such that
the speaker can reasonably expect the audience to recover that precise proposition.  Thus, unless
speakers are highly irrational, the object of speaker meaning cannot be propositional.  However, it
would  not  be  irrational  for  a  speaker  to  expect  the  audience  to  recover  one  (or  more)  of  the
propositions in the extension of some vaguely specified property.  This is because there is a far
greater chance of the audience recovering one of the many propositions which fall in the extension
of the intended property. 
This problem sounds very similar to the recovery problem, thus one might think that the solution
should carry over unproblematically.  This would be a mistake.  Buchanan's problem concerns the
determination  of  what  is  said  –  what  is  said  cannot  be  determined  by  speaker  intentions  if
84
propositions  are  the object  of speaker  meaning.    To claim otherwise would be to  attribute  an
unrealistic degree of irrationality to speakers.  The recovery problem, on the other hand, does not
concern the metaphysics of what is said.  The problem is simply that due to the collective epistemic
limitations of the speaker and audience speakers will, in certain cases, be insensitive to the ways in
which they may be misinterpreted.  This is entirely consistent with the notion that what is said is
actually a property rather than a proposition.  And it is consistent with the view that speakers are not
irrational enough to expect audiences to recover a particular fine grained proposition.  On a view
like Buchanan's recovery problem cases would simply be cases in which either A), the audience is
at risk of recovering a proposition which does not fall under the extension of the speaker's intended
property,  or B) the speaker does not realise that there are propositions in the extension of their
intended property which they do not know to be true.  It seems likely that the former situation
would occur more frequently, unless the speaker were being particularly careless.  In such cases the
set of propositions in the extension of the speaker's intended property will usually be a subset of the
epistemic candidates. 
7. Conclusion.
The recovery problem holds that we are often at risk of forming false or unsafe testimonial beliefs
as a result of our heavy reliance upon limited contextual knowledge when planning and interpreting
assertions.   This  problem will  arise  even for  agents  attempting  to  follow the  epistemic  norms
endorsed by most epistemologists  of testimony.  The problem will  be more pronounced in low
stakes contexts where speakers are more careless and audiences hedge their beliefs less.  Several
responses have been considered, none of which were satisfactory. 
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Chapter Four: Testimony, Pragmatics, and Plausible Deniability.
0. Introduction.
In previous chapters it has been argued that communication with context sensitive terms can lead to
epistemically problematic forms of miscommunication, which can block testimonial knowledge.  In
this  chapter  I  explore another  problem which seems to arise  from these same processes.   This
problem pertains to the commitments speakers undertake when they make assertions.  Because of
the many ways the recovery of content can go wrong, speakers are able to make assertions and yet
deny responsibility  for  the  proposition  asserted,  claiming that  the  audience  made  a  mistake  in
resolving the context sensitivity.  That is, speakers are able to maintain plausible deniability about
what is said.  Call this the 'deniability problem'.  The aim of this chapter is to explain why the
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deniability problem is problematic, and start to identify the range of utterances to which it applies.
Elizabeth Fricker (2012) has pushed a similar line of reasoning, arguing that implicatures fail to
carry  the  epistemic  force  of  outright  assertions.   She  argues  that  speakers  maintain  plausible
deniability about the implicature, meaning that they fail to undertake the commitments necessary to
transmit testimonial knowledge.  I start by outlining Fricker's view, and arguing that it potentially
applies to a far wider range of utterances than those she considers, including many assertions. I then
go into greater detail explaining exactly why this is worrying.  
The deniability problem is problematic for three reasons.  Firstly, many views of testimony (for
example,  'telling'  based  views  of  testimony such as  Fricker  (2006a),  Hinchman (2005),  Moran
(2005a, 2005b), and  Ross (1986)) emphasise the role of speaker commitments in the justification of
testimonial beliefs.  The deniability problem entails that speakers often fail to undertake the types of
commitments emphasised by such views.  On telling based views of testimony, when an audience is
told p they gain a reason to believe p in virtue of the speaker having publicly taken responsibility
for the audience's belief that  p.  However, when the speaker maintains plausible deniability about
what is said no such commitment is undertaken.  Secondly, plausible deniability prevents epistemic
buck passing.   Sanford Goldberg  (2006),  and Benjamin McMyler  (2013) have  argued that  the
ability to pass the epistemic buck in response to challenges to one's belief is a distinctive epistemic
right agents gain only in virtue of forming testimonial beliefs.  This diminishes the belief holder's
responsibility  for  their  testimonial  belief  as  compared  to  beliefs  formed  via  other  methods.
However, when the speaker maintains plausible deniability the audience loses the ability to pass the
epistemic buck, and thus fails to gain the epistemic rights distinctive of testimonial knowledge.
Finally,  the  ability to  maintain  plausible  deniability blocks  one  of  the primary disincentives  to
deceptive or careless assertion.  
After explaining why the deniability problem is problematic I focus on identifying the range of
utterances  to  which  it  applies.   I  outline  a  puzzle  arising  from the  recent  debate  over  context
sensitivity in  the philosophy of  language,  which seems to  suggest  that  the  deniability problem
extends to a very large number of utterances.  The puzzle is as follows - on the one hand it has been
argued that there is widespread context sensitivity in natural language, and audiences must rely
heavily on their knowledge of the context to recover the speaker's intended meaning.  This includes
cases which we would intuitively treat as being on a par with normal testimony.  On the other hand,
Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore (2004) have argued that such widespread context sensitivity
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would  make  communication  miraculous,  pointing  to  the  same  'problematic  epistemics'  which,
according  to  Fricker  (2012),  give  rise  to  plausible  deniability.   If  context  sensitivity  is  very
widespread, but  has the same 'problematic epistemics' that Fricker identifies for implicature, then
the deniability problem is extremely far reaching.  This would be a worrying and radical result.
Thankfully this result can be avoided, or at least weakened.  There have been several contextualist
responses to Cappelen and Lepore which aim to establish that widespread context sensitivity does
not  make  communication  miraculous.  These  responses  don't  work  as  general  solutions  to  the
deniability problem, however they do allow us to limit its scope.  We end up with a set of criteria
for  identifying discourses which are particularly susceptible  to  the deniability problem.  In the
conclusion I suggest some important discourses which may still face the deniability problem. 
1. The Deniability Problem. 
Because  of  what  Fricker  calls  the  'ambiguous  epistemics'  of  implicature  speakers  are  able  to
maintain plausible deniability about what they have implied.  That is, they maintain the ability to
deny that they ever intended to imply what the audience takes them to have implied.  Such a denial
will  involve  the  construction  of  a  believable  narrative  in  which  the  speaker's  attitudes  and
expectations at the time of utterance were such that they could reasonably make their utterance
without intending to imply what they were taken to have implied.  More precisely: 
Plausible deniability -  An agent has plausible deniability about intending to communicate a
proposition p with an utterance u of a sentence s if that agent is able to tell a story (with at
least  some degree of believability51) about their attitudes and expectations at the time of
utterance such that a reasonable agent with those attitudes and expectations could utter  s
with no intention to communicate p. 
The plausibility of the denial will depend on the plausibility of the story about the agent's attitudes.
In order to be plausible the story will have to be consistent with what the audience knows about the
speaker's  attitudes  and  beliefs.   That  we  have  such  plausible  deniability  about  implicatures  is
illustrated by the following example: 
51 Plausible deniability is clearly a gradable notion since some denials will be more plausible than others.  In section 
four we will consider some factors which might make some denials more plausible than others. 
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Implicature:  Matt is running out of fuel and needs some fast.  He stops and asks a stranger
where he can get some fuel.  The stranger says 'there is a gas station around the corner'.  The
stranger thereby implies (implicitly communicates) that the gas station is open and has fuel.
However, if Matt were to get to the gas station and find it closed or out of gas he would have
a hard time criticising the stranger for her utterance.  She could easily maintain that she
never intended to communicate that the gas station was open or that it had gas.  She can
maintain that she was merely suggesting it as a place to try (she could maintain this even if
she in fact knew that the gas station was shut or had no gas).  
When Fricker talks of 'ambiguous epistemics' she refers to the way audiences and speakers must
rely on what she calls 'knowledge context' (or 'K-context') in order to recover the communicated
message.   Knowledge context is the audience's representation of factors such as mutual knowledge,
past utterances, Gricean norms, the mutual goals of the conversation, and any other information
generally relevant to interpretation other than basic knowledge of the syntax and invariant semantic
content of the utterance.  Because of the many complex ways in which audiences must rely on
context in order to recover an implicature there are many ways the process can go wrong.  For
example,  the  audience  could  employ an  aspect  of  knowledge context  which  the  speaker  never
intended them to employ, or they could fail to employ an aspect of knowledge context that the
speaker did intend them to employ.  Likewise, they could hold false beliefs about the context, or at
least beliefs which were not mutual knowledge, and appeal to such beliefs in their recovery of the
implicature.  Because the recovery of implicatures can go wrong in so many ways the speaker is
able to deny responsibility for the proposition the audience recovers,  claiming that there was a
mismatch  between  what  the  audience  recovered  and  what  the  speaker  intended  (perhaps  even
claiming the speaker didn't intend any implicature at all)52.  Fricker's own take on the problem is as
follows: 
'Entirely genuine misunderstandings and mistakings are endemically liable to happen, 
regarding a supposed message that is conversationally implied, not stated, due to the very 
complex mutual epistemics of the situation. Given these complex epistemics, it is not 
52It has been pointed out by an anonymous reviewer that this problem actually cuts both ways.  In some cases contextual
indeterminacy seems to grant audiences the freedom to recover the meaning they find most convenient.  The reviewer 
provides the following example :  One's partner may say that they are going to have coffee at the local café, and one 
might interpret them as meaning that they are going to the café now, using it as an excuse to drink the last of the coffee. 
One might do this even if one knows that they might be planning to go later (in which case they may still want some of 
the remaining coffee).  I think this raises some interesting questions about the way in which speech acts make various 
courses of action permissible.  However, there is not enough space to give this issue a proper treatment here. 
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epistemically feasible to pin undeniable specific commitment onto a speaker: she can always
wriggle out of it. This may be in bad faith; but very often it may not—maybe she 
miscalculated what her audience would infer; maybe she had not really figured it out.  
Fricker.' (2012), 87.
'Since the claim that she intended to communicate E turns on claims about her private 
intentions and K-context, including her second order representations of others’ beliefs, she 
can always get away with denying that she intended any such thing; even if her denial is 
made in bad faith. Lies about my own intentions and other mental states may be suspected, 
but cannot be refuted. In contrast, when someone makes an explicit statement of a fact P, 
what she signs up to in doing so—taking responsibility for the truth of P—is a public fact 
about the situation, determined by semantics and objective features of context. So it cannot 
be incorrigibly denied by the speaker. I can be nailed as having stated that P; never as 
having insinuated that P.' (ibid: 88-89).
Fricker seems to suggest that the deniability problem only applies to implicatures, suggesting that
plausible  deniability  is  never  available  regarding  the  primary  content  of  one's  utterance.   The
thought is that one can deny that one intended to imply anything without descending into absurdity.
However, if one makes an intelligible declarative utterance one cannot, without descending into
absurdity, claim that one never intended to communicate anything. This may be true, but one can
still maintain plausible deniability about intending the particular proposition the audience recovered
without claiming that one never intended to communicate anything at all. To see that speakers do
attempt such conversational manoeuvres with asserted contents as well as implicatures consider the
following two examples (the first of which occupies a grey area between what is implied and what
is asserted, the second of which clearly concerns asserted content)53:
Scalar implicature:  We are planning a group trip to a theme park and deciding how many 
cars to take.  I wish to cause logistical problems because I hate fun, so I say 'Matt has three 
53  As we move through the examples from the clear case of implicature to the case of mere context sensitivity the 
stories the speaker tells start to sound slightly less plausible.  They would certainly raise our suspicions, and if a speaker
frequently made manoeuvres like these then we would consider them untrustworthy.  This is a point to which I will 
return when discussing responses to the problem.  For now it suffices to note that on one-off occasions we would 
usually let such matters slide and speakers would usually get away with making such conversational manoeuvres.  This 
is not to say that they wouldn't be criticised for being unclear, simply that they would not be held to what they 
communicated. 
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kids' knowing that he has five.  On the day of the trip Matt arrives with his five children and 
we don't have enough space in the car.  You challenge me for saying that Matt had only three
children.  However, I might attempt to maintain that I didn't mean he had only three 
children, I meant that he had at least three children, so we would need at least three 
additional seats.  The plausibility of such a story will depend on the way I said 'Matt has 
three kids' and the immediate preceding utterances, however we rarely recall such minute 
details of the conversational context, so it would not be difficult to construct a plausible 
story on which I intended to communicate only that Matt has at least three children.
Quantifier domain restriction: It is the start of a new year and we have organised a party for
the new graduate students.  We have a variety of beers on offer, but there are some special
craft lagers I want for myself (even though they were brought for the guests).  I have stored
most of the beer in the fridge, but I have put the craft lagers outside.  Sally, one of the new
students, arrives and asks where the beer is, so I tell her 'every beer is in the fridge'.  Later
on you find the craft lagers outside and ask me why I told Sally that every beer was in the
fridge.  In response to this challenge I might attempt to construct a story along the following
lines:  I had heard that Sally was a vegan, and I am aware that craft lagers often contain
animal products.  So when I said 'every beer is in the fridge' I didn't mean every beer we had
purchased for the party, I meant every beer which was safe for Sally, as a vegan, to drink. 
In these examples the speaker  attempted to construct  a narrative concerning their  attitudes and
representations of the context in which the audience's recovered meaning was not intended.  In
general, if recovery of an asserted content requires extensive appeal to knowledge context then the
speaker  will  often  be  able  to  claim  that  the  audience  recovered  the  wrong  proposition,  thus
disclaiming responsibility for the audience's belief.  Therefore, if heavy duty appeal to knowledge
context is often required for recovering what is said, and this appeal to knowledge context gives rise
to the same possibilities of error to which implicature gives rise, then the deniability problem will
apply to a wide range of assertions, not just implicatures. 
In the examples I have given the hearers come to believe some fine grained proposition, and the
speaker is able to maintain plausible deniability by claiming that a different fine grained proposition
was intended.  In chapter three it was noted that this is a simplification, and several other views
were  discussed (and rejected),  including the  view that  speakers  typically assert  a  very general
disjunctive  proposition. It  is  worth  briefly  reconsidering  the  disjunctive  view,  because  it  is
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especially problematic for the deniability problem. The deniability problem breaks down on the
view that  we recover  the  disjunction  of  the  propositions  that  the speaker  could plausibly have
meant.  The speaker cannot  plausibly deny having meant  to communicate something at  least  as
strong as the proposition recovered if the proposition recovered is the disjunction of propositions
the speaker could plausibly claim to have meant. 
As argued in the previous  chapter,  this  response fails  since we frequently do form testimonial
beliefs in fine grained non-disjunctive propositions when there are other propositions the speaker
could have claimed to have meant.   This is illustrated by the case of scalar implicature outlined
above: on the disjunctive view the recovered proposition communicated would be 'Matt has either
exactly three kids or at least three kids'.  The problem is that this just collapses into 'Matt has at least
three kids', yet it is plausible that we often take utterances like 'Matt has three kids' to communicate
that Matt has exactly three children.   On the disjunctive view such readings would be rare.   A
second problem which pertains specifically to the disjunctive view as a response to the denaibility
problem is that the range of situations an imaginative speaker would be able conjure up in order to
claim that a miscommunication has occurred will often be rather wide, and an unimaginative hearer
(or just a hearer who is interpreting quickly and unreflectively) is unlikely to consider (consciously
or subconsciously) the whole range of cases a speaker could construct.  Thus hearers will be able to
infer little from what they have been told due to the level of uncertainty over exactly what it is that
they have been told.  Consider the quantifier case again.  I mentioned one story the speaker could
conjure up in order to maintain plausible deniability, however there are many more.  For example,
the speaker might attempt to claim that 'beer' and 'lager' are distinct, and that the question Sally
asked was asked about beer (some people do consider this to be an important distinction), or the
speaker could maintain that the intended interpretation was 'every beer which is ready to drink',
claiming that the beer left outside was still warm at the time of utterance.  On the disjunctive view
the proposition the hearer recovers would be 'every beer for the party is in the fridge, or every vegan
friendly beer is in the fridge, or.....'.  It is not clear why Sally would consider all these readings
(especially if she is not actually a vegan), and even if she did she would not be entitled to assume
that  there  is  no  other  unconsidered  situation  the  speaker  could  conjure  up  in  order  to  claim
miscommunication.  Thus really all she would be entitled to take from the utterance would be that
there is  some beer in the fridge.  However, we frequently take much more from such utterances.
This is evidenced by the fact that Sally may well be surprised to find the craft lagers outside, or she
may assume they were someone's private stash.  She would not be so disposed unless she had come
to believe something like 'every beer for the party is in the fridge' (she may not have explicitly
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considered such a restriction, but this does not rule out forming a dispositional or unconscious belief
with such a domain restriction).  So I consider the disjunctive view to be implausible.  
A alternative (perhaps more plausible) way of spelling out the disjunctive view holds that audiences
do not take speakers to mean 'p or  q or...', but rather that audiences come to believe 'the speaker
means p, or the speaker means q, or....'54.  This view faces many of the same problems however, as
the audience is  still  only able to  draw a disjunctive conclusion about  the subject matter  of the
assertion.  For example, suppose I assert 'Matt has three kids', and the audience forms the belief
'Either S meant 'Matt as exactly three kids' or S meant 'Matt has at least three kids'.  The audience
will still only be able to draw a disjunctive conclusion about the number of children Matt has.  That
is, they will at best be warranted in forming the belief  'Matt has either exactly three kids or at least
three kids'. This clashes with the fact that we would often form the belief that Matt has exactly three
children upon hearing 'Matt has three kids'.  Other problems remain too.  For example, it still seems
likely that the range of interpretations an imaginative speaker would be able to conjure far outstrip
the number of interpretations the audience is likely to consider when forming their disjunctive view
about  what  the speaker  might  have meant.   Thus,  although this  modification of  the view does
perhaps seem more realistic, it still faces many of the same problems. 
In  the  previous  chapter  I  also  considered  speech  act  pluralism  as  a  response  along  with  the
disjunctive view.  One might think that speech act pluralism would offer a better response in this
situation because it holds that speakers assert multiple propositions, and thus that they can be held
to  multiple  propositions.   In  a  sense  this  seems  true.   For  example,  looking  back  on Nixon's
smoking gun utterance it seems clear that he could be held responsible for all the things attributed to
him. Thus it does seem we undertake a commitment to many different propositions when we assert.
However, it seems that speech act pluralism will not help in the cases outlined in this chapter.  There
are different views one might have regarding speech act pluralism and the commitments speakers
undertake. One might hold that a speaker has asserted any proposition they could be interpreted as
having asserted, or one could hold that speakers only assert a subset of the propositions they could
be  interpreted  as  having  asserted.   Additionally  one  could  hold  that  a  speaker  undertakes  a
commitment to all the propositions they assert, or only to some subset. It is simply not plausible that
speakers can be publicly held to all the propositions they can be interpreted as having expressed.
Otherwise we would, for example, be unable to use the phrase 'Matt has three kids' to express the
54 Thanks to an anonymous referee for the journal Episteme for pointing out this altervative version of the disjunctive 
view. 
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proposition that Matt has at least three kids, for we would always thereby commit to the claim that
Matt  has  exactly  three  kids.   This  rules  out  the  combination  of  the  claim that  speakers  assert
anything that they can be interpreted as having expressed and the claim that speakers undertake a
commitment to all the propositions they assert. The alternative views are that   speakers assert all
the  propositions  they can  be  interpreted  as  having expressed,  but  are  not  committed to  all  the
propositions they assert, or that speakers are committed to all the propositions they assert but do not
assert all the propositions they can be interpreted as having expressed.  However, both of these
views leave scope for plausible deniability.  The speaker can either deny that they asserted  p, or
deny that they are committed to p. For example, it might be true that I happen to assert both that
Matt has exactly three kids and that Matt has at least three kids whenever I utter 'Matt has three
kids'.   But  on  such a  view audiences  will  aim not  to  recover  what  is  asserted,  but  rather  the
propositions which are both intended and asserted.  Otherwise communication simply would not
make sense.  However, we now have scope for plausible deniability again, for speakers can deny
that they intended (and thus either asserted or became committed to) a particular proposition. 
2. Why is the Deniability Problem a Problem?
In the previous section I outlined the deniability problem, and argued that there is no principled
reason to hold that it applies only to implicature.  The problem, as it applies to assertions, can be
stated as follows: usually when one makes an assertion with a clear propositional content  p one
undertakes a commitment to p.  That is, one undertakes a commitment to defend one's belief in, and
assertion of p, or else retract the assertion.  This commitment is made public in the act of assertion
(see MacFarlane (2005,  2011),  and Rescorla  (2009) for views of  assertion which place special
emphasis on this fact).  However, in certain cases one has another option available when challenged
- one is able to deny that the audience recovered the intended proposition.  Call this alternative
conversational  move  the  'mismatch  move'.   When  the  mismatch  move  is  available  no  public
commitment  is  undertaken  to  defend  one's  assertion  or  provide  epistemic  justification  for  the
proposition seemingly asserted.
In this section I will explain why we should be worried by the deniability problem.  We should be
worried about the deniability problem because the commitments speakers undertake plausibly play
an  important  role  in  justifying  our  testimonial  beliefs,  and in  shaping  the  epistemic  rights  we
acquire when we form testimonial beliefs.  The presence of the deniability problem indicates that
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speakers are able to back out of certain commitments, meaning that the commitments are unable to
perform their justificatory or rights shaping roles. 
I start by discussing the justificatory role played by speaker commitments.  I focus primarily on
Fricker's  own view (in  order  to  further  explicate  her  take  on  the  problem)  and  the  assurance
theorists,  who  press  the  role  of  commitments  intentionally  incurred.   The  commitments  so
emphasised seem especially susceptible to plausible deniability, thus the deniability problem seems
to be particularly worrying for the assurance theorist55.  I will then briefly consider the extent to
which  the  deniability  problem might  be seen  to  extend beyond views such as  Fricker's  or  the
assurance  theorist's.   Next  I  outline  the  role  speaker  commitments  have  been taken to  play in
shaping the epistemic rights we acquire as a result of forming testimonial beliefs.  Sanford Goldberg
(2006), and Benjamin McMyler (2013) have argued that the commitments speakers undertake when
testifying shape the epistemic rights of the audience with respect to their testimonial belief. The
presence of the deniability problem causes problems for the acquisition of these epistemic rights.
Finally I argue that the presence of the deniability problem blocks one of the primary disincentives
to deception.  
2.1 Fricker and the Assurance Theorists.
Fricker  frames  her  discussion  in  terms  of  what  she  takes  to  be  the  paradigmatic  mode  of
transmission of knowledge via testimony - the act of telling.  She argues that by telling an audience
that p speakers vouch for, and take responsibility for, the truth of p.  In telling someone that p the
speaker presents p as being true in an act the import of which is that the hearer can form a belief in
p on her say so (Fricker (2006a)).  This act licences the audience to believe that p in virtue of the
fact that it is the 'conventionally constituted force of her speech act' that in asserting p the speaker
purports to speak from knowledge (Fricker (2006a), p594).  This is a commitment in the public
sphere, but it is also manifested publicly to the audience.  The knowledge norm for tellings follows,
Fricker thinks, from the fact that in telling someone p you offer them your word that p, and commit
to it.  To explain this Fricker draws an analogy with promising - it seemingly follows from the fact
that in promising to perform act a  you commit to doing a, that you should promise to a only if you
intend to a, and aing is within your power.  Similarly you should not commit to p unless you know
that p.  It is the fact that knowledge is the norm of telling which imbues it with its epistemic force.
55 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to focus on this aspect of the assurance theorist's view. 
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Audiences are justified in believing a speaker when they are justified in taking the speaker to be
trustworthy with respect to the particular telling.   The speaker's trustworthiness with respect to  p
consists in her having the following dispositional property: not easily would she assert that  p, or
vouch for the truth of p, unless she knew that p (Fricker (2006a), p 600).  When you are properly
justified in taking a speaker to be trustworthy, and you know they have acted in such a way that they
are committed to knowing that p, then you are both justified in taking p to be true, and justified in
believing that the speaker's support for p is sufficient to yield knowledge.  Once the audience knows
the speaker has asserted p, and is in a position to know that the speaker is trustworthy56, then the
audience is thereby in a position to know that  p.   This is how knowledge is spread via assertion
according to Fricker.  
So, according Fricker, speakers don't properly vouch for a proposition if they maintain plausible
deniability with respect to their intention to communicate that proposition, and 'tellings' only occur
when  speakers  do  undertake  such  a  commitment.   Thus,  any assertion  which  leaves  open the
mismatch move is not a telling in Fricker's sense.  However, tellings (and the commitments they
generate) are central to Fricker's view of testimonial knowledge.  It is in virtue of the commitments
tellings generate that the knowledge norm applies to them, and it is in virtue of the fact that the
knowledge norm applies to them that they constitute evidence for the proposition asserted.  Thus, in
Fricker's  framework,  audiences  will  not  be  able  to  achieve  testimonial  knowledge  from  any
assertion  where  the  mismatch  move  is  available  (unless  an  alternative  story  about  testimonial
knowledge is given to supplement Fricker's 'telling' based view).  If the deniability problem applies
to a wide range of assertions, or if particular discourses are especially susceptible to the deniability
problem,  then  this  should  sanction  either  a  widespread  scepticism,  or  a  targeted  scepticism
regarding the particular discourses in question.
Fricker's view is similar in many ways to the assurance view of testimony advocated by Richard
Moran (2005a), 2005b), Edward Hinchman (2005), and Angus Ross (1986).  Like Fricker assurance
theorists take tellings to be the paradigmatic speech act by which knowledge is transmitted, and like
Fricker they take tellings to generate a special sort of commitment on behalf of the speaker.  Unlike
Fricker assurance theorists take the reasons to believe provided by tellings to be non-evidential (that
is,  the  epistemic  force  of  testimony  does  not  primarily  consist  in  testimony  that  p providing
evidence that p).  
56 In earlier work Fricker (1994, 1995, 2006b) has maintained that in order to form a justified testimonial belief 
audiences must monitor speakers for trustworthiness.  Presumably it is such monitoring which will grant the 
audience knowledge level justification of the speaker's trustworthiness.  
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Assurance theorists distinguish between two ways in which we may learn something by believing
another's assertion.  Firstly, when someone asserts p we may take this as evidence that they believe
p (or perhaps gain the right to believe that they believe that p), and that, since they are likely to be a
reliable belief former, we should therefore believe that p.  This way of forming beliefs is, according
to the assurance theorist, in principle no different from coming to believe that p through observing
any aspect of an agent's behaviour and judging that they believe that  p.  Indeed, Moran (2005b)
argues that treating a speaker's utterance as evidence about their beliefs may be worse than treating
other behaviour as evidence for their beliefs due to the fact that the evidence provided by assertions
is, by its very nature, doctored evidence (see Keren (2012) for a response).  Assurance theorists also
argue that speakers do not intend for their utterances to be treated as evidence in this way.  Ross
(1986)  argues  that  in  order  to  take  the  evidential  view one  must  judge  another's  utterance  by
reference to further generalisations about their psychology and the conditions under which they are
likely or unlikely to utter particular words.  You need to view the assertion in a 'detached objective
light, as a natural phenomenon arising from certain causes' (Ross (1986, p72)). Ross observes that
we can obviously view other people's utterances this way, but thinks it is far less clear that we can
view our own utterances this way.    
'I cannot at one and the same time see it as up to me what I shall say and see my choice, as 
an observer equipped with a theory of speech behaviour might see it, as determined or 
constrained by facts about my own nature.' Ross (1986), 72.
Such an attitude would, according to Ross, be a form of disengagement from one's own actions,
similar to Sartre's 'bad faith'.  In order to take an utterance as it is intended by the speaker we must
not treat it as evidence.  The alternative, according to the assurance theorist, is to treat the speaker's
taking responsibility for the audience's belief as a reason for the audience to hold that belief.  The
idea is that in telling the audience that p the speaker gives the audience permission to epistemically
rely on them.  When we treat the behaviour of others as evidence for their beliefs, and then form
beliefs about the world on the basis of taking others to be reliable belief formers, we do not gain the
ability to hold others epistemically responsible for our new beliefs.  But when others tell us that p,
and we take them at their  word,  we apparently do.   Moran (2005a) summarises the distinction
between the two ways of viewing another's testimony as follows:  
'Corresponding to the difference between what the speaker 'gives' and what the speaker 
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'gives off' is the difference between what I learn from him and what I may learn from what 
he does and how he does it.  Only in the case of what I learn from him, the person, does my 
relation to his belief involve the speaker assuming any responsibility for what I believe, and 
that makes a difference to the type of reason to believe that is obtained in the two cases.' 
Moran (2005a), 335.
So the speaker's public commitment to defend the audience's testimonial belief takes centre stage in
the assurance theorist's view of testimonial knowledge.  It is important to emphasise the role of the
speaker's  intentions  in  generating  these  commitments.   It  is  by  openly  and  intentionally
communicating p that the speaker takes responsibility for the audience's belief.  It is not clear that
one can unintentionally take epistemic responsibility for another's belief.  After all, consider the
types  of  reactions  we  typically  have  to  an  unintentional  communication  of  a  controversial
proposition.  When the speaker clearly, openly, and intentionally communicates that  p we expect
them to present epistemic reasons in defence of  p, indicating that we expect the speaker to bear
epistemic  responsibility  for  the  communicated  proposition.  However,  when  a  speaker
unintentionally communicates p we do not expect them to defend the truth of p, rather we expect
them to either defend the reasonableness of their preferred interpretation, or apologise for being
unclear (we may also expect some form of compensation for any mishap which resulted from the
miscommunication).  This indicates that although we sometimes hold the speaker to bear some
practical responsibility for propositions unintentionally communicated we do not generally hold
them to bear any epistemic responsibility for such propositions.  The importance of the speaker's
intentions in generating these commitments is emphasised by Moran:
'Only with respect to what I  have called  ‘personal  expression’,  the intentional action of
expressing one’s belief, is the person in a position to speak for the meaning or epistemic
import  of  what  he  is  attesting  to.  With  respect  to  whatever  else  may express  itself  in
someone’s  speech  or  other  expressive  behaviour,  while  this  may indeed be  a  source  of
knowledge  for  the  audience,  they  are  on  their  own  as  far  as  assessing  its  epistemic
significance goes. Since beliefs which are revealed in these ways need not even be known
by the speaker  himself,  the hearer  (or  observer)  cannot  assume that  the  speaker  is  in  a
position to offer support or justification for what may be garnered in this way, nor that he
speaks with any authority about the meaning or general significance of the belief which
manifests itself in his speech or other behaviour.' Moran (2005a), 342.
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As we observed when discussing Fricker's view, the speaker's public commitment to defend the
audience's belief is precisely the type of commitment the deniability problem undermines.  This is
worrying if the mismatch move is widely available, or if there are particular discourses in which it
is  widely available.   In  cases  where  audiences  have  to  rely heavily on knowledge context  the
audience's attitude toward the speaker seems to be no less one of trust in the speaker than in the
assurance  theorist's  paradigm cases.   Therefore,  if  the  assurance  theorist  is  correct  that  in  the
paradigm cases we do not treat assertions as evidence then there are a range of utterances which we
do not typically treat as evidence, but which can only provide epistemic reasons in virtue of being
treated  as  evidence  (since  speakers  don't  undertake  the  assurance  theorist's  required  type  of
commitment  in  making  these  utterances).   Once  again  this  sanctions  a  scepticism  about  the
discourses in question.  
Indeed,  it  seems  that  the  assurance  theorist's  emphasis  on  the  speaker's  intentions  makes  the
problem especially worrying. This is because the story the speaker must tell in order to maintain
plausible deniability about their own intentions will usually require appeal to little more than claims
about their own internal mental states (over which they have epistemic authority).  In fact a speaker
could even maintain that they were simply not paying attention to what they were saying in order to
maintain that a rather obvious interpretation was unintended.  In such cases we would certainly hold
a speaker responsible for some wrong doing, however we would often still accept that they did not
intend to communicate what they in fact did communicate.  Thus, if the assurance theorist is correct
about the role of speaker intentions in generating the types of commitment required for testimonial
justification then it will often be fairly easy for speakers to make the mismatch move, meaning that
it will be widely available.  
Of course,  there are  many commitments and responsibilities we undertake when asserting over
which we do not have intentional control.  For example, we do not have intentional control over
which propositions will actually be communicated by our utterances.  However, we still  have a
moral  duty not to  make an assertion if  it  is  predictable  that  in  doing so we will  communicate
something false57.  If we do make an utterance which predictably results in a false belief then we
will often be held responsible for the resultant belief.  This responsibility is not epistemic, even if
we believe the predictably communicated proposition we are not thereby duty bound to defend its
truth.  Nonetheless, we will often be held practically or morally responsible for any misfortune
which results from the false belief.  It may be thought that these commitments are sufficient to
57 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.  
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provide a basis for testimonial justification.  We might reason, in a similar way to Fricker, that since
we  are  committed  to  not  predictably  communicating  falsities  we  will  try  to  only  predictably
communicate truths.  Thus, if a speaker makes an assertion such that it is predictable that p would
be communicated by that assertion this provides evidence that the speaker knows that  p.  Such a
view would not provide the kind off  anti-reductionist  justification the assurance theorist  seeks.
However, speakers have far less plausible deniability over what will be predictably communicated
by an utterance, so perhaps such a view could at least provide a reductionist account of the role of
speaker commitments in generating testimonial justification whilst mainly avoiding the deniability
problem. 
Ultimately I think that this view contains more than a grain of truth.  However, it is not without its
problems.   Firstly,  speakers  are  generally  far  more  careless  about  what  they might  predictably
communicate than what they clearly and openly communicate.  Thus, it is not clear just how often
audiences will be justified in believing that the speaker knows that p on the basis of the fact that the
speaker made an utterance such that it is predictable that that utterance would communicate p.  This
will depend on just how easily predictable the audience's interpretation was, and on the context (for
example, speakers are likely to be far more careful about what they might communicate in a high
stakes context than a low sakes context).   Secondly,  although speakers will  have less plausible
deniability about what was predictably communicated by their utterance, they will still have some.
That  is,  they might  have  some  plausible  deniability  regarding  their  own ability  to  predict  the
resultant  interpretation.   This  will  involve  the  construction  of  a  story  about  the  speaker's
representation  of  the  context  at  the  time  of  utterance  such  that  a  reasonable  agent  with  that
representation  could  make their  utterance  without  being  able  to  easily  predict  that  they would
communicate  p.  Even if such a story fails to establish that the speaker was not in a position to
predict the resultant interpretation it might still convince the audience that their own interpretation
was less obvious to the speaker than they thought, thus making the speaker less criticisable for their
utterance.  Thus it is unclear to what extent such a view does avoid the deniability problem.
2.2 Deniability and Buck-Passing.
In the previous section I argued that the deniability problem is worrying for those who emphasize
the role of speaker commitments in testimonial justification.  An agent's right to form a testimonial
belief  is,  according  to  such  views,  at  least  partly  grounded  in  the  fact  that  speakers  take
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responsibility for the audience's belief.  However, some authors have argued that the epistemic role
of speaker commitments extends beyond the justification of testimonial beliefs.  They argue that
testimonial knowledge comes with distinctive epistemic rights which sets it apart from other forms
of knowledge.  These rights pertain not to  our acquisition of testimonial beliefs but  rather  our
retention of them in the face of challenges.  As Goldberg (2006) emphasises this illustrates a sense
in which whatever one says about testimonial justification (that is, whether one is a reductionist or
an  anti-reductionist  about  testimonial  justification)  testimonial  knowledge  is  epistemically
distinctive. 
Both  Goldberg  (2006,  2011)  and  McMyler  (2013),  when  discussing  what  is  distinctive  about
testimonial knowledge, have emphasised the fact that audiences have the right to 'pass the buck' in
response to challenges.  That is, when one forms a testimonial belief on the basis of someone else’s
say so one has the right, when challenged to retain one's belief and defer to the original testifier.
For example, imagine that Sammy tells Lizzie that oats lower cholesterol, and Lizzie then tells
Mark that oats lower cholesterol.  Mark is sceptical and challenges Lizzie's assertion.  At first Lizzie
says  something  vague  about  low density  fibre  and  bacteria  in  the  intestines,  but  Mark  is  not
convinced and continues to challenge Lizzie's assertion.   At this point Lizzie is able to retain her
belief but defer to Sammy, saying 'Well Sammy told me, ask her about it'.  That is, Lizzie is able to
pass on the responsibility for defending her belief to Sammy, since Sammy was the original testifier.
The right to pass the buck in this way is a downstream epistemic right which agents acquire through
forming testimonial beliefs. Other belief forming methods (such as perception) do not generate such
a right. Thus, the fact that such rights are acquired seems to be a distinctive epistemic feature of
testimonial beliefs.  Goldberg puts the point as follows:
'My main contention is that testimonial knowledge is a distinctive kind of knowledge in that 
this sort of knowledge, but no other, is associated with a characteristic expansion in the sorts
of epistemically relevant moves that can be made by the subject in her attempt to identify 
the direct epistemic support enjoyed by her belief.' Goldberg (2006), 133-134.
'...this feature of testimonial knowledge reflects the fact that there is something 
epistemologically distinctive about relying on the epistemic authority of another rational 
being: it is because of what is distinctive in relying on the epistemic authority of another 
rational being, that there is a characteristic expansion in the sort of moves that can be made 
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in defence of a belief acquired on such authority. The characteristic expansion, I suggest, is 
that testimonial knowledge gives rise to the hearer's right to pass the epistemic buck  after 
her own justificatory resources have been exhausted.' (ibid: 134)
As  emphasised  by Goldberg  (2006),  one  can  recognise  this  no  matter  what  one's  view of  the
original justification for testimonial beliefs.  This is because the rights pertain not to the conditions
under which it is acceptable to form a testimonial belief, but rather the moves one can make when
those beliefs are challenged. Moreover, Goldberg (2011) later argues that these distinctive epistemic
rights  derive  from  rather  uncontroversial  features  of  testimony  and  assertion.   Assuming  that
assertion has an epistemic norm (that is, assuming that the propriety of an assertion that p requires
that  the speaker  be in  some way positively epistemically situated with respect  to  p)  the act  of
asserting  creates  mutual  knowledge  amongst  the  speaker  and  audience  that  the  speaker  has
performed an action the propriety of which requires that they are epistemically well situated with
respect to p.  Thus, when challenged the audience knows that there is a further body of information
(that possessed by the speaker) to which they can appeal in defence of their belief58.  As emphasised
by both Goldberg and McMyler these rights are genuinely epistemic since they pertain to the ways
in which agents are answerable for their beliefs (that is, the epistemic responsibilities they bear with
respect  to  those  beliefs).   These  are  taken  to  be  genuinely  epistemic  features  of  testimonial
knowledge  which  are  not  shared  by  other  forms  of  knowledge.  McMyler  provides  a  succinct
statement of his reasoning which is worth quoting in full: 
'..the responsibilities involved in epistemic buck passing are genuinely epistemic 
responsibilities, responsibilities that pertain to the way in which cognitive agents are 
distinctively answerable for their beliefs. Belief, I take it, is a commitment-constituted 
attitude. To believe that p is to commit oneself to a positive answer to the question whether 
p. A believer is thus answerable for being so committed.  She is open to criticism that bears 
on the content of her commitment, criticism that bears on the question whether p.  Plausibly, 
one aspect of the way in which subjects are thus answerable for their beliefs concerns their 
epistemic conduct in the face of reasonable challenges to their beliefs, where reasonable 
challenges to their beliefs involve the presentation of evidence that counts against their 
beliefs. Typically, when confronted with such a challenge, a rational epistemic agent ought 
to either find some way to meet the challenge—some basis upon which to rationally 
58 However, it is unclear to me how these facts alone generate any form of duty in the speaker to defend the audience's 
belief, and thus where the audiences right of deferral derives from.  
102
discount the evidence presented—or else give up her belief. When it comes to beliefs that 
are based on being told something by a speaker, however, an epistemic agent is entitled to 
maintain her belief without meeting the challenge herself by instead passing the epistemic 
buck back to the speaker. If an audience comes to believe that p on the basis of a speaker’s 
telling, and if a third party challenges the audience’s belief by producing evidence that 
counts against p, the audience is entitled to defer responsibility for meeting the challenge 
back to the original speaker, whereupon the original speaker is epistemically responsible for 
meeting the challenge.' McMyler (2013), 1067-1068.
I take these considerations to establish that, at least in some cases, testimony generates the right to
pass the epistemic buck, and that this is a genuine epistemic right.  In such cases the believer will be
less responsible for their belief than they would otherwise be. Moreover, this right to defer to the
someone else in defending one's belief illustrates a sense in which such beliefs, and the rights we
have regarding them, are distinctly social.  This brings us to another sense in which the deniability
problem  seems  genuinely  problematic.   The  deniability  problem  undermines  these  speaker
commitments.  This is particularly clear on Goldberg's (2011) statement of the view which rests on
there being mutual knowledge between the speaker and hearer that the speaker has performed an
action  the  propriety of  which  requires  that  they  are  epistemically  well  situated  to  a  particular
proposition p.  When the mismatch move is available the speaker is able to provide a defeater to this
mutual  knowledge  claim,  meaning  that  they  can  back  out  of  their  commitments.   If  speakers
undertake no public obligation to defend the audience's belief then audiences don't gain the right to
defer to the speaker when challenged.  Thus, when the mismatch move is available audiences will
form testimonial  beliefs  but  will  not  acquire  the  distinctive  epistemic  rights  which  standardly
accompany such beliefs.  If there are discourses which are particularly susceptible to the deniability
problem then audiences will bear more individual responsibility for the beliefs acquired from such
discourse than they think they do (which could lead to overly credulous belief forming).  
2.3. Plausible Deniability and Testimony Policing.
So far I have outlined two reasons to worry about the deniability problem.  First, it undermines
testimonial knowledge on telling based views.  Secondly, when the mismatch move is available
audiences will not gain the epistemic rights distinctive of testimonial beliefs, meaning that they will
bear more responsibility for their beliefs than they think they do.  There is one further reason to
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worry about the deniability problem.  Usually when someone falsely asserts that p we can criticise
their assertion, and criticise them as an asserter.  People who are caught asserting falsehoods are
publicly labelled  as  liars.   This  is  a  strong normative  assessment,  and the  chance  of  being  so
labelled provides a disincentive against asserting falsehoods.  However, when the mismatch move is
available it is far harder to make such an accusation.  The speaker can always respond claiming that
they never intended to communicate the falsehood in question.  Thus, if there are discourses which
are particularly susceptible to the deniability problem speakers in such discourses will have far less
incentive to speak honestly (Goldberg (2013) presses a similar line in order to explain why we
should be sceptical of anonymous internet testimony).   Of course,  we do have other normative
assessments available.  We can accuse a speaker of being misleading.  However, this accusation
carries  far  less  normative  force,  especially  if  we  cannot  establish  that  the  speaker  has  been
intentionally  misleading.   And  to  establish  such  a  thing  will  usually  require  a  great  deal  of
information about, for example, the speaker's motivations and their knowledge of their audience.  
This concludes the first half of the chapter.  I have outlined the deniability problem, argued that
there is no principled reason to hold that it applies only to implicatures, and provided three reasons
to consider it genuinely problematic.  Firstly, it undermines testimonial knowledge if one embraces
a telling based view of testimony.  Secondly, it undermines the distinctive epistemic rights typically
acquired via testimonial belief formation.  And finally it removes the disincentive for speakers to be
intentionally misleading with  their  assertions.  In  the  second half  of  this  chapter  my task  is  to
identify the scope of the deniability problem for assertions.  
3. The Contextualist Puzzle.
I have outlined the deniability problem, arguing that there is no principled reason to hold that it
applies only to implicatures, and I have provided three reasons to consider it genuinely problematic.
What I have not done is argued that a significant number of assertions actually suffer the deniability
problem (although it should be clear from the argument of chapter three that it will apply to at least
as many cases as the recovery problem).  It is to that task I now turn.  I start by considering a puzzle
arising  from  the  recent  debate  over  context  sensitivity  in  natural  language,  which  seemingly
suggests that the deniability problem is extremely widespread (far more widespread than we would
intuitively think).  I then discuss some responses to the puzzle which allow us to narrow the scope
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of the problem back down.  We end up with a loose set of criteria for identifying discourses which
will be particularly susceptible to the problem.
The first part of the puzzle is the seemingly widespread context sensitivity of natural language.  The
list of context sensitive uses of language includes indexicals, demonstratives, gradable adjectives,
comparative adjectives, definite descriptions, indefinite descriptions, adverbs, conditionals, modals,
quantifiers,  predicates  of  personal  taste,  possessives,  incomplete  adjectives,  psychological
attributions, moral attributions, perhaps knowledge ascriptions, non-sentential assertion, vagueness,
metaphor, hyperbole, and loose talk.  This constitutes a large portion of our language use.  Some
theorists  (radical  contextualists)  go  even  further,  holding  that  most,  perhaps  even  all,  of  our
language  use  is  context  sensitive.   Such  theorists  note,  for  example,  that  seemingly  context
insensitive terms can be used in many different (and incompatible) ways in different contexts (see,
for example, Travis (1985), Bezuidenhout (2002)).  They also provide general theories of utterance
comprehension which entail that we always engage in pragmatic processing to recover what is said.
On such views, even when the recovered proposition is the proposition determined by the literal
meaning of the terms used, such processing is employed to determine that it is the literal meaning
(if there is such a thing (see Recanati (2004))) rather than some alternative 'modulation' which is
most appropriate.  
So, it seems that there is a lot of context sensitivity in natural language, especially if you believe the
radical  contextualist.   This  fact  by  itself  shouldn't  worry  us.   What  is  worrying  is  that  the
mechanisms by which we resolve context sensitivity arguably have the same 'ambiguous epistemics'
that Fricker argues give rise to the deniability problem for implicatures.  It has already been argued
(in chapter three) that these ambiguous epistemics give rise to epistemic problems. Cappelen and
Lepore  (2004)  go  even  further,  arguing  that  the  mechanisms  which  contextualists  postulate  to
explain context sensitive communication would seemingly make communication miraculous. We
have already noted that audiences have to quickly appeal to a wide range of knowledge in order to
recover the content of utterances. Cappelen and Lepore point out that if we have to rely on all this
information just to recover the content of simple context sensitive utterances such as 'philosophy is
fun' then it seems miraculous that we generally tend to communicate smoothly and successfully
with context sensitive terms.  The fact that we have to rely on such knowledge means that there are
many ways the recovery of a given proposition can go wrong.  This, as we saw, was precisely what
generated the deniability problem for implicatures (and the recovery problem).  There were many
ways  the  recovery of  an implicature could go wrong,  thus  the  speaker  could  easily claim that
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something did indeed go wrong, disclaiming responsibility for the audience's belief.  To get an idea
of some of the ways in which we rely on knowledge context to recover what is said consider the
two leading approaches to context sensitivity.
Saturation:  For  many  sentences  the  phonetically  articulated  elements  don't  exhaust  the
syntactic structure, there are non-phonetically articulated syntactic elements which need to
be assigned values in order for a complete proposition to be expressed.  This is usually taken
to  consist  in  there  being  hidden  variables  in  the  underlying  logical  form  which  take
particular types of value59.  Some variables will be bound by linguistic material from earlier
on in the same sentence, meaning that their values will be easily recoverable. Indeed, one of
the primary reasons for positing hidden variables in clauses such as 'it is raining' is that it
looks as if there are longer sentences in which they have a bound reading.  However, when
such sentences are not embedded the audience must employ knowledge context in order to
work out the intended value of the variable (Stanley (2000) pushes this line of reasoning).  
Often the values  which need to  be assigned are complex and fine grained.  For example,  they
include properties to restrict quantifiers, and comparison classes for gradable adjectives.  The subtle
differences in possible values, and the sensitivity of these values to small changes in the mutual
goals  and presuppositions  of  the  speaker  and hearer  can,  in  many cases,  give  the  imaginative
speaker scope to make the mismatch move.  Take, for example, quantifiers - in many cases one can
claim the intended range of a given quantifier to be a restriction on the range the audience attributes.
You merely need to be able to identify a subset of the domain the audience attributes such that the
members of that subset have some distinguishing feature, and identify an aim relative to which this
feature would be relevant such that you could, with at least some level of plausibility, have taken it
to be mutually presupposed that it was a conversational aim.  For example, in the quantifier case in
section  one  the  distinguishing  feature  of  the  selected  subset  was  that  it  contained  only  vegan
friendly beers,  and the mutual  goal  was to  identify beers which Sally would be able  to  drink.
Speakers  are frequently slippery with what they say in precisely this way.
Modulation:  In  cases  of  modulation  a  constituent  has  its  meaning  adjusted,  and  thus
contributes something new to the truth conditions of the utterance.  The concept we end up
59 Not all theorists take saturation to be mandated by variables in the underlying logical form.  Some theorists deny the
existence of such variables, yet maintain that utterances of the sentences in question fail to express full propositions, 
arguing that audiences supply unarticulated constituents in order to fill in the gaps by appeal to the knowledge 
contexts (Carston (2002a), Hall (2008), Perry (2001), Recanati (2004)).  
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with will be related to the concept encoded in the constituent before modulation takes place,
but  will  usually  serve  the  speaker's  purposes  better.   For  example,  a  concept  may  be
narrowed and thereby assigned a new meaning which applies to a subset of the original
extension (e.g. when Sally, who has just left her timid and underachieving boyfriend says 'I
need a man', the concept encoded by 'man' is narrowed in order to apply only to men with
particular features commonly associated with masculinity (Carston (2002a)).  A concept may
also be loosened to generate a new concept which applies to more things than the original
concept.  Modulation occurs in response to the audience's perception of the demands of the
context.   It is controversial  how the process of modulation works.  Some (e.g. Recanati
(2004))  think  that  potential  meanings  vie  for  cognitive  activation  with  the  most  salient
meaning being assigned.  Others (e.g. Carston (2002a, 2002b), Carson and Wilson (2007))
think that potential meanings are ranked in order of salience and assessed for relevance (a
balance of cognitive effects and cognitive effort) until an expectation of optimal relevance is
met, at which point the meaning which meets the expectation is assigned.  
It should be clear from this that modulation also relies heavily on knowledge context, that the type
of context sensitivity it  accounts for is  common (consider how mundane most of the examples
were), and that there will often be many ways an audience can go wrong in recovering the correct
proposition.  When discussing saturation it was noted that in cases where the values assigned are
complex the precise values assigned will be very dependent on knowledge context, thus creating a
lot  of  scope  for  genuine  miscommunication,  and  the  mismatch  move.   The  same  is  true  of
enrichment.  Indeed, since enrichment is even less constrained it seems the problem will be even
worse.  Enrichment occurs only in response to the audience's impression of the demands of the
context, and the values involved are less constrained than in cases of saturation, giving even further
scope for the speaker to claim mismatch.  Additionally, speakers can claim to have intended to be
interpreted more or less literally than they were (an option which is not obviously available in cases
of saturation).  All in all, it seems that the problems which arise for saturation not only arise, but are
multiplied in cases of enrichment60.  
60 I think that many contextualists (especially those who focus on modulation and free enrichment) recognise the fact 
that their theories involve the sorts of 'problematic epistemics' pointed to by Fricker. Many of these theorists have 
worried about related problems which their own theories raise for communicative success.  This has led many 
prominent theorists (such as Bezuidenhout   (1997), Carston (2002), Heck (2002), Recanati (2004), and Sperber and 
Wilson (1986))  to conclude that communicative success does not require the precise sharing of contents between 
speaker and audience, but rather entertainment of similar propositions.  They endorse this view partly as a result of 
their recognition of the epistemic difficulties which arise in the recovery of propositional contents.  If 
communicative success required that speakers and audiences shared identical contents then communicative success 
would be rare due to the epistemic difficulties involved in recovering a propositional content identical to that 
intended by the speaker (many of these theorists also raise worries about the sharing of Fregean contents). 
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We now have the two components of the puzzle generated by contextualism.  Firstly there is reason
to believe that there is a great deal of context sensitivity in natural language,  secondly there is
reason to think that this context sensitivity has the same problematic epistemics which gave rise to
the  deniability  problem  for  implicatures.   This  suggests  that  the  deniability  problem  is  very
widespread.  This is a radical conclusion, and one we should be eager to avoid, since it seems quite
obvious that speakers don't have plausible deniability about what they say the majority of the time. 
4. Responding to the Contextualist Puzzle.
In this section I consider a series of responses to Cappelen and Lepore61.  I will argue that these
responses  fail  as  general  responses  to  the  deniability  problem.   Nonetheless,  they  are  worth
considering because they illustrate a sense in which it  may be harder for speakers to make the
mismatch move in certain contexts.  We will see that a discourse must have certain features in order
to block plausible deniability for context sensitive assertions.  Thus we will be able to identify
discourses which are particularly susceptible to the deniability problem. 
Ishani  Maitra  (2007) has argued that  certain contextual  values  are  more natural  and frequently
applied than others, and that we will assign such values unless we have reason not to.  For example,
if I say 'elephants are big' it will be more natural for you to assign the comparison class of species
rather than some other comparison class, for example the class of large mammals.   You would
generally only assess the claim relative to the class of large mammals in response to additional
information which made that reading more likely.  If this is the case then speakers and hearers will
usually converge on the same contents because audiences will not need to appeal to knowledge
context to a problematic extent.  
 
I think it should be clear that this response won't solve our problem.  Even if it does help to explain
how  interlocutors  converge  on  contents  it  still  leaves  a  lot  of  scope  for  speakers  to  detach
themselves from the proposition recovered.  If the audience settles on the more common or natural
reading  then  the  speaker  may claim that  further  information  should  have  been  appealed  to  in
61 Cappelen and Lepore's own position is that we must separate semantic content and speech act content, and that 
speech act content but not semantic content is context sensitive.  Many of the same problems arise for their theory as 
arise for the contextualist, because the proposition we will form a testimonial beliefs in will usually not be the minimal 
semantic content, but rather the context sensitive speech act content. 
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interpretation.  Likewise, if the audience moves away from the more common reading the speaker
can  claim  that  the  audience  drew  too  much  from  context  and  that  the  common  reading  was
intended.  This is not to say that Maitra's response is without use.  Certainly in some contexts, and
for certain common conversational tasks, standard meanings for terms emerge.  And certainly in
some contexts there will be a meaning so obviously more natural than all the others that the speaker
has no scope for plausible denial concerning what they meant.  But it is far from clear that the
majority of cases are like this.  
A related but more promising response has been provided by François Recanati (2010).  Recanati
doesn't postulate a set of natural or common meanings, however he does postulate that there are
important psychological commonalities which dispose people to converge on the same meanings of
terms, and which enable us to recognize how others intend concepts to be modulated.  For example,
people are disposed to recognise the same similarities between the situation of application for a
concept, and other situations to which the concept does not straightforwardly apply.  As a result they
are able to extend or narrow the use of term a which expresses that concept, perhaps modulating the
concept along these dimensions of similarity to apply to the new case (see also Bolinger (1968)).
Our interpretation is also taken to be guided by sets of implicit biases which are common across
speakers and audiences.  Recanati does not provide any examples of such biases.  However he does
point  to  some  biases  postulated  by  psychologists  working  on  the  early  acquisition  of  lexical
meanings.  For example, it is argued by Bloom (2000) that early acquisition of lexical meaning is
guided by a whole object bias (a bias toward taking a whole object rather than the parts of an object
to be the referent of a term). It is conceivable that a network of such common biases guides our
ordinary interpretation and helps us assign values to context sensitive terms62. 
This does not solve the deniability problem.  Firstly, this network of biases and abilities may often
lead audiences in the right direction, but (especially if such biases are rooted in theory of mind) they
will still be dependent on assumptions about the context to which the speaker can appeal to in order
to  claim miscommunication.   Thus  the  mismatch  move  will  still  be  available.   Secondly,  this
response has a rather narrow scope.   Although there may be similarities, or types of similarity,
which humans as a kind are more disposed to recognise, and biases toward objects which can be
categorised  in  certain  ways,  these  are  extremely  unlikely  to  exhaust  the  range  of  similarity
judgements and psychological mechanisms which guide interpretation.  It would be very surprising
62 I suspect that this response only secures convergence on similar rather than identical propositions.  This shouldn’t
worry  Recanati  since  he  maintains  that  similarity  of  content  is  sufficient  for  communicative  success  (as  do
Bezuidenhout (1997), Carston (2002), and Heck (2002))).  
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if  we  were  not  also  guided  by  similarity  judgements  and  biases  which  are  moulded  by  our
individual  experiences.   This  seems  especially  true  when  we  are  dealing  with  more  abstract
concepts.  This creates a greater chance of genuine mismatch, and more scope for speakers to make
the mismatch move. 
A third response draws our attention to communication as a collaborative affair.  It has been argued
that conversational participants don't allow situations to arise where there is any realistic chance of
content mismatch (Perrini (2009), Recanati (2010)).  This is because speakers don't just make an
utterance, get interpreted, and move on.  Rather, there are collaborative checks in place to ensure
understanding. Both speakers and audiences track each other's facial expressions, tone, and body
language for signs of misunderstanding or mismatch.  Additionally, if there is uncertainty about
what was said the audience asks for clarification (Clark and Krych (2001)).  
In responding to the deniability problem the thought would be this:  both audience and speaker
collaborate to establish a shared meaning, and audiences can refer back to this when a speaker
attempts the mismatch move, thereby blocking plausible deniability.   This response also fails.  It is
only in cases where either the audience is  aware of their  lack of understanding,  or when their
subsequent interactions with the local environment indicate misunderstanding, that mistakes are
corrected.  When the speaker and hearer are not coordinating on a mutual task involving the local
macro level environment the hearer will have nothing to refer to when calling out the speaker.
Additionally,  many  similar  but  epistemically  distinct  contextual  values  (e.g.  quantifier  domain
restrictions) will have very similar behavioural consequences, meaning that misunderstanding won't
immediately generate behavioural evidence of miscommunication.   So the response is somewhat
limited in scope. 
So far I have surveyed a series of responses to Cappelen and Lepore and found them lacking as
responses to the deniability problem.  Nonetheless, I think they can teach us something important.
These responses draw our attention to a set of resources to which an audience can appeal in certain
contexts in an attempt to call out a speaker who is attempting the mismatch move, thereby blocking
plausible deniability.  For example, if there is a clear common use for a term (or common default
contextual value), and the audience reasonably assigns such a value only to be met by the mismatch
move later on, then the audience is able to maintain that the speaker should have been more explicit
about their intention, maintaining that they are partly responsible for the resultant belief.  The same
goes for modulation based on similarity relations and biases.  This is especially true in cases where
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there  are  checks  in  place  related  to  some mutual  task.   If  someone acts  on  the  basis  of  their
understanding, and at that point the speaker fails to flag any misunderstanding, then this goes some
way to confirming the audience's initial interpretation, making it far harder for the speaker to make
the mismatch move without descending into absurdity.  In general, the more the audience is able to
check that they have the correct understanding, and the more obvious the default understandings
are, the harder it will be for a speaker to claim mismatch without absurdity.  
These  resources  are  rather  limited,  and in  one-off  instances  they may often  prove  ineffective.
However, if speakers repeatedly try to employ the mismatch move in order to avoid commitment in
circumstances where these resources are available then audiences will be able to call them out on
their frequent misleading behaviour.  It may be plausible that in a one-off case the speaker intended
the audience to assign a more esoteric meaning to a term than they did.  However, it becomes far
less plausible in a long run of cases.  Repeat offenders will lose plausible deniability.  Moreover,
speakers have motive to avoid appealing to the mismatch move in contexts where checks are in
place, for if they make the move frequently then they will quickly lose credibility as an informant.   
The deniability problem now seems somewhat less worrying.  However, it was only weakened for
discourses  where  audiences  have  the  resources  to  call  out  the  speaker  by  appeal  to  standard
meanings, very obvious ways of extending a meaning, or checks which serve to reliably confirm
understanding.   It  is  a  partially  empirical  question  how  many  discourses  actually  have  these
features. However, I think it is likely that some important discourses lack them.  The deniability
problem still arises with its full force for such discourses.  These will be discourses in which context
sensitivity (especially more unconstrained context sensitivity such as modulation) is rife,  which
don't  involve  coordination  on  macro  level  tasks,  where  the  values  or  modulated  concepts  are
complex or abstract, and where there are no highly standardised or clearly stated contextual values.
Such discourses provide speakers with a lot of scope to make the mismatch move without losing
much credibility.  There will be more resources to which speakers can appeal in order to claim
misunderstanding, and fewer checks an audience can appeal to in order to call them out or hold
them responsible.    It is not the task of this chapter to establish conclusively that any particular
discourse has such features, however several important discourses do seem to be candidates.  For
example, religious discourse is arguably rife with context sensitivity (consider the many and varied
religious conceptions of salvation, love, and even God (see Alston (2005), and Scott (2005) for
useful overviews discussing the context sensitivity of religious language), it has a highly abstract
subject matter, and it is not clear that there are always sufficient efforts put in place to coordinate on
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precise explicit meanings. Likewise much public political discourse seemingly has such features
(for example, consider the possible varied meanings of terms like 'class warfare').  Indeed, this no
doubt adds to the stereotype of politicians as slippery and dishonest.  Another important candidate
seems to be ethical discourse outside of academic settings (where there are often norms which
require precision and coordination on standard meanings).  Such discourse is abstract,  arguably
context  sensitive,  and  seemingly lacks  a  norm requiring explicit  joint  efforts  to coordinate  on
precise meanings.  These worries are strengthened by the studies discussed by Keysar, Barr, and
Horton (1998) which appear to show that audiences initially interpret egocentrically (on the basis of
their  own  private  set  of  assumptions  rather  than  the  common  ground),  and  only  revise  these
interpretations when they know that their own set of assumptions differs from that of the speaker in
such a way that it would generate miscommunication.  This illustrates that as long as there is the
illusion of understanding audiences will not check for coordination with the speaker, suggesting that
there could be a significant amount of actual miscommunication which gets missed.  Indeed, in
many  cases,  such  as  the  sermon  from the  pulpit,  or  perhaps  a  political  speech,  the  speaker's
assertion and intended modulations may be backed by an understanding of theology, or politics
which far outstrips that of their audience.  The educated priest's conception of god may be quite
different from that of their congregation.  These different factors effecting the way speakers and
audiences  modulate  the  relevant  concepts  are  also  likely  to  generate  actual  mismatch.   And
wherever there is scope for actual mismatch the mismatch move is available (and gains additional
plausibility).  Of  course,  it  is  beyond  the  scope of  this  chapter  to  establish  that  any of  these
discourses do have the features in question.  However, given the importance of such discourses in
our everyday lives this seems like a worthy question for further research. 
5. Conclusion. 
I have outlined the deniability problem for assertions, explained why it is genuinely problematic,
and presented a line of reasoning which seems to suggest that the problem is very widespread.  I
then looked at several ways of narrowing the scope of the problem back down. It was found that the
deniability problem would be less problematic in discourses with certain features.  I suggested a
selection of important discourses which may still face the problem. 
It is not clear how we should react once we discover that a discourse faces the deniability problem.
I suspect that the correct reaction will vary between different discourses.  One reaction may be to
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try and establish a set of precise meanings within the discourse, and eliminate context sensitivity as
much as  possible  (for  example,  if  certain  areas  of  academic  discourse  were  found to  face  the
deniability problem, this    would probably be the more appropriate response).    An alternative
response would be to give less weight to testimony in the problematic discourse.  One could treat
knowledge regarding the subject matter as necessarily personal rather than social.  One could re-
conceptualise the role of apparent testimony in the discourse, perhaps taking it to be expressive, or
seeing it as intended not to bring about belief but rather reflection or some other attitude.  And
another alternative would just be to view the discourse with scepticism.  The plausibility of any
given response will  depend on the discourse in question.   Finally,  one might  simply choose to
weaken the focus on speaker commitments in one's theory of testimony63.    
Chapter Five: Epistemic Injustice in Utterance Interpretation.
0. Introduction.
Miranda Fricker (2007) explores a type of injustice which arises when the credibility judgements
we make about speakers are informed by prejudicial stereotypes.  In this chapter I argue that by
focusing only on credibility judgements we miss an important species of injustice which arises
earlier in the process of testimonial belief formation.  The same prejudicial stereotypes which infect
credibility judgements  can also infect  our  interpretation  of  the  speaker,  leading to  uncharitable
miscommunication  (call  the  injustice  arising  from  prejudicial  interpretation  'interpretative
injustice').  There are several harms caused by interpretative injustice.  Firstly, as in the case of
lowered credibility judgements, interpretative injustice prevents certain groups from being able to
efficiently communicate knowledge to other (perhaps more powerful) groups.  Secondly it results in
speakers being held epistemically responsible for propositions they never intended to communicate.
And  thirdly,  it  contributes  to  the  illusion  that  prejudicial  low  credibility  judgements  are
epistemically justified.   I close by arguing that if Fricker's strategy for treating epistemic injustice is
implemented in absence of a treatment of interpretative injustice then we risk epistemically harming
the hearer with little benefit to the speaker.  Thus epistemic injustice and interpretative injustice are
best treated in tandem. 
63 Many thanks to Herman Cappelen, an anonymous reviewer for Episteme, and participants in the the Arché 
Evidence, Justification, and Knowledge seminar for comments which greatly improved the quality of this chapter.  
This research was supported by the United Kingdom Arts and Humanities Research Council. 
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1. Epistemic Injustice.
When we learn from testimony we usually assess the testimony for credibility.  This includes an
assessment of the over all credibility of the speaker with respect to the topic of their statement, as
well as other factors such as the plausibility of the content of the statement, and circumstantial
factors which may make the speaker less reliable in a particular context.  Generally, when we assign
the testimony a high degree of credibility we believe it (all else being equal), when we assign it a
low degree  of  credibility  we don't. Such assessments  are  usually  spontaneous,  and  reliant  on
general heuristics that we apply (perhaps sub personally) in particular situations.  For example, if
someone appears drunk then we may instinctively assign them a low credibility.  This is based on
the stereotype that drunk people are poor informants,  or an association between the concept of
drunkenness  and other  concepts  we associate  with poor  informants  (for  example  dishonesty)64.
Such reliance on general stereotypes or associations seems essential to our ability to quickly and
reliably make credibility judgements. However, this reliance on stereotypes or associations can also
lead us astray.   Historically there have been many stereotypes  linking disadvantaged groups to
factors which we associate with low credibility.  For example, there was (and to some extent still is)
a common stereotype of women as being emotional, irrational,  overly intuitive, and naive. If such
stereotypes are salient to a hearer then they may inform the hearer's credibility judgements (even if
the  hearer  does  not  explicitly endorse  the  stereotype).  The result  is  that  the hearer  will  assign
women low credibility as informants, at least with respect to certain topics. 
Fricker  points  to  several  harms  which  result  from epistemic  injustice.  Firstly,  when we assign
someone low credibility on the basis of factors such as race or gender we wrong them as a knower.
Fricker argues  that the capacity to know and to give knowledge is a fundamental human value.
Thus, in limiting some individual or group's ability to give knowledge we thereby restrict  their
ability to engage in an activity fundamental to human value.  As Fricker (2007) puts it, "the capacity
64 Fricker frames her discussion in terms of stereotypes, and I will mostly follow her in this.  However, I think that the 
notion that we appeal to stereotypes (most easily conceived of as a type of generalisation) in credibility judgements 
or interpretation over-intellectualises these processes.  I think it is more likely that we associate certain concepts 
with others, and that the salience of one concept (for example intoxication) may thereby raise the salience of other 
concepts (for example dishonesty), and that these associations guide our interpretation and credibility judgements.  
Likewise, if someone harbours anti-Semitic biases the concept 'Jew' might raise the salience of 'greed', which could 
in turn influence their credibility judgement when it comes to testimony relating to money.  Here the agent is not 
appealing to some sort of anti-Semitic generalisation like 'Jews are greedy' (they might not even consciously endorse
such a generalisation), it is the mere association of Jewishness with greed which does the job, leading to epistemic 
injustice. 
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to give knowledge to others is one side of that many sided capacity so significant in human beings:‐
namely,  the capacity for reason" p 44.  By assigning someone a low credibility on the basis  of
prejudicial stereotypes we prevent them from giving knowledge, and thereby exclude them from the
'community of epistemic trust'.   Fricker even contends (drawing on Bernard Williams)  that the
ability to share one's beliefs plays an important role in the psychological development of one's
social identity through the steadying and securing of one's beliefs.  When limited in our ability to
convey knowledge we are, according to Fricker, limited in our ability to develop our own social
identity. 
Fricker  also  identifies  a  variety  of  secondary  harms  which  arise  from  prejudicial  credibility
judgements.  Our ability to share information is essential for our ability to partake in a large number
of social activities which are central to the good life.  For example, one's ability to progress in one's
career, or to effectively defend oneself from false allegations65 will usually depend on one's ability
to effectively communicate one's knowledge.  Indeed, usually when we try to impart knowledge we
are  doing so for  some particular  reason,  in  service  of  some more  general  task.   When one is
restricted in one's ability to share knowledge one is thereby restricted in one's ability to partake in
any task in service of which one may wish to impart knowledge.  Epistemic injustice also causes
harm in the sense that it can lead people to lower their opinion of their own epistemic abilities.  If
you are treated as unintelligent for a long enough period you will eventually start  to believe it
yourself.  If you are treated as unreliable on a particular topic you may lose confidence in your
beliefs on that topic, and thereby lower your credence bellow the threshold required for knowledge. 
An ideal  agent  would instinctively appeal  only to non-prejudicial  stereotypes when assessing a
speaker for credibility.  However, most of us are not ideal in this respect.  Something must be done
to remedy this situation.  Fricker's proposed solution is that we attempt to develop the virtue of
testimonial justice.  This is a corrective virtue whereby we actively reflect on the prejudices we may
harbour and develop a sensitivity for  the kinds of situation in  which we may be led to  unjust
credibility judgements as a result of these biases.  In such situations we should not rely on our quick
intuitive judgements, but should try to make an accurate and unprejudiced judgement.  Fricker puts
the point as follows: 
'When the hearer suspects prejudice in her credibility judgement—whether through sensing
65 One of Fricker's key examples is Harper Lee's (1960) novel 'To Kill a Mocking Bird',  in which Tom Robinson, who
has been falsely accused of rape, is unable to defend himself as a result of the racial prejudices of the time preventing
his testimony from being trusted. 
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cognitive dissonance between her perception, beliefs, and emotional responses, or whether
through  self conscious  reflection—she  should  shift  intellectual  gear  out  of  spontaneous,‐
unreflective  mode  and  into  active  critical  reflection  in  order  to  identify  how  far  the
suspected  prejudice  has  influenced  her  judgement.  If  she  finds  that  the  low credibility
judgement she has made of a speaker is due in part to prejudice, then she can correct this by
revising the credibility upwards to compensate. There can be no algorithm for her to use in
determining how much it should be revised upwards, but there is a clear guiding ideal. The
guiding  ideal  is  to  neutralize  any  negative  impact  of  prejudice  in  one's  credibility
judgements by compensating upwards to reach the degree of credibility that would have
been given were it not for the prejudice.' Fricker (2007),  91-92.
The hope is that eventually such reflective adjustment will condition us in such a way that our
automatic intuitive credibility judgements become unprejudiced.
2. Interpretative Injustice.
Fricker's  brand  of  epistemic  injustice  arises  as  a  result  of  the  way  in  which  our  credibility
judgements  are  guided  by potentially  prejudicial  stereotypes.   However,  credibility  judgements
occur late in the process of testimonial belief formation.  Other stages in this process are likewise
guided by a reliance on stereotypes.  In particular, our interpretation of the utterances themselves
will often be guided by stereotypes66.  This is especially true in cases involving context sensitivity,
loose talk, unfamiliar dialects or accents, noisy environments, implicature etc.  In such situations we
must appeal to our knowledge of the context, including what we know about the speaker (their
likely goals, interests, beliefs, background, intelligence etc.) in order to reach a verdict on what
proposition they are intending to communicate.  These judgements, generally being fast and sub
personal (like credibility judgements), will also rely on stereotypes and associations. 
Interpretative injustice is the phenomenon whereby a hearer's employment of prejudicial stereotypes
results  in  the hearer  mistakenly attributing a  message  to  the  speaker67 when the  speaker  never
66 My focus here will be on our understanding of the content of utterances.  However, our understanding of the types 
of act performed can also be shaped by misleading stereotypes.  For example, we may mistakenly interpret an order 
as a request.  Such cases are discussed in Kukla (forthcoming) who argues that the very acts we perform are 
determined by their actual uptake, meaning that certain groups are limited in their ability to perform certain acts 
(such as issuing orders).  
67  Or making a similar mistaken content related judgement, since it is not clear that audiences will always attribute one
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intended  to  convey  that  message.   That  is,  interpretative  injustice  occurs  when  prejudicial
stereotypes result in miscommunication.  As we will see, these prejudicial stereotypes affect both
speech  perception  and  the  assignment  of  meaning.   Thus,  interpretative  injustice  is  a  broad
phenomenon.  I mostly follow Fricker's use of the term 'prejudicial stereotype' to mean, roughly, a
generalisation which embodies a judgement about a social group, which is not properly evidence
responsive68.  That is, one harbours a prejudicial stereotype if one harbours a (usually negative)
generalisation (or a set of associations which embody a generalisation) about a particular social
group, and one's harbouring of that generalisation (or set of associations) is not sensitive to the
available evidence.  This constitutes an injustice for the following reason:  If an aspect of our social
practice systematically, unfairly, and disproportionately harms certain social groups, then in cases
where members of those groups have been harmed by the social practice they have been victims of
an injustice. Interpretative injustice gives rise to numerous harms (discussed in detail in section
three),  and  these  harms  are  experienced  disproportionately  by  particular  disadvantaged  social
groups.  Moreover, in cases where these harms are experienced as a result of interpretative injustice
it will be the hearer's lack of evidence responsiveness which gives rise to the harm.  Thus it seems
that the harm is unfairly inflicted upon the speaker (the miscommunication does not result from
either a fault in the speaker or mere bad luck, rather it arises out of a fault in the hearer, or the wider
social situation in which the hearer is embedded)69.  Moreover, these harms will often constitute part
of a wider web of harms which the disadvantaged individual is systematically subjected to.  On
some views of assertion (for example, Cappelen and Lepore (2004)) a typical assertion will have a
huge  number  of  propositional  contents,  many  of  which  bear  no  relation  to  the  speaker's
communicative  intentions.   Thus  it  is  worth  noting  that  interpretative  injustice  relates  to  the
audience's  recovery of the speaker's  intended proposition (or a similar  message)  rather  than an
asserted content more generally.   If Cappelen and Lepore's speech act pluralism is correct then
recovery of an asserted content does not rule out interpretative injustice.  
It is worth flagging some similar notions which I will put aside for the rest of the chapter.  Firstly, I
do not consider interpretative injustice, as discussed here, to include cases where a hearer reaches
the correct judgement about what a speaker intended to communicate, but does so on the basis of a
particular message to the speaker. 
68 It was mentioned earlier that characterising stereotypes as generalisations may not be optimal, since the processes
underlying both linguistic understanding and our credibility judgements are likely to be associative.  However, we can
think of sets of associations as embodying generalisations.  For example, the association of 'black' with 'crime', 'gun',
and 'drugs' would embody a generalisation about black people like 'black people are criminals'. 
69 This is not to say that audiences in cases of interpretative injustice are always completely free of responsibility for
the miscommunication.  An already unclear speaker who's chances of being understood are futher undermined by
the audience's prejudices is still at an unfair communicative disadvantage as a result of the audience's prejudices.
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misleading  stereotype.   Such  cases  seem to  be  instances  of  lucky  interpretation,  and  may  be
interesting in their own right.  However, I will not be discussing them further.  
Some cases involving luck do fall under the banner of interpretative injustice though.  For example,
consider the following case in which the audience does not luckily reach the correct interpretation,
but is lucky in the sense that their prejudice does not prevent them from understanding an utterance
they otherwise would have understood70:  A person of colour tries to subtly communicate  p, and
does so in such a way that it might be unclear to even a reasonable audience that p was intended.
However,  the  audience  simply considers  persons  of  colour  to  be  incapable  of  subtlety,  and so
straightforwardly interprets the speaker as asserting  q.  In this case although the chance of being
understood was already reasonably low the audience's prejudices lower the chances even further, in
a way which is out of the speaker's control.  This is analogous to throwing away someone's lottery
ticket on the basis of their race.  It is unlikely that they would have won even if the ticket had not
been thrown away,  however  their  chances of winning are substantially and unfairly diminished
further  by the  act  of  throwing  away the  ticket.   It  is  not  clear  that  the  audience  would  have
understood  the  utterance  even if  they had not  been prejudiced,  however  this  is  still  a  case  of
interpretative injustice.
Also of potential interest is the more general case where someone misinterprets a communicative
act on the basis of a false belief or presupposition.  Interpretative injustice is a subspecies of this
phenomenon, and many of the things I say about the harms of interpretative injustice will carry
over.  However, I am concerned primarily with interpretative injustice on the basis of prejudicial
stereotypes or associations because it is a more systematic phenomenon.  
Finally,  it  is  worth distinguishing interpretative injustice from Fricker's  notion of hermeneutical
injustice.  Hermeneutical injustice is the phenomenon whereby a subjugated group or individual is
unable to render their experience intelligible either to themselves or to others, due to their lacking
the concepts with which to communicate (or render intelligible) their experience.   Fricker uses the
concept of sexual harassment as an example.  Until the notion of sexual harassment entered into
public discourse women who experienced sexual harassment were severely limited in their ability to
communicate the species of wrong they were being subjected to, or even to identify it themselves in
a clear way (Fricker (2007)).    Interpretative injustice does not concern the existence or availability
of the concepts required to render our social experiences intelligible.  Rather, interpretative injustice
70 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for providing this case. 
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occurs  when  the  wrong  content  is  assigned  as  a  result  of  prejudicial  stereotypes  influencing
interpretation, regardless of what concepts are available in our public language.  The existence of
interpretative injustice is therefore entirely consistent with the absence of hermeneutical injustice.
With  that  said  I  will  turn  to  the  task of  arguing that  interpretative  injustice  is  a  genuine,  and
genuinely problematic phenomenon. 
In  cases  of  context  sensitivity,  loose  talk,  and  implicature,  there  are  metaphysical  and
causal/epistemic questions about what is said or implied.  That is, there is the question of what it is
for  a  particular  proposition  to  be  implied,  or  for  a  particular  proposition  to  be  asserted  (the
metaphysical question), and there is the question of how it is that we, as audiences, come to judge
that  a  particular  proposition  has  been  asserted  or  implied  (the  causal/epistemic  question).  The
causal/epistemic question will  be more important for us here,  since we are concerned with the
propositions  attributed  to  speakers  by  audiences.   However,  the  metaphysical  question  is  still
important.  This is because if the facts which determine whether a particular proposition has been
asserted  include facts  about  the  speaker  and hearer's  representations  of  one another's  cognitive
states, then factors which can have a harmful effect on these representations will have a knock on
effect on the metaphysics of what is said.
As noted in previous chapters, we judge a context sensitive term to receive a particular value in
context, a particular proposition to be implied, or loose talk to be resolved in a particular way, by
making judgements about the conversational common ground and mutual salience.  That is, we
make judgements about what information the speaker trying to communicate, and the information to
which they expect us to appeal, on the basis of our representation of the speaker's representation of
our mutual goals, knowledge, interests, intelligence, salience judgements etc. This follows from a
very simple view of the aims of communication: when we communicate we generally aim convey
our intended meaning to the audience, and the audience generally aims to recover the speaker's
intended meaning.  Given these aims it makes sense that both audience and speaker would plan
their utterance, or interpret on the basis of their best judgements regarding the other interlocutor's
representation  of  the  factors  which  would  lead  to  a  particular  proposition  being interpreted  as
asserted or implied.  The same line of reasoning supports the notion that we rely on information
about the common ground when we are confronted by unfamiliar accents, or noisy environments.
In such situations we have to do some work to calculate the speaker's meaning, so we will appeal to
hypotheses about what the speaker likely intended to communicate.  
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Indeed, some philosophers think that conversational common ground plays a metaphysical role in
the  determination  of  what  is  said  as  well.   For  example,  Jeff  King  (2013,  Forthcoming  A,
Forthcoming B)  has argued that the value a context sensitive term receives in a context is the value
which  A)  the  speaker  intends,  and  B)  a  competent  interpreter  who  knows  the  conversational
common ground would attribute.  Whether a competent interpreter who knows the common ground
would  attribute  a  particular  value  to  a  term depends  on  what  propositions  are  included  in  the
common ground (that is, the set of propositions mutually known to be presupposed by speaker and
audience). 
However, it is rare that we explicitly reason about the common ground, or about mutual salience.
Rather,  like  our  credibility  judgements  our  judgements  about  what  is  said  or  implied  are
unreflective and intuitive.   We don't  explicitly consider  the common ground and work out  the
speaker's  meaning in  an effortful  step by step manner,  rather  we rely on quick heuristics,  and
associations or stereotypes in order to quickly make a judgement about the common ground and
about  the  asserted  or  implied  proposition.  As  in  the  case  of  credibility  judgements  a  hearer's
stereotypes  concerning social  identity will  have an impact  on the  judgements  they reach.   For
example, a stereotype concerning social identity could alter the audience's representations of the
speaker's likely interests or background knowledge.  
Indeed, there is even empirical support for the notion that social identity judgements play a role in
semantic processing.  For example, Van Berkum et al (2008) found that anomalies with respect to
the social identity of the speaker (for example 'I have a large tattoo on my back', spoken in an upper
class accent, or 'If only I looked like Britney Spears in her latest video' spoken in a male voice (Van
Berkum et al, (2008), p 2)) yielded the same type of neural response as semantic anomalies (such as
'the earth revolves around the trouble in a year'). This suggests that speaker identity plays a role in
semantic interpretation even at the earliest stages.  More recently Boland and Clark (MS) found that
in linguistic contexts which promote predictive processing audiences were able to more quickly
assign a referent to an ambiguous term when the referent was associated with the social identity of
the speaker (for example, finger nails were more quickly identified as the referent of 'nails' when the
sentence  was  spoken  in  a  female  voice).   Finally,  Geiselman  and  Bellezza  (1977)  found  that
audiences judged the same sentence to be more or less 'potent' (a measure of connotative meaning)
when spoken by a male or female respectively.  These studies support the view that amongst the
stereotypes upon which we rely to recover content are stereotypes concerning social identity (e.g.
class, gender, race etc.). 
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It is worth considering a specific account of the way in which we assign contextual values in order
to get clear on precisely how implicit stereotypes are able to play a role.  I use relevance theory as
an example because it is a clear and relatively well known account of the mechanisms underlying
the resolution of context sensitivity.  According to relevance theory we assess interpretations for
relevance,  and  select  the  first  interpretation  to  meet  our  expectation  for  optimal  relevance.
'Relevance' is a term of art denoting a feature of inputs to cognitive processes which strikes the
greatest balance between relevant cognitive effects (new derivable information, and strengthening
or weakening of previous assumptions) and cognitive effort (Sperber and Wilson (1986), (2004),
Carston (2002)).  That is, when we assign a meaning to a term we rank concepts on a basis of
cognitive  activation  and  assess  each  for  relevance.   The  first  concept  to  meet  the  audience's
expectation  of  relevance  is  assigned as  the  meaning of  the  term.  Consider  the  sentence  'Betty
walked to the edge of the cliff and jumped'.  Imagine that it is used in a discussion concerning
Betty's  suicide.   The  audience  may start  by assessing  the  literal  meaning  of  'jumped',  but  the
resultant proposition would not meet the audience's expectation of relevance, so they would move
on an assess other candidate meanings.  The topic of conversation (suicide) will make the notion of
'jumping of a cliff' salient, and will thus be amongst the potential meanings assessed for relevance.
It would meet the audience's expectation of optimal relevance, and so would be assigned as the
meaning of 'jumped'.  There are multiple points at which stereotypes and generalisation based on
the speaker's social identity can enter into and effect this process.  For example, an audience's view
of the speaker will effect the level of activation of the various concepts which are ranked in order to
be assessed for relevance. That is, if an audience member associates a particular concept or topic
with a particular race, gender, or social class then a candidate meaning related to that concept or
topic may be assigned a higher initial ranking when the speaker is a member of that race, gender, or
social class.  Likewise, the cognitive effects taken to be relevant will be affected by the audience's
expectations regarding the aims and interests, and beliefs of the speaker.  
Indeed,  such factors  don't  just  guide us in  our  resolution of context  sensitivity,  loose talk,  and
implicature.  By observing our informants and making judgements about their beliefs, backgrounds,
and interests, we build up a picture of the speaker which also guides our expectations regarding
what words they are likely to use.  There is reason to think that social identity judgements play a
role in speech perception - in our judgements about the very words spoken.  I am sure every reader
will have found themselves in a situation where they mistook one word for another on the basis of
expectations about what the speaker was going to say.  For example, picture yourself in a noisy bar
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talking to a well groomed, well spoken man in an expensive looking suit.  Suppose he is actually a
social scientist (you don't know this), and he says 'I work on current opinions on markets'.  Due to
the noisy environment you could easily mishear him and, partly on the basis of the expectations you
developed as a result of his appearance, hear him as saying  'I work on currency options markets'.  If
he were less well dressed and had a more working class accent you may mishear him as saying 'I
work currently in an open market'  (as in, an open air market).  These are clear cases of social
identity judgements leading to miscommunication (for psychological and linguistic research into the
impact  of  social  information  (including social  identity judgements)  on  sentence  processing  see
(Casasanto  (2008),  Campbell-Kibler  (2010),  Creel  and  Bergman  (2011),  and  Sumner  et  al
(2014)))71,72.
Sub-personal  reliance  on  stereotypes  about  the  speaker  is  an  essential  feature  of  utterance
interpretation.  However, as we have already seen such reliance on stereotypes can lead us astray.
One can imagine many ways in which prejudicial stereotypes in particular can lead to problems.
For example, Payne (2001) observed that white subjects primed with images of black faces were
more likely to misclassify an image of a pair of pliers as an image of a gun.  You might imagine a
similar situation arising with speech perception.  For example, white subjects may be more likely to
mistakenly hear a black speaker as saying 'I've got a gun', when saying 'I want some gum'. It is not
hard to see how such misinterpretation, if common enough, could be very problematic (for example,
in  cases involving trigger happy police officers).  One can also imagine cases where someone's
testimony is not understood and, as a result of prejudicial stereotypes, the audience just assumes the
testimony was irrelevant.  For example, imagine a rather unintelligent and prejudiced secondary
supply  teacher  covering  a  social  studies  class.   A black  male  student  invokes  the  notion  of
hegemony whilst making a point.  However, the teacher is not aware of the concept of hegemony,
she just assumes that the student is referring to some aspect of urban culture which has little bearing
on the class.  She thereby writes of his testimony.  This would be a case of interpretative injustice
since it pertains to the type of content attributed to the student rather than the teacher's assessment
of the student's credibility.  She may take him to be a perfectly credible informant with respect to
urban  culture  (the  topic  to  which  she  thinks  he  is  referring),  but  is  simply  not  interested  in
71 The phenomenon of stereotypes and generalisations infecting our speech perception,  can be seen as analogous to 
the phenomenon of cognitive penetration in the philosophy of perception.  Cognitive penetration occurs when 
background beliefs, expectations, and emotional states affect the character of our visual experiences.  For example, 
if we expect someone to be angry we may see them as angry, or if one has an overwhelming fear of guns and 
glances a long dark object out of the corner of one's eye one may perceive it as having gun like features (see Siegel 
(2012, 2013) for discussion of the epistemic significance of such cognitive penetration). 
72 Just to be clear, I don't intend this to be taken as a case of interpretative injustice, for no harm is brought about and 
the biases leading to the misinterpretation are not prejudicial.  
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information about urban culture.  
Clearly the problems just outlined are important - the first due to it's ability to disproportionately
subject certain groups to potentially harmful situations, and the second because it constitutes a form
of  silencing.   However,  I  would like  to  focus  primarily on  a  more  general  problem raised  by
prejudicial  stereotypes  in  interpretation.   The problem is  simply that,  as  a  result  of  systematic
misleading stereotypes, utterances by members of certain groups are going to be misinterpreted far
more often than the utterances of other groups.  Accurate stereotypes (or, stereotypes which serve as
reliable  heuristics)  will  generally  aid  hearers  in  recovering  what  the  speaker  intends  to
communicate, in the same way that reasoning based on accurate generalisations will usually lead us
to the truth.  However, if there are popular generalisations, stereotypes, or associations about certain
groups which  get  things  radically wrong then the  application  of  these  stereotypes  in  utterance
interpretation will lead to these groups being disproportionately misinterpreted.  This is simply due
to the fact that reasoning on the basis of faulty generalisations will generally lead to faulty beliefs.
This in and of itself gives rise to certain harms73. 
The problems don't end here however. In her discussion of credibility judgements Fricker notes that
stereotypes  of  disadvantaged  groups  have  often  included  negative  generalisations  about
intelligence,  rationality,  and  knowledgeableness.   Disadvantaged  groups  are  often  perceived  as
unintelligent,  irrational,  and  lacking  in  knowledge.   However,  judgements  about  the  likely
knowledge,  rationality,  and  intelligence  of  the  speaker  will  determine  the  charitability  of  the
audience's  interpretation.   That  is,  if  one's  interpretation  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the
audience is unintelligent and has various false beliefs then one's interpretation will be less charitable
than if one interpreted on the basis of the assumption that the speaker is a rational and reliable belief
former.   The  result  is  that  members  of  disadvantaged  groups  are  not  only  more  likely  to  be
misinterpreted by members of more powerful groups, but are more likely to be interpreted The fact
that certain groups are disproportionately subject to uncharitable interpretation is evidenced by a
recent study by Alison Brooks et al  (Forthcoming).   Brooks et  al found that potential investors
systematically preferred entrepreneurial pitches by men over identical pitches by women, and that
73 Indeed, if King (2013, Forthcoming A, Forthcoming B) is correct  then these problematic stereotypes might lead to
nothing being said at all in certain cases.   If  one's prejudicial stereotypes lead to false judgements about what the
speaker  does  or  does  not  take  to  be  common  ground,  then  these  prejudicial  stereotypes  will  influence  which
propositions  are  in  the  common ground.   Therefore,  they could  result  in  the  information  the  speaker  intends  the
audience to appeal to being absent from the common ground.  The result of this is that a competent interpreter who
knew the actual common ground might not be able to recover the speaker's intended meaning.  Thus, on King's account,
no proposition would be asserted. 
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they preferred pitches by attractive men to identical pitches by unattractive men.  Participants were
asked  to  rate  how  persuasive,  fact  based,  and  logical  the  presentations  were,  and  found
presentations  by men (especially attractive men) to rate  higher  on each scale,  even though the
female and male entrepreneurs were reading from the same script.  Since the extent to which a
presentation  is  logical  or  fact  based  is  dependent  on  the  content  of  the  presentation  it  seems
reasonable to conclude that the gender of the entrepreneur had an impact on the way they were
interpreted, with males being interpreted more charitably, and attractive males having a particular
advantage.  Charitability  will  be  especially  relevant  when  we  reconsider  Fricker's  response  to
epistemic injustice.  First, however, it is worth spending some time considering a case in which
these problems arise, and clarifying precisely why the problems just outlined give rise to harms.
3. The Harms of Interpretative Injustice.
In  section  two  it  was  argued  that  interpretative  injustice  constitutes  a  wrong  because  it
systematically and unfairly harms members of disadvantaged social groups.  We have seen how the
phenomenon might arise.  However, we have not yet considered any detailed examples, nor have
we  considered  any  specific  harms  which  will  be  systematically  associated  with  interpretative
injustice.  In this section I will provide a clear example of interpretative injustice and to briefly
highlight some of the ways in which interpretative injustice leads to genuine harms74.
One of Fricker's central cases is the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee's 'To Kill a Mocking Bird'.
Tom Robinson is a black man falsely accused of rape in the deep south of the United States in the
mid 30s.  In Lee's tale Tom Robinson is wrongly convicted of rape despite the fact that a convincing
case for his innocence has been put forward.  Fricker uses this as an illustrative example in which
an audience (the jury) do not assign an accurate degree of credibility to the speaker as a result of
their prejudicial biases, and the speaker is harmed as a result. As Fricker notes, in the racial climate
in which the trial takes place it is very difficult for the jury to take the word of a black man over the
word of a white woman, especially in a rape case.  This was, after all, a period in which there was
still a very widespread and open anxiety about the sanctity of white southern womanhood and the
supposed  threat  of  predatory,  animalistic black  male  sexuality.   Considering  the  trial  of  Tom
74 I am not concerned with how 'epistemic' each of these harms is.  Certainly they are epistemic in the sense that they 
contribute to Fricker's form of epistemic injustice - they relate to our ability to share knowledge, and they involve 
people being wrongly held epistemically responsible for certain propositions.  However, it is less clear that the 
speaker is  directly wronged as a knower in instances of interpretative injustice.  Indeed, in many of these cases the 
problem arises because the speaker is treated as a knower, but treated as a knower of the wrong proposition. 
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Robinson, and its historical context, we can come up with clear cases of interpretative injustice.
Fricker draws our attention to a particular passage in which Robinson is asked why he visited his
accuser's home regularly.  Robinson did so because he felt sorry for his accuser, she seemed to live
a lonely sad life, and he wanted too help her.  He expresses this by saying that he felt sorry for her.
This goes down very badly.  In the climate of the trial the very notion that a black man could feel
sorry for a white woman (who would be considered his superior) would be found shocking, and the
audience would likely read into his utterance that he felt superior to her.  This, in and of itself,
might be seen as a case of interpretative injustice.  However, I am primarily concerned with cases
where the primary communicated content of an utterance is  misinterpreted,  and I think we can
modify this case to get a clearer example of interpretative injustice along such lines.  Let us suppose
that Robinson did not state that he felt sorry for his accuser, but rather that he visited her regularly
because she seemed vulnerable.  Here the term 'vulnerable' could be read different ways.  As used
by Robinson it would have meant (or been intended to mean) 'in need of help/assistance'.  However,
in the context of the racist south where one of the dominant associations of black maleness was an
association with sexual aggression (especially toward white women), as well as being uncontrolled,
animalistic, predatory, uncivilised, and morally inferior, the description of the apparent victim of a
rape as 'vulnerable' could easily be seen as him accidentally revealing that he saw here as an easy
target for sexual violence.  Indeed, if he realised his misstep here and 'shifted uncomfortably in his
chair'  (as  he  does  in  the  book),  this  could  be  taken  as  further  confirmation  that  he  has  just
accidentally reviled his true intentions in the case – slipped up by revealing that he saw her as an
easy target75.   I am sure it is clear to the reader that misinterpretations such as this can lead to great
harm,  and  that  a  group's  being  systematically  and  disproportionately  subject  to  such
misinterpretations  constitutes  a  social  injustice.  For  the  rest  of  this  section  I  will  outline  three
particular harms which seem to arise from interpretative injustice (and which, thus, are inflicted
disproportionately and unfairly on certain groups). 
Now that we have considered a clear case of interpretative injustice it is worth considering several
harms which systematically arise from interpretative injustice. Firstly, interpretative injustice makes
it harder for some groups (particularly disadvantaged groups) to be heard.  That is, certain groups
are silenced disproportionately.  Silencing occurs when an individual or group is prevented from
carrying out a communicative action,  either by being prevented from attempting the action (for
example, through intimidation) or as a result of the action being prevented from being successful.
75 One can see how this would fit into the relevance theoretic story given earlier.  The relevant associations of 
predatory animalistic sexuality will be highly salient to the audience, thus the resultant concept of vulnerability will 
receive a higher level of activation and thus be ranked above Robinson's intended meaning. 
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Hornsby and Langton (1998) characterise the latter forms of silencing in terms of the illocutionary
or perlocutionary force of the act being blocked.  That is, either the communicative act is prevented
from  producing  its  intended  outcome  (perlocutionary  silencing)  or  it  is  prevented  from  even
constituting the intended type of action (illocutionary silencing). Hornsby and Langton maintain
that in order for an illocutionary act (for example, an assertion or a refusal) to be carried out the fact
that it is intended to be an assertion or refusal must be recognised by the audience.  So when the
audience  fails  to  recognise  the  illocutionary  act  the  speaker  is  attempting  the  speaker  is
illocutionarily  silenced76.   More  recently  Ishani  Maitra77 (2009)  has  characterised  silencing  in
Gricean terms.  Grice's conditions on speaker meaning are as follows: 
'A speaker S means something by uttering x iff, for some audience A, S utters x intending:
(i) A to produce a response r;
(ii) A to think (recognize) that S intends (i); and,
(iii) A’s fulfilment of (ii) to give him a reason to fulfil (i)'
Grice (1989), 92.
Maitra then characterises silencing as follows:
'On my view, a speaker is communicatively disabled iff she is unable to fully successfully 
perform her intended communicative act, because her intended audience fails to satisfy 
either the second or the third of her (Gricean) intentions.' Maitra (2009), 327-328.
All cases of interpretative injustice are cases of silencing, since if one misinterprets the content of
an  utterance  then  one  thereby fails  to  recognise  the  illocutionary  act  being  performed,  or  the
speaker's  communicative  intention78.   Indeed,  the  paradigmatic  case  of  ethically  problematic
silencing79 is arguably a case of interpretative injustice.  In the paradigmatic case of silencing a
76 As mentioned in footnote 6 Jeff King's (2013, forthcoming a, forthcoming b)  metasemantics entails a similar form 
of silencing - if the common ground is rendered defective in such a way that the information contained therein 
would not be sufficient for a competent audience to recover the intended proposition then the speaker will be 
prevented from performing the act of asserting their intended proposition. 
77 Maitra is not aiming to capture cases of silencing where the speaker is prevented from even attempting a 
communicative act. 
78 It is not clear that all cases of silencing in Hornsby and Langton's sense will be cases of interpretative injustice, since
one could misinterpret the illocutionary force of an utterance without misinterpreting the content.  However, these 
cases will still be related, since they will often be cases in which some other aspect of an agent's speech act (the 
actual act being performed) is misinterpreted, perhaps on the basis of problematic stereotypes.  
79 Maitra (2009) argues that all silencing is ethically problematic.  I find this claim problematic.  It is not clear that the 
speaker is wronged when it is their own fault that their communicative intention has not been recognised.  
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woman  tries  to  refuse  a  man's  sexual  advances  by  saying  'no'.   However,  as  a  result  of  his
misleading conception of women as always wanting to avoid the appearance of promiscuity, yet
really usually desiring sex, he misinterprets the woman's refusal.  He thereby fails to recognise her
communicative intention.  Thus the woman is prevented from performing the illocutionary act of
refusal.  In this case the man's interpretation of the woman was guided by a misrepresentation of the
speaker's interests, desires, and intentions based on a harmful stereotype of women.  As emphasised
by Maitra (2009), the harms of silencing do not end here.  She writes: 
'Speech has, at the very least, great instrumental value.  It enables us to get what we want
and need, for ourselves and others. It constitutes our first line of defence against a variety of
injuries,  from unwanted  sexual  overtures  to  tyrannical  governmental  action.   And  it  is
essential  both  to  the  propagation  of  knowledge,  and  to  the  proper  functioning  of  a
democratic society.  When a speaker is communicatively disabled, she is thereby deprived of
these (and other) benefits that speech can offer.' Maitra (2009), 331. 
As  Maitra  points  out,  when  one  is  silenced  one  is  thereby restricted  in  one's  ability  to  share
knowledge.  Fricker,  in her discussion of epistemic injustice,  emphasises the importance of the
ability to convey knowledge.  Firstly she argues that the ability to share knowledge is a fundamental
human value, and that when a group is limited in their ability to share knowledge they are thereby
limited in their ability to engage in a practice fundamental to human value, and to human society
more generally.  If prejudicial stereotypes lead to some groups being misinterpreted (and therefore
silenced) disproportionately then the prejudicial stereotypes make it harder for these groups to enter
into the practice of sharing knowledge.  Thus, if Fricker is right, these stereotypes will make it
harder for certain groups to engage in social practices fundamental to human value.  Moreover, it
will make it harder for these groups to pursue their ends80.  For example, it will make it harder for
individuals in certain groups to progress in their careers.  Brooks et al (forthcoming) illustrated one
particular way in which this could occur - female entrepreneurs are at a distinct career disadvantage,
seemingly as a result of their tendency to be interpreted uncharitably (at least in certain situations).
Additionally, communication is a messy affair, and communicative success is always a matter of degree.  I think it is
likely we rarely have a 100% accurate grasp of the speaker's communicative intention.  However I think it is 
implausible that we commit the wrong of silencing in the majority of communicative interactions. 
80 A related point is that as a result of stereotypes about a group the group itself (not just the individuals in the group) 
may be misinterpreted in political discourse.  For example, if the poor are seen as generally being lazy and 
dependent on handouts, then the desire of the poor for greater welfare may be interpreted in political discourse as a 
desire for handouts.  Thus, stereotypes about the group make it harder for the group's interests to be represented in a 
democratic system (thanks to Sebastian Becker for this point).  A full account of this phenomenon would require an 
account of what it is for a group as a whole to have particular interests, and to communicate them successfully. 
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It is easy to imagine how the same phenomenon could occur in job interviews, marketing pitches,
academic research presentations etc.   In such cases the female speaker  will  be prevented from
communicating her intended message, and will be assessed and treated as if she has attempted to
communicate something different (in a similar way to the black male who is not understood when
he tries to invoke the notion of hegemony).   The case of Tom Robinson provides a particularly
vivid example of harmful silencing.  As a result of his inability to be understood he is wrongly
convicted of rape, and (the book implies) is murdered soon after.  
Since all  cases of interpretative injustice seem to be cases  of  silencing it  may be unclear  why
interpretative injustice is a worthy topic of investigation in its own right81.  Why not just study the
general phenomena of silencing?  I think there are several reasons why it is important to study
interpretative  injustice  as  an  independent  phenomenon.  Firstly,  as  we  will  soon  see,  there  are
distinctive  additional harms not systematically caused by other forms of silencing82.  Two of these
harms will be discussed later in this section, and it seems plausible that there may be further harms
which are caused only by interpretative injustice.  Secondly, interpretative injustice complicates our
response to epistemic injustice.  This is discussed in the final section of the chapter where I argue
that the phenomenon of interpretative injustice may render Fricker's solution to epistemic injustice
suboptimal. The final (and more general) point is that although silencing is a unified phenomena,
different types of silencing have different types of causes.  In order to be able to find solutions to
the problems caused by silencing, and in order to properly understand the way in which different
social practices silence, it is important to have a clear taxonomy of the types of silencing not just in
terms of their effects (i.e. whether they are perlocutionary, illocutionary etc), but in terms of their
causes.   The phenomenon of interpretative injustice fits  into such a taxonomy because it  has a
distinctive cause – underlying  prejudicial  biases  shaping the way we interpret  people's  speech.
Other types of silencing have different causes, for example the same biases altering our credibility
assessments,  or  more  overt  prejudices  causing  us  to  discount,  or  try  to  actively  prevent  the
testimony of certain groups.  Some types of silencing are unified by, for example, being caused by
prejudicial stereotypes.  However, these stereotypes can act in different ways on different levels of
cognition,  giving rise to importantly different forms of silencing.  A solution to one of type of
silencing will not necessarily generalise to all.   
81 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern. 
82 This is not to say that the harms to be discussed shortly are never caused by other forms of silencing.  Rather, 
interpretative injustice, by its very nature (and unlike silencing in general), seems particulaly strongly (and 
systematically) associated with these particular harms.  
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Related harms occur when some groups are disproportionately interpreted overly charitably.  In
these cases it is not clear individuals are directly harmed.  However, a practice of systematically
interpreting some groups overly charitably (and interpreting other speakers with a more reasonable
level of charity) will lead to some groups having specific advantages over other groups in a way
that produces many of the same harms as silencing.  For example, silencing makes it harder for
certain groups to advance in their career.  Overly charitable interpretation of one group will likewise
make it harder for members of other groups to advance in their careers, because it will be harder
from them to compete.  A possible example of this occurring in philosophy might be philosophers
from prestigious institutions being interpreted more charitably than philosophers from lower ranked
institutions.  It is easy to see how this could occur.  Given the difficulty of strictly interpreting even
the clearest analytic philosophy, there are usually a few ways an argument can be read.  If our
knowledge of the prestige of the author influences our interpretation of their argument this will
place that author at an advantage over others who we may interpret less charitably (and perhaps
more accurately) as a result of the status of their institution (race and gender could conceivably lead
to the same form of overly charitable interpretation)83,84. 
Secondly, when a speaker is interpreted as having asserted a proposition  p they are held publicly
accountable for defending  p.  This facts  is  emphasised by Macfarlane (2005, 2011),  Hinchman
(2005),  Goldberg  (2006)  Rescorla  (2009),  and  McMyler  (2013).   Hinchman  puts  the  point  as
follows: 
''If you’ve told someone that p, that person is now under certain conditions -for example, if
he’s challenged whether p-entitled to hold you accountable for producing a reason to believe
that p.' Hinchman (2005), 568.
Of course,  in  cases  of misinterpretation (where the fault  lies  with the audience rather  than the
speaker, as is the case with interpretative injustice) the speaker does not actually say what they are
interpreted  to  have  said.   So  the  audience  will  not  actually  be  entitled  to  hold  the  speaker
accountable for having said p.  Nonetheless, if the audience thinks the speaker has said that p they
83 Of course, judgements based on institutional affiliation may not be completely unreliable, since philosophical ability
has at least some role in candidate job placement.  I do not wish to take a stand on the usefulness of institutional 
affiliation as a guide to ability here. 
84 Tom Robinson's trial illustrates another sense in which someone may be interpreted overly charitably to the detriment
of a member of a disadvantaged group.  If Robinson's accuser slipped up and accidentally implied that she had sexual 
desires toward Robinson, yet the jury were unable to interpret her (a southern white female) as expressing desire for a 
black male, then this would surely harm Robinson's chances of receiving a fair trial.  And in this context this would 
constitute overly charitable interpretation (since the alternative interpretation would harm the accuser's case).
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will  hold  the  speaker  responsible  for  p,  even  if  they are  not  entitled  to  do  so.   If  prejudicial
stereotypes result in certain groups being misinterpreted more frequently than others (without the
misinterpretation  being  the  fault  of  the  speaker)  then  members  of  these  groups  will  also  be
disproportionately held responsible for intending to communicate things they never intended to
communicate.  Being held responsible for something you never did constitutes a harm.  
Moreover, in combination with other prejudices this could lead to further problems down the line.
In her discussion of credibility judgements Fricker notes that some groups have been perceived as
being inherently dishonest.  If this is the case then the disadvantaged speaker's ability to correct the
audience's mistake may also be harmed.  They could be perceived as being dishonest and trying to
slip out of a commitment.  Indeed, if some groups find themselves having to correct mistakes in
interpretation more often than others this could add to the perception of that group as being sneaky
and dishonest.  This in turn will contribute to the stereotype that the group is dishonest.  Thus, it
will give rise to lowered credibility judgements.
Relatedly,  victims  of  interpretative  injustice  will  often  be  forced  to  defend  themselves  against
misinterpretation  (both  during  and  following  communicative  exchanges).   This  experience  of
having questions raised against oneself, having one's credibility brought into question, and having
to  actively  re-shape  the  audience's  conception  of  ones-self,  will  often  be  cognitively  and
emotionally draining, and often humiliating.  This will be especially true of cases in which one's
words, which are one's primary means of shaping the audience's conception of oneself, are at risk of
being misinterpreted and actually contributing to the conception one is trying to correct.  We can
imagine an extension of the Tom Robinson case in which this occurs.  Imagine than Robinson is
asked to clarify what he means by 'vulnerable'.  Robinson may have replied 'well, she seemed like
she needed a man'.  It is unclear what should be built into the concept of 'man' here (presumably not
any male will do), and it raises the question of the purpose for which a man is needed.  In this case
Robinson would have meant  that  his  accuser  needed the help of someone who was capable of
performing manual labour around the house.  However, in making this utterance he would once
again be at risk of misinterpretation (due to the very same biases which lead to the misinterpretation
of 'vulnerable').  The audience's conception of black men as animalistic sexual predators, and their
preconceptions of Robinson's likely aims in the scenario, could lead to him being interpreted as
stating that his accuser desired a dominant sexually aggressive black male (perhaps even with the
implication  that  she  desired  the  rape).  This,  of  course,  is  far  from  what  Robinson  intended.
However, after his two misinterpreted utterances any further attempts to clarify his assertions would
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likely be taken as attempts to wriggle out of what he has said.  I'm sure it is clear to the reader how
humiliating, frustrating and emotionally draining this experience would be for Robinson (and not
only because of the likely consequences of a rape conviction). 
Finally, if members of certain groups are interpreted uncharitably more frequently than others then
this  will  contribute  to  the  stereotype  that  members  those  groups  are  poor  informants,  thereby
feeding into the stereotypes which give rise to prejudicial  credibility judgements.  Consider the
following:  suppose  we  have  two  informants,  Max  and  Sally.  If  we  frequently  interpret  Sally
uncharitably so that, for example, we take her to be asserting that p, where p is less plausible than
some alternative interpretation q which we would assign to Max in the same circumstances, then the
following situations will arise more frequently with respect to Sally than with respect to Max:  A)
we find Sally's utterance so initially implausible that we lower our judgement of her credibility8586,
and B) we believe her only to later discover that the proposition we took the her to be asserting was
false, which once again leads us to lower our judgement of her credibility.  Therefore, as a result of
our uncharitable interpretations of Sally we will find ourselves with what seem like good reasons
for assigning Max a higher credibility than Sally, even though he may be no better as an informant. 
If  audiences  make credibility  judgements  on  the  basis  of  the  speaker's  social  identity,  and the
speaker's social identity is a partial determiner of the charitability of the audience's interpretation,
then that audience will find themselves in situations A and B more frequently with respect to the
testimony of  certain  social  groups than others.  This  will  thereby strengthen the stereotype that
particular groups have low credibility, and thus contribute to prejudicial credibility judgements.  We
can imagine this  occurring in  the context  of  entrepreneurial  pitches  as discussed above.   If  an
investor frequently has the impression that female entrepreneurs present weaker, less coherent and
more illogical pitches, then they may come to the belief that female entrepreneurs are generally not
very intelligent or reliable.  As a result they may assign a lower credibility to certain assertions
made by the entrepreneur, for example assertions which concern the entrepreneur’s ability to carry
out the project, or the entrepreneur's statements regarding projected profits.  Thus, interpretative
85 Karen Jones (2002) discusses the potential harms produced when we lower our credibility judgement of the speaker 
on the basis of what we take to be the initial plausibility of their assertion.  
86 It might be thought that we would not assign initially implausible interpretations if we are taking the gricean maxims
to be in effect. This would be a mistake.  When applying gricean norms you need to represent what would be a
cooperative contribution given the speaker's representation of the situation.  For example, imagine you know that p,
and believe that a speaker doesn't know that p.  If the speaker were to make an assertion which would imply q only
if  p was  common  knowledge,  then  you  would  not  take  them  to  be  implying  q.   If  you  take  the  speaker's
representation of  the communicative situation to  be defective then the contribution you take the speaker to  be
making will not be the most cooperative given the actual facts, but rather the most cooperative given a particular set
of faulty background assumptions.  And this contribution may seem implausible. 
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injustice contributes to epistemic injustice.
So far everything I have said can be seen as supplementary to Fricker's account of testimonial
injustice.  In the final section I argue that the two phenomena interact in an important way.  More
precisely,  I  argue that  adopting Fricker's  proposed solution to testimonial  injustice without  also
treating interpretative injustice will cause the hearer to be epistemically harmed, with only minimal
benefits to the speaker. 
4. Interpretative Injustice and Credibility Adjustments.
Fricker does not merely identify and describe the phenomenon of epistemic injustice.  She also
offers a strategy for overcoming it.  She argues that the appropriate response to epistemic injustice
is to develop the virtue of testimonial justice, whereby we gain a sensitivity to the sorts of situations
in  which  our  credibility  judgements  may  be  biased,  and  re-consider  our  judgements  in  such
circumstances.  In such situations we should not rely on our quick intuitive judgements, but should
try to make an accurate and unprejudiced judgement. The hope is that we eventually become more
reliable habitual judges of credibility, and that prejudicial stereotypes will no affect our credibility
judgements.  At this point we will display an instinctive sensitivity to actual signs that the speaker
has low credibility, and not judge speakers to have low credibility on the basis of factors such as
race and gender. 
It might be thought that developing the virtue of testimonial justice would make us more reliable
belief formers.  For example, suppose that on reflection I realise that I have an underlying bias
against a particular race, and that I assign members of that race a lower credibility than I should.
Next  time I  have an  interaction  with a  member of  that  race I  actively reconsider  my intuitive
credibility judgement, and compensate upwards.  The effect of this is that the speaker is no longer
prevented from communicating their knowledge to me, and I no longer miss out on knowledge I can
gain from this speaker. 
This  solution  becomes  less  straightforward  once  interpretative  injustice  is  taken  into  account.
Consider the case of Max and Sally from the previous section.  However, imagine that in this case
we have not only been interpreting Sally uncharitably,  but  have also been assigning her a  low
credibility, and thus not trusting her testimony.  After reading Fricker's 'Epistemic Injustice' and
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reflecting on the way we assign credibility judgements we realise that we have been assigning Sally
a low credibility on the basis of prejudicial stereotypes.  As a result we no longer trust our intuitive
credibility judgements of Sally. Instead we actively reason about her credibility.  Sometimes this
results in our rejecting her testimony for reasons other than prejudicial bias.  However, on other
occasions it results in us compensating upwards and assigning her a high degree of credibility. That
is, in many cases when Sally makes an utterance and we take her to be asserting a proposition p, we
go against our instinctive (but prejudicial) credibility judgement and assign her a higher credibility,
thereby leading us to believe p.  Certainly we will find ourselves believing what we take Sally to
have said more often than we would have done otherwise.   
It should be clear why this will lead to problems if we do not also adjust for interpretative injustice.
Consciously assigning Sally a higher credibility will not necessarily affect the charitability of our
interpretation87.  The practice of assigning high credibility to uncharitably interpreted utterances will
lead to unreliable belief formation, and will thus be harmful to the hearer.  Moreover, in the cases
where Sally is misinterpreted she will still be blocked from sharing her knowledge.  The audience
will  bear  an  epistemic  cost  which  is  of  little  benefit  to  the  speaker.  This  result  applies  more
generally.   If  we  treat  epistemic  injustice  in  the  way  Fricker  suggests,  without  also  treating
interpretative injustice,  then in many cases we run the risk of not only continuing to harm the
speaker, but also harming ourselves.  
To be clear, I am not claiming that Fricker's solution fails to treat testimonial injustice.  If we raise
our credibility assignments then we will avoid disrespecting the speaker as a knower.  Thus one of
the main harms of testimonial injustice will be removed.  Rather, my point is cautionary.  Treating
testimonial injustice in the way Fricker suggests without also treating interpretative injustice will, in
cases where both interpretative and testimonial injustice are present, put the hearer at epistemic risk,
and only make a minimal positive difference to the speaker.  
It might be thought that this is unproblematic, since the virtue of testimonial justice can be applied
earlier on in the process of testimonial belief formation88.  This would involve shifting gear from
being a passive spontaneous interpreter to being an active interpreter.  The first point to note here is
that  the  problem raised  above  was  only  intended  to  illustrate  the  risks  of  treating  testimonial
87 It is perhaps a matter of contingent empirical fact the practice of actively adjusting one's credibility judgements will
eventually change one's  overall  perspective of  the speaker,  which will  also solve the problem of interpretative
injustice.  However it is an empirical question (to which we don't have an answer) whether this will be the case. 
88 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this observation.
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injustice without also treating interpretative injustice.  If one shifted gear earlier on then one would
not be ignoring interpretative injustice.  Thus, there is no tension with the point above.  However,
there are two further points which indicate that it may be less straightforward to shift gears with
respect to one's interpretation than it is to do so with respect to one's credibility judgements.  The
first  (minor)  point  is  simply  that  although  the  processes  underlying  both  interpretation  and
credibility  judgements  are  subpersonal,  credibility  judgements  seem  more  easily  accessible  to
consciousness.   We  are  more  used  to  actively  reasoning  about  a  speaker's  credibility  during
conversational exchanges than we are to reasoning about how to interpret them.  The second point
is that credibility judgements seem to be scalar in a way in which interpretation is not.  That is, it
might be thought that our credibility judgements fall somewhere on a scale, and in order to adjust
our judgements we must merely shift where we locate the speaker's utterance on that scale.  With
interpretation there are multiple possible meanings which need to be ranked for plausibility given
our knowledge of the context.  Thus, the task of adjusting interpretation cannot be reduced to a
simple  heuristic  such  as  'shift  credibility  upward'.   This  is  not  to  say that  such  adjustment  is
impossible.  However, given the greater demandingness it is likely to have a greater detrimental
effect  on  the  conversational  exchange  than  a  credibility  adjustment.  As  a  result,  a  practice  of
adjusting this way will  still  leave certain groups at  a communicative disadvantage compared to
those for whom no adjustment is needed.
5. Conclusion.
I have introduced the notion of interpretative injustice and explained the numerous harms to which
it gives rise.  It gives rise to silencing, unjust attributions of responsibility, and it contributes to the
stereotypes  which  give  rise  to  epistemic  injustice  in  credibility judgements.   Moreover,  I  have
argued that interpretative injustice causes a problem for Fricker.  That is, if the virtue of testimonial
justice is developed without interpretative injustice being treated as well then in many cases harm
will be caused to the audience without any benefit to the speaker.  
It is not clear how we should respond to interpretative injustice.  The practice of actively reflecting
on our interpretations whilst communicating would be costly.  After all, we have developed fast sub
personal mechanisms of interpretation for good reason.  Indeed, if it is generally more cognitively
demanding  for  members  of  certain  privileged  groups  to  communicate  with  those  from  less
privileged groups then the less privileged individuals will still have problems integrating. I suspect
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that the problems of interpretative and epistemic injustice cannot be treated alone, and are most
efficiently treated by eliminating the harmful prejudicial stereotypes from one's psyche altogether.
It is an empirical question how this is best achieved (if it is possible at all).  However, one thing we
can do in the mean time is to develop a sensitivity to the kinds of situations in which interpretative
injustice may be especially harmful.  If we develop such a sensitivity, and actively reflect on our
interpretation  in  such situations,  then  at  least  some of  the  more  severe  harms of  interpretative
injustice will be stemmed. 
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Chapter Six: Cognitive Penetrability and Testimonial Anti-
Reductionism.
0. Introduction.
This chapter explores testimonial versions of the cognitive penetrability cases presented by Susanna
Siegel (2012, 2013). It is argued that the phenomenon of cognitive penetration (or an analogous
phenomenon)  can  arise  at  the  level  of  linguistic  understanding  (both  as  a  result  of  speech
perception,  and interpretation).   It  is  argued that  a  range of  views about  testimony (especially
certain brands of anti-reductionism which purport to sustain a priori testimonial knowledge) make
the  wrong  predictions  about  the  cases.   I  start  by  outlining  Siegel's  cognitive  penetrability
arguments  against  perceptual  dogmatism.   Next  I  distinguish  several  forms  of  testimonial
reductionism and anti-reductionism in order to indicate precisely which theories of testimony will
be  rendered  problematic.   Following  this  I  outline  cases  of  cognitively  penetrated  linguistic
understanding arising out of both speech perception and linguistic interpretation, and  I explain why
these cases render certain views of testimony problematic.  Finally I discuss several responses.  I
start by arguing that several responses to Siegel's arguments regarding perception do not carry over
to the case of testimony.  I then discuss three further responses specific to the case of testimony (one
of which is found to have promise, but places difficult constraints on one's account of the basis for
one's right to trust one's own linguistic understanding).  
1. Perceptual Dogmatism and Cognitive Penetrability. 
Perceptual dogmatism holds that when it perceptually seems to us that p we are by default justified
in  forming  a  belief  that  p.   That  is,  perceptual  seemings  themselves  provide  a  (defeasible)
justification without need for any further knowledge or inference. Dogmatism has recently been
challenged by Susana  Siegel  (2012,  2013).   Siegel  explores  the hypothesis  that  our  perceptual
experiences can be cognitively penetrated.  The general idea is that other doxastic and attitudinal
states can have an impact on the contents of our perceptual seemings.  That is, a state S1  (such as a
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perceptual seeming, or an intuition that p)  is cognitively penetrated by a state S2 (such as a belief or
a desire) if the content of S1 is caused (in some internal mental way) by S289.  For example, Payne
(2001) found that subjects under a time constraint were more likely to misidentify an image of a
tool as an image of a gun when primed with images of black faces than when primed with images of
white  faces.   There are several  possible explanations for this.   One such possibility is  that the
underlying expectations and associations evoked by the images of the black faces actually effected
the subjects' perceptions of the tool, causing them to see it as a gun.  
Perceptual  dogmatism instructs  us  to  form beliefs  even  on  the  basis  of  cognitively penetrated
perceptual experiences, and this, according to Siegel, entails that some seemingly irrational beliefs
will be justified.  In Siegel's cases an irrational belief or attitude B1 influences the content of the
perceptual seeming, meaning that the resulting belief B2 ultimately arises partly as a result of that
irrational belief or attitude B1.  Siegel argues that we should treat the resultant belief as unjustified.
It will help to consider one of Siegel's examples:  
ANGRY-LOOKING JACK: Jill believes, without justification, that Jack is angry at her. The
epistemically appropriate attitude for Jill to take toward the proposition that Jack is angry at
her is suspension of belief. But her attitude is epistemically inappropriate. When she sees
Jack, her  belief  makes him look angry to  her.  If  she didn’t  believe this,  her  experience
wouldn’t represent him as angry. Siegel (2012), 209.
Since it perceptually seems to Jill that Jack is angry she is, according to the dogmatist, justified in
believing  that  Jack  is  angry.   Experiences  with  such  problematic  causal  origins  are  labelled
'checkered experiences'. Siegel hypothesises that such experiences do not provide justification. This
is characterised by the following principle: 
DOXASTIC DOWNGRADE THESIS: If S forms a first-order belief B with content P, on
the basis of an experience E that is checkered with respect to its content P, B is thereby
doxastically unjustified, assuming that S has no other basis on which she believes P90. Siegel
89
This definition is a rough generalisation of that given by Stokes (2012). The precise character of cognitive 
penetration is not of central importance to this chapter, as what really matters is just that background beliefs and 
attitudes can have an impact on the contents of states which are taken to provide default justification in such a way 
as to undermine that justification. 
90 Siegel also provides a propositional version of the downgrade principle.  However, she takes the doxastic 
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(2013), 704. 
There are several reasons to endorse the doxastic downgrade thesis.  Firstly, many find it counter
intuitive to claim that beliefs (such as Jill's) which arise from checkered experiences are justified.
Secondly, the features by which ill-founded beliefs transmit their ill-foundedness to other beliefs
are, according to Siegel, shared with checkered experiences.  Thus, there is reason to think that
beliefs based on checkered experiences, just like beliefs based on other unjustified beliefs, are not
justified.  Siegel (2013) argues for this by going through several differences between beliefs and
perceptual seemings, and arguing that none of these differences could account for the ability of
beliefs, but not seemings, to transmit illfoundedness. If Siegel is correct then it is likely that the
features by which ill-formed beliefs transmit their lack of justification are shared with checkered
experiences.  For example, beliefs differ from perceptual seemings in sometimes being adjustable in
response to evidence, in being rational or irrational, and in being formed through explicit reasoning.
However,  according to Siegel,  none of these features explain the ability of a belief  to transmit
irrationality to other beliefs.  For example, implicit beliefs can transmit irrationality, as can beliefs
which  are  very  hard  to  adjust.   Even  rational  beliefs  can,  according  to  Siegel,  help  transmit
irrationality.   Thus, it  seems that whatever feature of belief allows it  to transmit irrationality is
shared with perceptual experience91.  Finally, Siegel (2012) argues that cognitive penetration can
produce viciously circular beliefs.  Consider Jill's belief about Jack's anger again: Her conclusion
that Jack is angry is dependent on her perception of him as angry, which is in turn dependent on her
prior belief that he is angry.  To illustrate this final point Siegel draws the following analogy: 
GOSSIP CIRCLE: In a gossip circle, Jill tells Jack that p, Jack believes her but quickly
forgets that she’s the source of his belief, then shortly afterward Jack tells Jill that p. It seems
silly for Jill to take Jack’s report that p as providing much if any additional support for p,
beyond whatever evidence she already had. On the face of it, this looks like a feedback loop
in which no new justification is introduced. Similarly, when beliefs are formed on the basis
of  cognitively  penetrated  experience,  it  is  as  if  your  belief  that  p  told  you  to  have  an
experience that p, and then your experience that p told you to believe that p. Siegel (2012),
202.
downgrade principle to be of more central importance.
91 Of course, an argument like this can never be conclusive, as it is always open that a new feature of belief will be 
identified which explains its ability to transmit illfoundedness and which is not shared with states of perceptual 
seeming. 
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It seems plausible that these problems will generalise beyond perceptual dogmatism to other views
on  which  cognitively  penetrable  states  are  taken  to  provide  default  justification.   Perceptual
seemings present the world as being a particular way, are taken by dogmatists to provide default
justification, and appear to be cognitively penetrable.  However, other sources such as memory and
intuition  also  seem  to  present  the  world  a  particular  way,  can  be  taken  to  provide  default
justification, and may well be cognitively penetrable.  If one's intuition that p is somehow caused by
a prior belief that p, and is still taken to provide default justification, then this would give rise to a
similar  sort  of  problematic  circularity  (of  course,  whether  memory  or  intuition  actually  are
penetrable in this way is unclear). 
2. The Varieties of Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism. 
My primary aim will be to argue that cases similar to those given by Siegel cause problems for
particular forms of testimonial anti-reductionism. However, strictly speaking these arguments can
also be taken to apply to certain conceivable brands of reductionism.  Furthermore, reductionist and
anti-reductionist theories are sometimes formulated in such a way that they fail to make predictions
about the cases I discuss.  Thus, I will endeavour in this section to clarify several different ways of
spelling out reductionist and anti-reductionist views of testimony, in order to get clear on which
views are rendered problematic by cases of cognitive penetration. 
The  distinctions  I  draw concern  different  stances  a  theorist  might  take  on  the  question  of  the
conditions  under  which  an  agent  has  an  epistemic  right  to  trust  in  their  own  linguistic
understanding. Thus, before getting into the distinctions it is worth saying a little about linguistic
understanding. When we hear others speak we hear their words as words, not as mere sounds.  We
hear assertions not as mere noises but as assertions, with a particular content.  It is as if we perceive
utterances as having a particular meaning and force.  Following Fricker (2003) let  us call  these
apparent perceptions of meaning and force 'quasi-perceptions'.  Quasi-perceptions appear to play a
centeral role in the normal process by which we acquire testimonial knowledge.  It is via our quasi-
perceptions  of  meaning  that  we  form  beliefs  about  what  is  said.   Arguably,  veridical  quasi-
perception is  necessary for understanding what  has been  said9293.  We will  distinguish different
92 It is unclear what constitutes a veridical quasi-perception of meaning, because it is unclear under what conditions a
speaker counts as having said that p.  Unfortunately there is not sufficient space to discuss the issue here. 
93 It is important to note that veridical quasi-perception is not required for knowledge of what is said, as you might find
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views of testimony in terms of their different commitments regarding whether or not we have a
default right to take our quasi-perceptions at face value.  
Reductionism and anti-reductionism about testimonial justification are usually thought of as views
concerning whether or not agents must, if their testimonial belief is to be justified, possess reasons
to  accept  testimony.  There  are  two  importantly  different  ways  in  which  such  views  might  be
formulated: They may be formulated as views about the conditions under which a testimonial belief
is  justified (that  is,  as  theories about  the epistemic status of  the belief  formed on the basis  of
testimony)(call these 'resultant belief' formulations), or they may be formulated as views regarding
the conditions under which one is warranted in transitioning from the belief or knowledge (or fact)
that a speaker has said that p, to a belief that p.  We might characterise a transitional version of
reductionism as the view that one requires reasons to trust the speaker in order to transition from 'S
said that p' to 'p'. Anti-reductionism would be the denial that such reasons are required.  Transitional
views obviously have implications for the epistemic status of the resultant  belief.  If  one needs
reasons to make the transition, but one makes the transition without the requisite reasons, then the
resultant belief will be unjustified.  However, transitional views do not tell the whole story, as they
say nothing about the agent's epistemic rights with regard to their own linguistic understanding.
Transitional  views  will  not  be  directly  challenged  by  the  arguments  presented  here,  as  the
arguments  I  present  concern whether  or  not  one has  a  default  entitlement  to  trust  one's  quasi-
perceptions. 
Reductionist and Anti-reductionist views are sometimes formulated not as views about  justification
but as views about knowledge.  Anti-reductionism about testimonial knowledge would be the view
that  testimonial  knowledge needn't  be  based  on inference or  positive  reasons possessed by the
speaker.  Reductionism would be the negation of this claim.  Views of testimonial knowledge are
best seen as resultant belief theories.  This is because, like resultant belief formulations of accounts
of  testimonial  justification,  they  assess  the  epistemic  status  of  the  belief  which  results  from
testimony, not the transition from the belief that 'S said that p' to 'p'.  One could maintain that an
audience can justifiably make this transition without positive reasons to trust the speaker, and still
maintain that testimonial knowledge requires positive reasons if one denied that audiences have a
default right to trust their quasi-perceptions. Thus, the cases I give here will also count against many
anti-reductionist views of testimonial knowledge. 
out that a speaker said that p by being told by another speaker that they said that p. 
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We can divide up the resultant belief versions of reductionism and anti-reductionism in terms of the
different claims which could be made about an agent's rights to trust in the credibility of one's
informant, and the rights one has to trust in one's own understanding.  Firstly, one could maintain
that in order for an agent's testimonial belief to be justified it is neither necessary that the agent have
reasons to trust in the credibility of the speaker, nor that they have reasons to trust in their own
understanding.    Such a  view would  endorse a  default  defeasible  right  to  move from a  quasi-
perception of the speaker as having asserted that p  to a belief that the speaker said that p, and a
defeasible right to move from a belief that the speaker testified that p to a belief that p.  Call this
view  'strong  anti-reductionism'.   Strong  anti-reductionism  corresponds  to  transitional  anti-
reductionism with the additional claim that one has a defeasible default right to trust one's own
understanding. It also corresponds closely to Tyler Burge's influential brand of anti-reductionsim94.
Strong anti-reductionism is required if one wishes to endorse Burge's claim that it is possible to gain
a priori testimonial knowledge.  
Burge's  (1993) argument  for  a priori  testimonial  knowledge runs roughly as  follows: firstly he
argues that perception plays a purely preservative role in understanding.  That is,  it introduces no
empirical information into the audience's reasoning, merely triggering understanding of the content
presented as true.  He draws an analogy between testimony and memory: the function of memory in
deductive  reasoning  is  merely  to  recall  propositions  previously  known,  and  present  them  to
consciousness.  No reasoning about memory itself is required.  With testimony it is, according to
Burge,  as if  we simply perceive what others have told us.  Perception presents the message to
consciousness without introducing any new content.  Our perception of the speaker's utterance plays
a merely causal role in our acquiring testimonial knowledge.  We perceive and de-code the message
without having to reason about the fact that the utterance was made, or the context in which it was
made95.  This part of Burge's argument corresponds closely to the claim that one has a default right
to trust one's own understanding.  
Secondly he argues that we have an a priori right to accept propositions presented to us as true.
That is, if something is presented to us as true then we have a defeasible right to accept it.  His
argument for this latter claim is a little murkier, relating to the way a system capable of presenting
propositions as true must be, in some way, systematically connected to the truth. This claim seems
94 Burge's endorsement of the right to not only trust the speaker, but also to trust one's own understanding is discussed
in Burge  (1993, 1997), Christensen and Kornblith (1997), and Malmgren (2006).
95 For objections to this part of Burge's argument see Bezuidenhout (1998), Christensen and Kornblith (1997), 
Longworth (2008), Malmgren (2006)
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to correspond to the notion that we have a right to transition from being told that p to the belief that
p.  The two claims together seem to allow for a priori testimonial knowledge. When an a priori
proposition is asserted the audience's perception will introduce no new subject matter, it will simply
present the a priori proposition to the agent's consciousness.  No a posteriori reasoning or reasons
play a justificatory role here.  Since the audience's entitlement to accept such presentations as true is
also a priori, the resultant knowledge will be a priori.  
Strong anti-reductionism will be my main target here.  Thus, one upshot will be that we cannot
achieve  a  priori  testimonial  knowledge.   Not  all  brands  of  anti-reductionism will  be  rendered
problematic.  One could conceivably be a credulist regarding the transition from 'S said that p' to 'p',
and  still  deny  the  default  right  hypothesis  with  respect  to  the  output  of  one's  own  linguistic
understanding. Call such a view 'weak anti-reductionism'.  Transitional anti-reductionist views are
neutral between strong and weak anti-reductionism. It might be initially unclear why one would
endorse  a  default  right  hypothesis  regarding  trust  in  the  speaker,  but  not  trust  in  one's  own
understanding.  After all,  we regularly reason about the credibility of our informants, but rarely
about  our  own  understanding.   However,  it  is  not  clear  that  the  main  motivations  for  anti-
reductionism motivate strong anti-reductionism over weak anti-reductionism.  For example, it  is
often claimed that reductionism is untenable since we frequently lack reasons to trust speakers even
when we are intuitively warranted in doing so.  However, it is less clear that we ever lack reasons to
trust  our  own  understanding.   Moreover,  arguments  such  as  those  presented  by  the  assurance
theorists concerning the way in which we see the speaker (as a source of evidence vs someone
offering their word) only seem to support credulist views about the move from 'S said that p' to 'p'.
They say nothing about our rights to trust our own understanding.  Thus, for all I say here it is
possible for one to maintain a weak anti-reductionist view96. 
Reductionist views can also be divided into strong and weak variants depending on the claims they
make about the audience's right to trust their own understanding.  A strong reductionist would claim
that  we  have  neither  a  default  right  to  trust  the  speaker,  nor  such  a  right  to  trust  our  own
understanding of the speaker.  A weak reductionist would maintain that we have a default right to
trust  our  understanding,  but  no  default  right  to  trust  the  speaker.   It  is  not  clear  that  weak
reductionism is really reductionist at all, as it still involves a distinctive default right.  That is, on
such views  one's  right  to  accept  testimony is  not  fully  reduced  to  one's  reasons  to  accept  the
96 This is not to say that the arguments definitely don't carry over, simply that it is not clear whether or not they do.  If 
the primary arguments for anti-reductionism support strong over weak anti-reductionism then the arguments of this 
chapter render anti-reductionism in general problematic.  
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testimony.  Weak reductionist views will also be rendered problematic by the cases of cognitive
penetrability.  
Usually when views of testimonial justification are formulated it is done so in terms of the agent's
rights with respect to p in cases where the speaker has said that p.  This is true of both transitional
and resultant belief formulations. That is, such views are normally formulated by reference to the
'good case': in cases in which the agent's understanding of the speaker is correct, does the agent
need reasons to trust the speaker, and to trust their own understanding of the speaker, in order to be
justified in believing that  p?  The views we have considered so far can be further divided on the
basis of the claims they make about what we might call the 'bad case'.  That is, they can be divided
in terms of what they say about cases in which the audience misunderstands the speaker.  In the
good case the audience has a quasi-perception of the speaker as having said that p, and the speaker
actually does say that p. In the bad case the audience has the same quasi-perception, but the speaker
does not actually say that p - the quasi-perception is misleading.  There are two stances a theorist
could take to each type of case.  Firstly one could maintain symmetry:  agents have the same rights
in the good case and the (phenomenologically indistinguishable) bad case.  Secondly, one could
endorse difference: despite the fact that the cases are phenomenologically indistinguishable agents
have  different  rights  in  each  case.   My target  here  will  be  strong anti-reductionists  and  weak
reductionists who endorse symmetry. 
Strong reductionists and weak anti-reductionists are likely to endorse symmetry.  After all, it is not
clear  why one  would  endorse  a  default  right  to  trust  one's  understanding  only  when  one  has
misunderstood the speaker.  Moreover, internalists of all stripes are likely to endorse symmetry.
This is because the good case and the bad case will be be phenomenologically indistinguishable to
the agent, meaning that the epistemic rights they have in each case should (for the internalist) be the
same.  Internalist strong anti-reductionists and internalist weak reductionists will have problems
with cases of cognitive penetrability.  
It is open to externalists to deny symmetry.  That is, it is open to externalists to claim that one has a
default  right  to  trust  one's  understanding  only  in  cases  in  which  one  understands  the  speaker
correctly.  However, this not to say that it is easy for externalists to deny symmetry.  Such a view is
problematic  for  several  reasons.   Firstly,  it  is  counter  intuitive.   Since  the  cases  are
phenomenologically indistinguishable to the agent it seems intuitive that the agent should have the
same  rights  in  each  case.   Of  course,  there  are  well  known responses  to  this  problem.   The
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externalist could simply maintain that the agent is rational or blameless for their belief in the bad
case, and claim that this captures intuitions to the contrary97. More problematic is the fact that the
externalist  credulist  is  not  exempt  from  providing  an  account  of  our  right  to  trust  our  own
understanding in the good case.  In order to deny symmetry the externalist anti-reductionist must
produce an account of our default right to trust our own understanding which does not predict that
we have a default right to trust our understanding in the bad case.  It is not clear quite how such a
theory  should  go.   For  example,  if  one  endorses  the  claim  that  we  are  entitled  to  trust  our
understanding in the good case because of the fact that our comprehension functions to produce true
beliefs, then one should claim that we are also entitled to trust our understanding in the bad case,
since we are still relying on a mechanism which functions to produce true beliefs98.  Alternatively it
might be claimed that our entitlement to rely on our understanding in the good case derives from the
fact that such reliance on our own understanding is generally reliable (reliance on our understanding
is a reliable way of gaining true beliefs about what is said).  However, this also seems to carry over
to the bad case.  It is just as true in the good and bad cases that our linguistic understanding is
generally reliable (which is not to say that, generally, our linguistic understanding is reliable in the
good  and  bad  case).   Indeed,  one  could  simply  think  of  the  general  reliability  claim  as  the
hypothesis  that there are significantly more good cases than bad cases.  Thus, many externalist
strong anti reductionists (and many externalist weak reductionists, if there are any such theorists)
will also be forced to endorse symmetry. 
My primary target  will  be strong anti-reductionists  who endorse  symmetry (call  such theorists
'symmetrical strong anti-reductionists').  Strong anti-reductionism combined with symmetry entails
that one has a defeasible default right to believe that  p whenever one has a quasi-perception of a
speaker as having said that p, regardless of whether or not the speaker actually did say that p. This
will run into problems in some cases of miscommunication which arise from cognitively penetrated
quasi-perceptions.  In these cases a belief formed on the bases of the quasi-perception would be
intuitively unjustified. 
97 In the cases discussed in the next section (especially the interpretation based cases) it appears that the agents 
involved may be blameworthy and irrational.  So this strategy will not be completely straightforward.  However, I 
believe that it is open to the externalist to claim that the agent is blameworthy and irrational in the cases presented 
here, yet blameless and rational in more standard cases of misunderstanding where the agent involved is not at fault 
in their misunderstanding. 
98 Burge (1993) can arguably be read this way, as can Graham (2010).  For a similar view applied to perception see 
Schellenberg (2013)
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3. Cognitively Penetrated Quasi-Perception.
In order to understand how quasi-perceptions can be cognitively penetrated, and to understand the
relation  between  cognitive  penetration  of  perceptual  states  and  cognitive  penetration  of  quasi-
perceptual  states,  it  is  worth  considering  two distinct  components  of  quasi-perception,  both  of
which which might be influenced by background beliefs, attitudes, and associative mental states99.
The contents of our quasi-perceptions are determined by our perceptions of certain sounds as words,
and our  assignment  of  meaning to  those words  (as  well  as  other  factors  such as  our  grasp of
underlying syntax).  Let us consider speech perception first, as it is closer to Siegel's primary target
and, as a form of perception, plausibly falls under the scope of her original arguments.
3.1. Speech Perception.
As discussed in the previous chapter, judgements about the beliefs, interests, and backgrounds of
other interlocutors generate expectations concerning what they are likely to say,  and thus about
what  words  they  are  likely  to  use,  and  there  is  reason  to  suspect  that  these  judgements  and
expectations influence speech perception.  Firstly, if Siegel is correct about perception in general
being  cognitively  penetrable  then  it  follows  that  auditory  perception  should  be  cognitively
penetrable100 (although Siegel focuses on visual perception, she does take her arguments to extend
to  other  types  of  perception).   Moreover,  as  noted  in  chapter  five,  it  is  seemingly common to
mistake one word for another on the basis of expectations about what a speaker is likely to say.
Chapter five considered a case in which an audience member is in a noisy bar talking to what
appears to be a business man, and mishears his utterance of 'I work on current opinions of markets'
as 'I work on currency options markets'.  This is an intuitively plausible case in which an agent's
background  beliefs  and  attitudes  can  have  an  impact  on  their  speech  perception,  leading  to  a
miscommunication.  This case, although clearly epistemically problematic, doesn't seem to generate
a problem for symmetrical strong anti-reductionists, as it seems plausible that the belief formed on
the basis of this miscommunication is justified and rational. However,we can easily alter it so it falls
in line with Siegel's examples: 
99 I use the term 'components' loosely here.  I do not mean to take a stand on the question of whether quasi-perceptions
are composite states, or whether such a notion even makes sense. 
100 As in the case of visual perception it is ultimately an empirical question whether speech perception is cognitively
penetrable.  
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INVESTMENT ADVICE:  Sally has been tasked with headhunting an expert in currency
swap  options.   However,  she  has  been  as  yet  unsuccessful,  and  is  getting  increasingly
desperate. When she enters a bar and sees a man wearing jeans and a smart shirt she, purely
through wishful thinking, forms the belief that he is an expert on currency options. As it
happens he is actually a social scientist who works on public opinions of markets.  Sally
asks him what he works on and he says 'I work on current opinions of markets'.  However,
due to her expectations (based on her wishful thinking) she hears him as having said 'I work
on currency options markets'. Sally takes this apparent testimony at face value, and takes it
to confirm her prior belief that the man works on currency options. 
This case seems no less plausible than Siegel's cases of cognitively penetrated visual perception.
Sally has a quasi-perception of the man as having asserted that  he works on currency options.
Moreover, it does not look as if Sally possesses any defeaters concerning either her understanding,
or the claim that the man works on currency options.  The bar needn't be especially noisy,  the
assertion  may well  have  sounded clear  to  Sally,  and the  man's  appearance  provides  very little
evidence concerning his occupation. The symmetrical strong anti-reductionist holds that if one has a
quasi-perception as of the speaker saying p, and one has no reason to doubt the speaker, then one is
justified in believing that p. Thus symmetrical strong anti-reductionism predicts that Sally's belief is
justified.  This is the wrong prediction.  Sally's belief seems to have the same problematic features
as Jill's belief that Jack is angry.  It seems intuitively unjustified.  It seems to involve an implicit
move which, if explicit, would be judged to be straightforwardly irrational.  And it seems circular,
since her seemingly testimonial belief that the man is an expert on currency options depends on her
prior belief that he is an expert on currency options. It seems that the symmetrical weak reductionist
will make the wrong prediction here too.  After all, Sally surely has most of the usual evidence we
have  of  speaker  reliability  when  talking  to  strangers.   Thus,  if  she  has  a  right  to  trust  her
understanding, and the case is parallel to other cases in which we have reasons to trust the testimony
of a stranger, then she should, according to the symmetrical weak reductionist, be justified.
This case does seem problematic for the strong symmetrical anti-reductionist.  However, it is not
conclusive. Assuming that auditory perception is a-rational, it might be argued that once Sally has
heard the speaker as uttering the words "I work on currency options markets" she has no rational
choice but to accept that the speaker works on currency options.  After all, she surely cannot be
rationally criticised for hearing particular words.  This would be like rationally criticising someone
for having a hallucination.  It might then be maintained that if Sally cannot be rationally criticised
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then her belief is rational and/or justified.  The viability of this response will depend on what one
takes to be the relationship between rationality, justification, and blameworthiness.  However, we
needn't get into such issues here, as it will be argued in the following section that parallel arguments
cannot be given in response to interpretational versions of cognitive penetrability cases.  This is
because, it will be argued, quasi-perceptions can, in some circumstances, be criticised as irrational.
In cases of simple mishearing it would be inappropriate to criticise an agent for their defective
quasi-perception.   However,  in  cases  of  misinterpretation  it  will  sometimes  be  appropriate  to
criticise agents for their quasi-perception. 
We  have  seen  that  cases  involving  cognitively  penetrated  speech  perception  are  inconclusive.
Moreover,  it  is  not  clear  that  the  type  of  cognitive  penetration  just  discussed  is  interestingly
different from the phenomena discussed by Siegel.  After all,  it  just seems to involve cognitive
penetration of our perception of the audible sounds produced by a speaker.  That this is a possibility
follows straightforwardly from Siegel's general claim that perception is cognitively penetrable. This
result will be completely unsurprising to those who already accept Siegel's arguments, and it will be
unpersuasive for those who already reject them.  Thus it is worth considering a second way in
which quasi-perception can be cognitively penetrated. 
3.2. Interpretation.
It has been a theme of the previous chapters that much of language is context sensitive, and that
even semantically context insensitive assertions are often interpreted in a way that is sensitive to the
needs of the context.  For example, consider the term 'vulnerable'. This is not standardly seen as a
context sensitive term.  However, as we saw in chapter five, it can be used and understood in subtly
different ways in different contexts.  Consider two speakers, one is a member of a charity which
provides blankets, food, and heating for old people living in poverty, the other is a member of a
criminal gang who brazenly steals from old people who are unable to put up a fight.  An utterance
of 'Alice is vulnerable' will mean subtly (but importantly) different things in the mouths of each
speaker  (at  least,  in  contexts  where  they  are  planning  their  respective  activities).   For  one
'vulnerable'  will  mean  'at  risk  from  hunger  and  the  cold'  (this  reading  will  be  denoted  as
'vulnerable1'), for  the  other  it  will  mean  'an  easy/helpless  target'  (this  will  be  denoted  as
'vulnerable2'101).   Thus,  the way we understand utterances  containing  the  word 'vulnerable'  will
101 It is important to note that these two readings are genuinely distinct.  There are people who may fall in the extension
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depend on the way we modulate the term (and whether or not we do modulate it) in response to the
needs of the context.  Since we rely on our representation of the context in assigning meaning, it
should be clear that misrepresentations of the context can lead to misinterpretation.  For example, if
one falsely believed that the speaker of 'Alice is vulnerable' were a member of the criminal gang
planning  a  robbery,  then  one  would  likely  misinterpret  the  speaker  as  saying  that  Alice  is
vulnerable2. 
Our  quasi-perceptions  of  utterances  are  perception  like  experiences  of  utterances  as  having  a
particular meaning.  The phenomenology of context sensitive or modulated speech perception is no
different  to  that  of  context  insensitive  speech perception  (if  there  is  such a  thing).   Thus,  the
background representations which determine our modulations or assignment of meanings to context
sensitive terms affect the contents of our quasi-perceptions.  This would be the case even if our
actual  perception  of  the  words  spoken  (and  perception  more  generally)  were  cognitively
impenetrable.  The influence of background representations of the speaker on our assignments of
meaning can generate cases in which justification and rationality is undermined.  The case of Tom
Robinson discussed in chapter five provides a plausible example of this.  Indeed, we can conceive a
case based on that of Tom Robinson which is directly analogous to Siegel's examples:
RACIST JACK: Tom, a black man, has been falsely accused of stealing from Alice, an old
woman living in poverty.  Jack, a racist, is on the jury.  As it happens Tom was simply in the
wrong  place  at  the  wrong  time.  He  was  at  Alice's  home  intending  to  offer  her  help.
However, a robbery was in progress as he entered the premises. At the start of the trial Jack
forms the belief  that Tom is guilty for no other reason than the colour of his  skin.   He
congers up a narrative in which Tom had been scheming to steal from poor defenceless
Alice. So when Tom is asked why he was at Alice's residence, and he replies 'because she
was vulnerable'  Jack naturally interprets Tom as having revealed that he saw Alice as an
easy target.  He takes this to confirm his prior belief that Tom saw Alice as an easy victim,
and that he was in fact the robber. 
In this case Jack quasi-perceives Tom as saying that he saw Alice as vulnerable2.  We can imagine
that he possessed no defeaters concerning his own understanding or Tom's actual attitude102.  Thus,
he is, according to symmetrical strong anti-reductionism, justified in believing on the basis of his
of vulnerable1 but not vulnerable2.  For example, a poor old lady trained in krav maga. 
102 We can imagine that this took place at the start of the trial when Jack had very little information concerning Tom's
innocence. 
148
quasi-perception that Tom saw Alice as vulnerable2.  His belief here seems clearly unjustified.  And
it  also  seems  viciously  circular,  as  it  is  reliant  on  his  previous  belief  that  Tom saw Alice  as
vulnerable2, a belief he formed purely on the basis of Tom's race.  Thus, symmetrical strong anti-
reductionism is once again rendered untenable.  Moreover, this conclusion holds even if Siegel is
wrong about the cognitive penetrability of perceptual states.  Thus the case against symmetrical
strong anti-reductionism seems stronger than the case against perceptual dogmatism. 
In the  previous section it was noted that the symmetrical strong anti-reductionist might bite the
bullet and maintain that Sally was justified.  The reasoning was that Sally cannot be blamed or
judged irrational for mishearing the speaker.  A similar worry may arise here. That is, one might still
worry that,  since Jack possesses no defeaters,  he cannot be rationally criticised for trusting his
understanding, and is therefore not rationally criticisable for his belief.  This would be a mistake.
Unlike  the case  of  perceptual  seemings (including penetration of  speech perception)  which are
arguably a-rational, we can be rationally criticised for our quasi-perceptions.  For example, people
who's quasi-perceptions fail to track contextual evidence seem to be rationally criticisable.  Suppose
you point very clearly at an apple and say 'that is my apple'.  If I were to see your gesture and yet
still misunderstand you and take you to be talking about a different apple, despite your very clear
gesture, you would be within your rights to criticise me.  This is not the case for faulty perceptual
seemings.   For  example,  if  I  hallucinated,  or  merely  had  some  strange  preoccupation  with  a
particular apple which caused me to actually perceive you as pointing to that apple then you would
not be able to hold me accountable for any epistemic wrongdoing.  But if I clearly saw you point at
the intended apple you would be able to hold me responsible.  Indeed, I would surely be irrational if
I were to see your clear gesture and yet still take you to be talking about a different, contextually
non-salient apple.  The upshot of this  is  that even if  Jack can't  be criticised for the move from
understanding to  belief  he can  be  criticised  for  his  understanding.   Thus  his  over  all  belief  is
rendered  criticisably  irrational.  Indeed,  the  notion  that  Sally  might  be  justified,  whilst  Jack  is
unjustified,  seems  to  pattern  well  with  intuitions  about  the  cases.   Intuitively  Jack's  belief  is
epistemically worse than Sally's, and this fact cries out for explanation103.  An obvious explanation
for this is that Jack's belief, unlike Sally's is unjustified. 
The notion that quasi-perceptions can be judged rational or irrational also serves to illustrate why an
103 If it is not initially clear that Jack's mistake is worse than Sally's consider the fact that Sally at least appeared to hear
the words "I work on currency options markets".  It is practically unheard of to criticise someone for mishearing an
utterance.   It is, however, fairly common to criticise audiences for misinterpreting speakers.  We will return to this point
shortly. 
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important response to Siegel's arguments against perceptual dogmatism does not carry over to the
cases presented here. Siegel (2013) discusses several features which separate perceptual seemings
from beliefs, and argues that these features cannot be the features which allow beliefs to transmit
their ill-foundedness, meaning that whatever features do allow beliefs to transmit ill-foundedness
are shared with perceptual seemings.  Richard Fumerton (2013) responds, arguing that the rational
assessability of beliefs accounts for their ability to transmit irrationality.  Perceptual seemings may
have  rationally  assessable  etiologies,  but  they  are  not  themselves  rationally  assessable.   Thus,
perceptual  seemings do  not  share  with  beliefs  the  feature  which  allows  beliefs  to  transmit  ill-
foundedness.  This objection does not carry over to the testimonial case since quasi-perceptions, as
we  have  just  seen,  do  seem  to  be  rationally  assessable.  Thus,  if  Fumerton  is  correct,  quasi-
perceptions share with beliefs the features which allow beliefs to transmit ill-foundedness.
The claim that quasi-perceptions can, in some cases, be rationally criticisable will be buttressed in
the next section where, in response to Jack Lyons's response to Siegel's argument, it is argued that
quasi-perceptions can be based. 
4. Response: Circularity and Basing. 
Perceptual seemings are importantly different from beliefs, and the differences between the two
have been a source of several objections to Siegel's arguments. One such difference, discussed in
the previous section, is the ability of beliefs, and inability of perceptual seemings to be irrational.  A
second important (and related) difference is the ability of beliefs to be based. It is argued in this
section that quasi-perceptions,  are not only rationally criticisable,  but are also capable of being
based.  
 
Jack Lyons (2011) argues that the problem with cognitive penetrability cannot be that it allows for
viciously circular beliefs to be justified104.   The reason for this is that circularity is a matter of
improper basing. That is, epistemic circularity occurs when an agent's only evidence for a belief B1
is  either  a  prior  belief  in  B1,  or  is  epistemically  dependent  on  the  agent's  prior  belief  in  B1.
However, as Lyons points out, perceptual seemings to not not appear to be the sort of things which
104 Lyons does not claim that the agents in Siegel's cases are justified, rather he claims that they are unjustified because 
their beliefs are unreliably formed.  He takes Siegel's cases to motivate a reliablist view of justification.  I do not 
wish to commit to a reliablist view of justification.  Thus I wish to avoid accounting for the lack of justification in 
these cases in terms of reliability.  Moreover, as noted in section two, I think it is plausible that many reliablist 
theories of our right to trust our understanding will also make the wrong predictions about these cases. 
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are 'based'. You cannot receive evidence for or against a perceptual seeming, they are not responsive
to reasons.  It does not make sense to ask someone why they see a banana as yellow for example.
The answer will simply be 'because it is yellow', or 'it just looks yellow'. The existence of cognitive
penetration appears to show that perceptual seemings can be causally based on prior beliefs.  But
this is not sufficient for circularity, circularity requires epistemic evidence responsiveness. 
Indeed, one of the guiding thoughts in Siegel's (2013) development of her argument is that beliefs
based on checkered experiences may not be based on the checkering process.  She points out that if
a belief B1 is based on another belief B2 then a change in B2 will usually trigger a change in B1.
However, we rarely adjust beliefs based on a checkered experiences in response to changes in the
checkering  state.  For  example,  if  one  were  petrified  of  guns,  and this  fear  caused  one  to  see
something in one's fridge as a gun, then one would not lose one's belief that there was a gun in the
fridge upon losing one's fear of guns.  You would still think that you saw a gun. Siegel's (2013)
formulation of the problem moves away from the circularity claim and avoids any suggestion that
the problematiic beliefs are based on the checkering process.  Instead she considers ways in which
checkered experiences differ from beliefs, and argues that none of these differences explain why
beliefs, but not perceptual seemings, are able to transmit ill-foundedness.  
It might be thought that these worries extend to the testimonial version of the problem.  That is, it
might appear that quasi-perceptions are not the kind of things which can be based either. After all,
the phenomenology of quasi-perception is similar to that of normal perception. When we explicitly
reason regarding the meaning of someone's utterance it might be thought that the resultant state of
understanding is not really a quasi-perception (after all, one of the distinguishing features of quasi-
perceptions was their phenomenology, and the resultant state here may have a markedly different
phenomenology). 
Before responding to this worry it is worth putting to one side a bad reason to think that quasi
perceptions can be based:  Some theorists maintain that states of linguistic understanding are simply
states of belief (or knowledge). For example, some cognitivist accounts of  linguistic understanding
hold  that  such  understanding  consists  in,  or  requires,  belief  or  knowledge  of  a  compositional
semantic and syntactic theory105.  Thus, it might be thought that states of linguistic understanding,
being beliefs, can obviously be based. This line of argument is unconvincing. Even if the cognitivist
105 Pettit  (2002)  argues,  on  epistemic  grounds,  that  linguistic  understanding does  not  require  knowledge or  belief
concerning meaning.  Gross (2005) defends the belief hypothesis against Pettit's attack. 
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is correct that states of understanding are states of belief, such beliefs are purely tacit.  Thus, it is an
open question whether they are genuinely evidence responsive like normal beliefs. Moreover, the
perception-like phenomenology of quasi-perceptions gives us good reason to distinguish them from
beliefs. However, beliefs are not the only things which are susceptible to basing.  For example, fears
or suspicions can be justified or unjustified, and based on prior beliefs and attitudes.  So the mere
fact that quasi-perceptions are not beliefs does not give us reason to conclude that they cannot be
based.   Moreover,  there  are  important  differences  between  perceptual  seemings  and  quasi-
perceptions which lend credence to the hypothesis that quasi-perceptions can be based.  
Siegel's  main reason for avoiding the claim that checkered beliefs are based on the checkering
process is that a change in the penetrating state will not usually trigger a change in the checkered
belief.  This claim has less plausibility in the case of checkered testimonial belief.  We experience
miscommunication often, and we are accustomed to adjusting our beliefs about what we have been
told when we adjust our conception of the speaker (and their character, goals, and knowledge etc.).
Sometimes these reassessments are explicit, other times they merely affect the way that we recall a
situation.  For example, suppose that racist Jack has an epiphany and realises that his racist views
were wrong all along.  This is likely to cause him to see many of his past interactions with black
people  in  a  new light.  His  quasi-perception  of  Tom as  saying  that  Alice  was  vulnerable2 was
penetrated by an picture he had built  up of Tom as a predatory scheming criminal.   Once this
conception is reversed Jack is likely to see Tom's utterance in a new light, and revise his belief. This
revisability in response to altered conceptions of the social situation or speaker is a feature which
testimonial beliefs do not seem to share with perceptual beliefs.   These considerations seem to
suggest that in the case of testimony the resultant beliefs may be partly based on the checkering
process. 
Additionally,  it  seems  that  quasi-perceptions,  unlike  perceptual  seemings,  can  sometimes  be
retrospectively rationalised and justified.  For example, if someone points to an apple and says 'that
is red' you will have a quasi-perception of their utterance as meaning that the particular apple they
are pointing at is red.  If asked why you understood the speaker as saying that the apple was red you
would be able to quickly respond 'because I saw her pointing at the apple'.  This suggests that your
quasi-perception  was  evidence  responsive.   That  is,  it  was  partially  based  on  your  perceptual
experience  of  the  speaker  pointing  to  a  particular  apple.   This  apparent  basing  seems  to  be
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accessible  to  consciousness,  even though the phenomenology is  non-inferential106.   Indeed,  this
ability of quasi-perceptions to be retrospectively rationalised not only supports the hypothesis that
they can be based, but also that they are capable of being rational or irrational.  Moreover, the
rational flaw in the cases of seemingly irrational quasi-perception (where the speaker clearly points
to a particular object, yet a different referent is assigned) seems to be that the quasi-perception is not
properly evidence responsive (and thus badly based).  Thus, the cases discussed at the end of the
previous section also seem to support the hypothesis that quasi-perceptions can be based. As a
result, Lyons's argument against the circularity formulation of Siegel's argument does not carry over
to the testimonial variant of the argument.
5. Response: Defeaters and Monitoring.
I have argued that symmetrical strong anti-reductionism makes the wrong predictions about cases in
which the audience inexcusably misinterprets  the speaker and forms an unjustified belief.   The
symmetrical strong anti-reductionist might claim that they do not actually make the problematic
predictions,  since  most  forms  of  anti-reductionism contain  a  no  defeater  clause,  and there  are
defeaters present in the cases presented above.  This thought could be spelled out different ways.  It
could be spelled out in terms of subpersonal monitoring for signs of unreliability, or it could be
spelled out in terms of the agents in the cases actually possessing defeaters to the claim that their
understanding is reliable. 
The monitoring theorist will maintain that although audiences need not possess positive reasons to
trust the speaker or their own understanding, they must nonetheless be sensitive to signs that their
understanding (or the speaker) is unreliable.  It is not clear that such a view is really a form of anti-
reductionism.  Indeed, it seems to be a version of Elizabeth Fricker's local reductionism.  However,
it  might be thought that if  the monitoring is subpersonal then it  does not constitute part of the
audience's agent level reasoning.  Thus it might be thought that such subpersonal monitoring is
compatible with anti-reductionism (see Goldberg and Henderson (2006) for a  view along these
lines,  see  Fricker  (2006b) for  a  response).   If  subpersonal  monitoring is  compatible  with anti-
106 Indeed, considerations along these lines have been taken to show that linguistic understanding consists in inferential
propositional knowledge (for example, Stanley (2005)).  Stanley argues that linguistic understanding is always based
on contextual knowledge because such knowledge is required in order for us to tell whether or not an assertion
violates the gricean maxim of manner, and thus whether or not it should be interpreted literally. However, even if we
do not accept such an extreme conclusion, these considerations still seem strongly suggestive of the hypothesis that
states of quasi-perception, despite their phenomenology, can be based. 
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reductionism then it might be claimed that we monitor for signs that we have misinterpreted the
speaker.  We might, for example, be sensitive to indicators such as hearing exactly what we wanted
to hear, which indicate that wishful thinking has played a part in interpretation.  
The monitoring response is problematic.  It might provide a plausible account of the Sally case,
however not all cases of problematically penetrated quasi-perception involve deviant causes such as
wishful thinking.  Some merely involve background mental states (such as attitudes and beliefs)
influencing interpretation the same way they do in the good case.  For example, in cases of semantic
context sensitivity or modulation we rely on our representation of the speaker in determining the
correct interpretation.  Many of the problem cases arise when these background representations of
the context are themselves irrationally formed.  The actual process by which these representations
are drawn upon in order to determine an interpretation are the same across both the good and bad
cases (this seems to be the case with Racist Jack).  Thus in many cases there is nothing unusual
about  the  quasi-perception for  the  sub-personal  monitoring mechanism to pick up on (at  least,
nothing that it would not pick up on in the good case as well). 
A second version of the defeater response holds that the agents in the cases I have presented possess
positive defeaters for their beliefs.  That is, it might be thought that the majority of adult speakers
have enough experience to know the sorts of situations in which they are likely to misinterpret
people.  The plausibility of this response will depend on the defeaters which are postulated.  Once
again  the  response  seems to  work  better  for  Sally than  for  Jack.  Perhaps  any agent  in  Sally's
situation could be expected to  be weary of their  interpretation.  After  all,  we all  know that  we
sometimes misinterpret people in high stakes situations, especially when we really want to hear a
particular thing.  It is harder to see what defeater Jack might possess.  For example, it is unlikely
that he possesses any defeaters concerning his ability to interpret black people in an unbiased way. I
think that the most promising way to develop this objection is to hold that there are certain very
general defeaters possessed by all adult speakers which serve to block default trust in one's quasi-
perceptions in almost all cases.  For example, every adult speaker is surely aware of the fact that we
sometimes  misinterpret  one-another.  Perhaps  this  serves  as  a  defeater  to  Jack's  reliance  on his
understanding.  Of course this defeater is also present in the good cases, so we would have to
maintain that the default right of adult speakers to rely on their understanding is always defeated.
However, this might not be seen as a problem.  After all, it might be thought that adults possess
enough positive and negative information that they do not need to rely on default rights to achieve
testimonial knowledge.  On such a view anti-reductionism and reductionism will only differ in their
154
predictions about the testimonial beliefs of small children. 
Unfortunately,  even  the  general  defeater  approach  will  not  vindicate  symmetrical  strong  anti-
reductionism.  This is because we can produce cases of problematic cognitive penetration involving
small  children  who  are  not  yet  experienced  enough  to  possess  general  beliefs  about
miscommunication.  Consider the following case:
MARBLES: Tommy, a small child, has a collection of marbles.  He is very proud of his
marbles, and he thinks of them constantly.  As a result, whenever anyone talks about marbles
he takes them to be talking about his marbles (even when he has no reason to think they
would  know about  his  marbles).   One day at  playgroup  the  playgroup  leader  says  'the
marbles are very special', intending to refer to the marbles available for the children at the
play group.  However, Tommy misinterprets the playgroup leader and takes her to be talking
about his marbles (despite the fact that he has no reason to think that he knows about his
marbles).  Indeed, he does so partly on the basis of his prior belief that his marbles are very
special.  Tommy thus reaffirms his belief that his marbles are special. 
In this case Tommy has a quasi-perception of the playgroup leader as saying that his marbles are
very special. Symmetrical strong anti-reductionism holds that if one has a quasi-perception of a
speaker as saying p and one has no reason to either distrust the speaker or one's own understanding,
then one is justified in believing that p.   Tommy does not possess any defeaters.  He has no positive
reason to distrust his play group instructor (indeed, we might maintain that she has always been a
highly reliable informant, as people often are with children).  Moreover, Tommy is too young to
possess any defeaters concerning the general reliability of his ability to interpret others.   He might
not  even  be  aware  of  the  phenomenon  of  misinterpretation.  Thus,  symmetrical  strong  anti-
reductionism predicts that Tommy's belief is justified.  However, his belief is surely not justified.
Indeed,  it  seems  problematic  in  much  the  same  way  as  racist  Jack's  belief  (that  is,  it  seems
epistemically problematic in the same way.  Jack's belief was also morally problematic).  Thus,
symmetrical strong anti-reductionism still makes the wrong prediction.
6. Conclusion. 
I have outlined a series of cases in which symmetrical strong anti-reductionism appears to make the
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wrong predictions  about  whether  or  not  an agent's  belief  is  justified.   These  cases  all  involve
cognitively penetrated quasi-perceptions, and are analogous to the cases of cognitively penetrated
perception presented by Susanna Siegel in response to perceptual dogmatism. Whilst discussing
these cases I illustrated several important similarities and dissimilarities between quasi-perception,
beliefs,  and  perceptual  seemings,  and  used  these  analogies  to  argue  that  the  case  against
symmetrical  strong  anti-reductionism  is  stronger  than  the  case  against  perceptual  dogmatism.
Strong  anti-reductionism  is  required  to  support  the  claim  that  there  is  a  priori  testimonial
knowledge.  Thus, if one wishes to endorse a priori testimonial knowledge one must endorse non-
symmetrical strong anti-reductionism.  In order to do so it is necessary to produce an account of our
default right to trust in our understanding in the good case which does not carry over to the bad
case.   I have not argued that such an account cannot be given.  However, it is unclear how it would
go, and the onus is on the proponent of a priori testimonial knowledge to give such an account. 
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